Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 7

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
Rocznik Tomistyczny
|
2020
|
vol. 2
|
issue 9
203-226
EN
The aim of this paper is to show source inspirations on which anthropological model of transhumanist doctrine has been built. Fundamental thesis of transhumanism says that there is possibility of transgressing the natural condition of man through the various latest technologies what suppose to develop more excellent human’s essential form. The author turns attention to the fact that there is a category of possible beings and ontology of transfer adopted by transhumanist doctrine and that there is no essential differentiation between two notions such as „being” and „product”. For that reason it is impossible to apply aparatus of Thomisitic metaphysics to that doctrine. Another element which shows discrepancy of both stances is, analysed by the author, opposition between materialistic-naturalistic transhumanist anthropological model, called on the ground of natural science encephalocentrism and hylemorfism proper for Christian antropology. The author shows irrationality of many anthropological ideas of transhumanist doctrine and also presents its two main sources. The first is ideologization in the area of natural science whose extreme appearance we find in reductionist encephalocentrism. The second is extrapolation of reductionist encephalocentrism stance along with stances of technological probabilism into religious domain of anti-Christian antic gnostic systems. The author ultimately states that transhumanism is ideology which skillfully transforms gnostic mysticism into „new garments” of the latest technologies and for that, it effectively resonates in a contemporary irrational anti-culture.
PL
The commented judgment of the Supreme Court concerns the judicial independence and the rule of law in times of constitutional crisis. For the first time in the Polish history the Supreme Court ruled that one of the chambersof the Supreme Court, as well as the National Council of the Judiciary, did not give an appearance of judicial independence. The Supreme Court followed the test of the appearance of judicial independence that had been provided by theCourt of Justice of the European Union. The Supreme Court also claimed that judicial independence is the essence of the right to a fair trial. In constitutional terms, it means that independence cannot be lawfully limited, even ina proportional way. The commentary discusses that claim under two different theoretical concepts of the essence of a constitutional right (objective and abstract versus individual and relative).
EN
The article deals with the prerogatives of the President of Republic to appoint judges on the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary. Its aim is to give arguments in favor of the thesis that neither Article 179 nor Article 144, para. 3, subpara. 17 of the Constitution cannot provide a basis for the President’s decision refusing to appoint the judge. In a democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principle of legality in the exercise of powers of public authorities, one cannot unquestioningly accept the thesis that the prerogative is a personal privilege of the President, which may be enjoyed irrespective of the constitutional regulation of rights and without a specifi c legal procedure. Article 179 in conjunction with Article 144 para. 3, subpara. 17 of the Constitution provides a basis for the reconstruction of two norms: a competence norm and a norm requiring President to make use of the powers granted to the him. This provision cannot provide a basis for the president’s decision refusing to appoint the judge. The National Council of the Judiciary, due to its constitutional authority to safeguard the independence of courts and judges, is competent to carry out a detailed and substantive evaluation of the candidate for the position of judge. However, in view of the limitations of Article 10 in conjunction with Article 173 of the Constitution, the President may apply to the National Council of the Judiciary to reconsider the case.
EN
The article disuses arguments against the unlimited power of the President of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal to assign and re-assign judges to Tribunal’s panels hearing particular cases. It argues that this power should be exercised in accordance with the strict and plain meaning of the statutory provisions. The President should fully respect constitutional principles of legality, judges’ impartiality as well as the efficiency of Tribunal’s work. Criticising the President’s latest practice, the article argues that the membership of the panels should be relatively invariable. The President should be allowed to change the membership in limited statutory circumstances only. Moreover, he or she should always assign judges, including the chairman of the panel and the judge-rapporteur, in alphabetical order. The President should also be absolutely bound by the order and subject-matter of cases to be heard by the Tribunal. The article discusses cases of abuses of the President’s power to assign judges to the panels. The currently binding constitution and statutes do not directly provide any remedies for such presidential abuses. They can be considered unlawful in theoretical terms only. However, these abuses do not automatically make the Tribunal’s judgement unlawful or invalid. The article provides an explanation for this duality of consequences from a theoretical and doctrinal perspective. Taking into account Article 77 of the Constitution, it also calls upon individuals to bring action for damages against unlawful abuses of the President’s power.
