Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 8

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Subjektivita, svoboda a obnova. Přítomnost Patočkova myšlení v Polsku

100%
Płotka W.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2020
|
vol. 68
|
issue 2
201-221
EN
The article attempts to systematize the reception of Jan Patočka’s thought in Polish philosophy and phenomenology. The author argues that Patočka’s philosophy resonated in Poland on three different levels: 1) the theory of subjectivity, and the concept of a-subjective phenomenology; 2) practical philosophy, and the problem of freedom and responsibility; 3) a socio-political dimension that involves both the actual political meaning of the idea of care for the soul and a theoretical reflection on the limits of such a political involvement. The very first reaction in Poland on Patočka’s thought is Tadeusz Kroński’s critical review, published in 1939, of Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém (The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem). As the author shows, Kroński’s subjective reading is later redefined in the light of a-subjective phenomenology, and finally develops the popular exposition of phenomenology as a theory into a form of questioning (e.g., Tischner, Michalski).
CS
Článek usiluje o systematický pohled na recepci Patočkova myšlení v polské filosofii a fenomenologii. Autor dovozuje, že Patočkova filosofie našla v Polsku ohlas na třech úrovních: 1) jako teorie subjektivity a koncepce asubjektivní fenomenologie; 2) jako praktická filosofie a jako tematizace problému svobody a odpovědnosti; 3) ve společensko-politické dimenzi zahrnující jednak politický výklad myšlenky péče o duši, jednak teoretickou reflexi mezí takového výkladu. První polskou reakcí na Patočkovo myšlení byla recenze Tadeuzse Krońského na Patočkův Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém, publikovaná r. 1939. Jak autor ukazuje, Krońského výklad zdůrazňující subjektivitu byl později redefinován ve světle asubjektivní fenomenologie; fenomenologie, tradičně pojímaná jako teorie, byla nakonec pochopena jako forma problematizujícího tázání (např. u Tischnera a Michalského).
DE
Der Artikel bemüht sich um eine systematische Erfassung der Rezeption von Patočkas Denken in der polnischen Philosophie und Phänomenologie. Der Autor erläutert, dass Patočkas Philosophie in Polen auf dreierlei Ebene Anklang fand: 1) als Theorie der Subjektivität und Konzeption der asubjektiven Phänomenologie; 2) als praktische Philosophie und als Thematisierung des Problems von Freiheit und Verantwortung; 3) in der gesellschaftlich-politischen Dimension, die zum Einen eine politische Auslegung des Gedankens der Sorge für die Seele umfasst, zum Anderen eine theoretische Reflexion der Grenzen einer solchen Auslegung. Die erste polnische Reaktion auf Patočkas Denken war die Rezension von Tadeuzs Kroński zu Patočkas 1939 veröffentlichtem Werk Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém (Die natürliche Welt als philosophisches Problem). Wie der Autor zeigt, wurde Krońskis Interpretation, in der die Subjektivität betont wird, später im Lichte der asubjektiven Phänomenlogoie neu definiert; die traditionell als Theorie aufgefasste Phänomenologie wurde letztlich (z. B. bei Tischner und Michalski) als eine Form der problematisierenden Fragestellung begriffen.
2
Content available remote

O fenomenologii Boga i religii w projekcie filozoficznym Edmunda Husserla

100%
Płotka W.
Filo-Sofija
|
2009
|
vol. 9
|
issue 9
115-132
EN
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology could be pointed as a source of a long-term tradition of considering the question of God. Such thinkers as: Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Lévinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Robert Sokolowski, Henry Duméry, or Gerardus van der Leeuw used the phenomenological method to investigate the problem of God. Although all of them were connected with the phenomenological movement, none of them posed the question about the notion of God in Husserl’s phenomenology itself. This article aims at fulfilling the mentioned lack. Additionally, the article discusses the relation between Husserl – a Christian and Husserl – a philosopher. Furthermore, after introducing the phenomenological idea of reduction, three notions of God are indicated within Husserl’s phenomenology. Firstly, an operative notion of God as the model for a perfect cognition is analyzed. Secondly, Husserl uses a descriptive notion where God is equal to the moral order of the society. Thirdly, a transcendental notion of God is understood as teleology. The three notions present phenomenology as a way leading from methodological atheism to the anticipation of the ultimate God.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Phenomenology between internalism and externalism. Problem statement

100%
Płotka W.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
|
2020
|
vol. 56
|
issue S1
187-206
EN
The article is an attempt at establishing a theoretical basis for a dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary philosophy, with regard to the problem of internalism-externalism. It is argued, according to Roman Ingarden, that one has to first of all put forward an adequate question about the problem, to be able to understand it appropriately. Moreover, the analysis is limited to the two forms of the internalism-externalism debate, namely semantics and the philosophy of the mind. Within Husserl’s phenomenology one can easily point to basic intuitions that justify thesis that this philosophy refers to the internalism-externalism problem. Ultimately, by using phenomenological terminology, the article arrives at questions about possible internalism-or-externalism within Husserl’s phenomenological project. The questions, however, suggest that phenomenology can be neither clearly nor completely classified either as internalism or as externalism.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Czy działania opierają się na reprezentacjach? Kognitywistyka a praktyka

