The present study constitutes an attempt to analyze the essence of homicides of the qualified type against its legal regulation both in Polish and Russian Penal Code, as well as a modest reflection on the feasibility of the expansion of its typology. A homicide of the qualified type, as a particularly reprehensible case of intentional killing of another human, does not constitute a monolith in Criminal Code; rather it forms a set of acts, at times significantly different in spite of the identity of consequences, which, in the context of its unlawfulness and highly detrimental impact on society deserves a particularly harsh response and punishment from the penal law. Therefore, a more severe legal penalty compared to a common corpus delicti is imposed on the offender. Aggravation of a penalty for homicide of the qualified type, as sentencing in Russia reveals, is carried out by increasing both lower and upper thresholds. The expansion the types of homicide in polish penal code of 1997 for homicide of the qualified type was met with criticism, not only due to its too casuistic engrossment, but also the lack of any difference in punishment for common corpus delicti in its upper threshold.
The key to the statutory characteristics of homicide in both Polish and Russian criminal law lies in the establishing of the semantic domain of this specific legal notion, which, docketed in Polish and Russian legal order, is a thought model reproducing illegal acts committed intentionally resulting in homicide. However, the explicit legal notion of this crime came into only in the 20th century ultimately excluding the possibility of either ‘registering’ accidental manslaughter or suicide, penalized for centuries, into its scope. Although a ransom, a drastic social therapy in the form of a bloody retaliation or ius talionis constitute now only a historical evolution marks of the right to punish for the crime of murder, the essence of penalty as a reprisal for the crime committed has been intact. The description of homicide only in strict legal terms yielding to normative force and dogmatic conversion can not be completed. The way to its right comprehension lies in rejecting the dominant in Polish and Russian criminal law notion of variegating of the scope of the legal protection of life of individuals for human development stage.
The principles of equality in civil law relations as stated in the article 1, section 1 of the civil law code in Russia and the principality of autonomy of the will of both sides formulated in the article 1, section 2, point 1 the civil law code of the Russian Federation are the bases for civil law subjects to profit from authorization which is vested to them. However, in order to accomplish them efficiently natural person should be equipped with a certain potential, which to great extent depends on the will of a legislator. The potential is described by the terms legal capacity and capacity for legal acts. Any ability is an inborn gift, talent which gives a human being specified powers. The legal capacity should be understood as an innate possibility of a human being to be a subject of law which exludes crediting with normative character. It is groundless to reduce the legal capacity to the category of subject law as well as admitting the possibility of setting limits. Such limits in reality may be applied to only a definite law. The capacity for legal acts in the view of a legislator, is the ability of a citizen to achieve and carry into effect his civil laws, both creating and executing his duties. Contrary to legal capacity it is restricted depending on eg. the level of physical, psychical and social maturity. The full capacity for legal acts is gained by people who come of age (eighteen years and older) as well as the people who before that age got married or were emancipated at the age of sixteen as a result of getting employed or conducting economic activity. The justified circumstances for limiting the capacity for legal acts of anybody who acquired the full capacity for legal acts is abusing alcohol, taking drugs which leads to financial difficulties of their families. In order to protect the rights of an individual in case of mental disability, the court is entitled to announce the capacity for legal acts of a given person null and void.
The present study constitutes an attempt to analyze the essence of homicides of the qualified type against its legal regulation both in Polish and Russian Penal Code, as well as a modest reflection on the feasibility of the expansion of its typology. A homicide of the qualified type, as a particularly reprehensible case of intentional killing of another human, does not constitute a monolith in Criminal Code; rather it forms a set of acts, at times significantly different in spite of the identity of consequences, which, in the context of its unlawfulness and highly detrimental impact on society deserves a particularly harsh response and punishment from the penal law. Therefore, a more severe legal penalty compared to a common corpus delicti is imposed on the offender. Aggravation of a penalty for homicide of the qualified type, as sentencing in Russia reveals, is carried out by increasing both lower and upper thresholds. The expansion the types of homicide in polish penal code of 1997 for homicide of the qualified type was met with criticism, not only due to its too casuistic engrossment, but also the lack of any difference in punishment for common corpus delicti in its upper threshold.
The principles of equality in civil law relations as stated in the article 1, section 1 of the civil law code in Russia and the principality of autonomy of the will of both sides formulated in the article 1, section 2, point 1 the civil law code of the Russian Federation are the bases for civil law subjects to profit from authorization which is vested to them. However, in order to accomplish them efficiently natural person should be equipped with a certain potential, which to great extent depends on the will of a legislator. The potential is described by the terms legal capacity and capacity for legal acts. Any ability is an inborn gift, talent which gives a human being specified powers. The legal capacity should be understood as an innate possibility of a human being to be a subject of law which exludes crediting with normative character. It is groundless to reduce the legal capacity to the category of subject law as well as admitting the possibility of setting limits. Such limits in reality may be applied to only a definite law. The capacity for legal acts in the view of a legislator, is the ability of a citizen to achieve and carry into effect his civil laws, both creating and executing his duties. Contrary to legal capacity it is restricted depending on eg. the level of physical, psychical and social maturity. The full capacity for legal acts is gained by people who come of age (eighteen years and older) as well as the people who before that age got married or were emancipated at the age of sixteen as a result of getting employed or conducting economic activity. The justified circumstances for limiting the capacity for legal acts of anybody who acquired the full capacity for legal acts is abusing alcohol, taking drugs which leads to financial difficulties of their families. In order to protect the rights of an individual in case of mental disability, the court is entitled to announce the capacity for legal acts of a given person null and void.
The key to the statutory characteristics of homicide in both Polish and Russian criminal law lies in the establishing of the semantic domain of this specific legal notion, which, docketed in Polish and Russian legal order, is a thought model reproducing illegal acts committed intentionally resulting in homicide. However, the explicit legal notion of this crime came into only in the 20th century ultimately excluding the possibility of either ‘registering’ accidental manslaughter or suicide, penalized for centuries, into its scope. Although a ransom, a drastic social therapy in the form of a bloody retaliation or ius talionis constitute now only a historical evolution marks of the right to punish for the crime of murder, the essence of penalty as a reprisal for the crime committed has been intact. The description of homicide only in strict legal terms yielding to normative force and dogmatic conversion can not be completed. The way to its right comprehension lies in rejecting the dominant in Polish and Russian criminal law notion of variegating of the scope of the legal protection of life of individuals for human development stage.
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