PL
W artykule sformułowano argumenty przeciwko nieograniczonej kompetencji Prezesa TK do wyznaczenia sędziów odo składu orzekającego. Kompetencja Prezesa powinna być interpretowana w sposób zawężający zgodnie z językowym brzmieniem przepisów ustawowych. Wykonując swoją kompetencję, Prezes TK musi bowiem przestrzegać zasady legalizm, niezawisłości wewnętrznej sędziów TK oraz zasady sprawności funkcjonowania samego TK. Krytykując praktykę Prezesa TK po 2016 r., w artykule sformułowano pogląd o względnej niezmienności składu orzekające TK. Zmiana może nastąpić bowiem tylko w okolicznościach wprost wskazanych w ustawie. Artykuł analizuje ponadto wypadki nadużycia kompetencji przez Prezesa TK oraz teoretyczne i dogmatyczne konsekwencje tego nadużycia. Obowiązujące przepisy nie przewidują żadnych środków prawnych przeciwdziałania tego rodzaju nadużyciom. Czynności Prezesa TK mogą być rozważane jako nieważne z teoretycznoprawnego punktu widzenia. Niemniej jednak wniosku takiego nie sposób sformułować na gruncie dogmatyki konstytucyjnej. Artykuł wyjaśnia ten dualizm i jego konsekwencje dla wyroków TK wydanych w składach wadliwie obsadzonych przez Prezesa TK. Preferowaną przez autora drogą sankcjonowania naruszeń dokonanych przez Prezesa TK, jest odpowiedzialność odszkodowawcza przewidziana w art. 77 ust. 1 Konstytucji.
EN
Referring to the honourable one-hundred-year history of Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, and the more than seventy-year tradition of Państwo i Prawo, the two most prestigious legal journals in Poland, the authors discuss the mission of legal journals in a democratic society. They focus on the times of constitutional revolutions and transformations, where the well-established interpretations of constitutional provisions became questioned or even violated. The 2015−2020 constitutional developments in Poland serve as an illustrative background and point of reference for the authors in answering the following question: how and what should legal journals publish when the constitution is being ‘vanished’ (to use the compelling metaphor of Mirosław Wyrzykowski). This predominantly descriptive and interpretative article consists of the following four parts: the mission of journals, constitutional revolution, constitutional crisis, and constitutional anomy.
PL
Odwołując się do stuletniej historii „Ruchu Prawniczego, Ekonomicznego i Socjologicznego” oraz ponadsiedemdziesięcioletniej tradycji „Państwa i Prawa”, dwóch najbardziej prestiżowych czasopism prawniczych w Polsce, autorzy rozważają pojęcie misji czasopisma naukowego i jej znaczenie w demokratycznym społeczeństwie. Rozważania te osadzone zostały w szczególnym kontekście: rewolucji konstytucyjnych, w trakcie których utrwalone interpretacje konstytucyjne są kwestionowane, a przepisy konstytucyjne – naruszane. Tłem rozważań autorów są zmiany polskiego prawa i praktyki z lat 2015–2020 o znaczeniu konstytucyjnym. Ten okolicznościowy artykuł szkicuje odpowiedź na pytanie, jak czasopisma prawnicze powinny reagować na sytuację „wymazywania” konstytucji (by użyć obrazowej metafory Mirosława Wyrzykowskiego). Aby odpowiedzieć na to pytanie, autorzy odwołują się kolejno do koncepcji: rewolucji konstytucyjnej, kryzysu konstytucyjnego, oraz adaptują pojęcie anomii konstytucyjnej. Artykuł ma w istotnej mierze charakter deskryptywny oraz interpretacyjny, choć jego części mogą służyć dalszym rozważaniom normatywnym.
EN
The article assesses the compatibility of the new Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) with the Polish Constitution. It concludes that although the Polish Constitutional Tribunal remains in principle competent to review acts of EU law (including directives if certain conditions are met), the scope of such a review is very limited and consists only of assessing whether EU institutions acted within scope of the competences transferred to them. The same holds true for domestic measures which merely implement directives. As a consequence, any review of the TPD provisions will be very restricted and can hardly lead to their inapplicability on the Polish territory. The article also assesses the compatibility with the Polish Constitution of the plain packaging requirement, which is not provided for, but only suggested by the TPD. In this context, it concludes that the Tribunal will be fully competent to review any national measure that introduces such a restriction. Although the outcome of such a review cannot be predicted with certainty, the article posits that there are good grounds to believe that the plain packaging requirement will be considered constitutional (i.e. in particular with respect to those provisions of the Constitution which protect property and freedom of economic activity).
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.