100%
Płotka W.
Rocznik Kognitywistyczny
|
2011
|
vol. 5
159-165
EN
The article, by referring to the computational theory of thinking and Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind, argues that both theories presuppose an understanding of activity as a process reducible to a set of rules. The author rejects the presupposition and sketches an alternative view on action; the alternative view justifies a necessity of building connectionist models of neural networks and it leads to a formulation of hypothesis of extended, embodied and embedded mind.
5
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Prolegomena do fenomenologii anomalii

100%
Płotka W.
Rocznik Kognitywistyczny
|
2010
|
vol. 4
PL
Prolegomena to the Phenomenology of AnomaliesNowadays, phenomenology presents one of the paradigmatic ways of conducting research in the cognitive sciences. Referring to these studies and to considerations of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, this paper makes attempts to formulate the methodological foundations for the inquiry of anomalies. Phenomenological apprehension of anomaly does not only present it as a deviation from the norm, but – highlighting the roots of anomalies in the body of the acting subject – it considers anomaly in the context of experience, world and intersubjectivity as an optimum. Thus, phenomenology allows to inquire anomalies as the „other” normality.
6
Content available remote

Psychologia opisowa na nowo odczytana? Szkic o metodzie w filozofii Leopolda Blausteina

100%
Płotka W.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
|
2020
|
vol. 15
|
issue 1
71 - 91
EN
The main purpose of the article is to define the framework in which one can situate Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy. The author focuses on the question of the method which is used by Blaustein and he situates it in the historical-philosophical context. The article defends the thesis that Blaustein uses a method which can be labelled as a phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology that is close to, though not identical with, Edmund Husserl’s project as formulated in the first edition of his Logical Investigations and that is connected to Husserl’s 1925 lectures on the phenomenological psychology. The article is divided into four parts. In the first part, the author disputes the one-sided classifications of Blaustein’s philosophy either as a continuator of the analytical tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School, or as a mere repetition of Husserl’s achievements. In the next part, the author sketches an intellectual biography of Blaustein and on this basis he defines the context in which one has to situate this thought. In this regard, two further parts of the article are devoted to two sources of inspiration for Blaustein. In the third part, a selection of methods and concepts of descriptive psychology are examined, and in the last part of the article, references to Husserl’s phenomenology are explored.
7
Content available remote

U źródeł krytyki teorii poznania w szkole frankfurckiej

100%
Płotka W.
Filo-Sofija
|
2011
|
vol. 11
|
issue 2-3(13-14)
769-790
EN
The author argues that the Frankfurt School’s critique of phenomenology as the theory of cognition (as defined by Theodore W. Adorno) is unjustified. The article is divided into five main parts. In the first part, historical, as well as theoretical relations between the two philosophical currents are reconstructed. In the second part, Adorno’s critique of the theory of cognition is defined with regard to Husserl’s phenomenology in particular. The third part of the article analyses why Adorno’s critique seems to be unjustified. The author shows that Husserl denied the theses which Adorno criticized. In the fourth part, the author enlarges the argument by showing that Husserl’s critique of scientific rationality is similar with Adorno’s proposition. Nonetheless, in the fifth part the author stresses main differences between the two critiques of rationality. .
8
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Fenomenologia między internalizmem i eksternalizmem. Sformułowanie problemu

100%
Płotka W.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
|
2013
|
vol. 49
|
issue 1
71-91
EN
The article is an attempt at establishing a theoretical basis for a dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary philosophy, with regard to the problem of internalism-externalism. It is argued, according to Roman Ingarden, that one has to first of all put forward an adequate question about the problem, to be able to understand it appropriately. Moreover, the analysis is limited to the two forms of the internalism-externalism debate, namely semantics and the philosophy of the mind. Within Husserl’s phenomenology one can easily point to basic intuitions that justify the thesis that this philosophy refers to the internalism-externalism problem. Ultimately, by using phenomenological terminology, the article arrives at questions about possible internalism-or-externalism within Husserl’s phenomenological project. The questions, however, suggest that phenomenology can be neither clearly nor completely classified either as internalism or as externalism.
PL
Artykuł jest próbą stworzenia teoretycznej płaszczyzny dialogu pomiędzy fenomenologią i filozofią współczesną w odniesieniu do problemu internalizmu-eksternalizmu. Za Romanem Ingardenem argumentuje się, że należy wypracować adekwatne pytanie o ten problem, aby móc go właściwie zrozumieć. Analizy zawęża się przy tym do dwóch form debaty internalizmu z eksternalizmem, a mianowicie do semantyki i filozofii umysłu. Na gruncie fenomenologii Husserla bez trudu można wskazać podstawowe intuicje, które utwierdzają przekonanie, że filozofia ta może traktować o omawianym problemie. Korzystając z terminologii fenomenologicznej, ostatecznie formułuje się pytania o możliwy internalizm i eksternalizm w projekcie filozoficznym autora „Badań logicznych”. Pytania te jednak sugerują, że fenomenologia nie daje się w całości zdefiniować ani jako internalizm, ani jako eksternalizm.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.