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1

PARFIT ON MORAL DISAGREEMENT AND THE ANALOGY BETWEEN MORALITY AND MATHEMATICS

100%
Greif A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 9
688 – 703
EN
In his book On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a version of moral non-naturalism, a view according to which there are objective normative truths, some of which are moral truths, and we have a reliable way of discovering them. These moral truths do not exist, however, as parts of the natural universe nor in Plato’s heaven. While explaining in what way these truths exist and how we discover them, Parfit makes analogies among morality on the one hand, and mathematics and logic on the other. Moral truths “exist” in a way that numbers exist, and we discover these truths in a similar way as we discover truths about numbers. By the end of the second volume, Parfit also responds to a powerful objection against his view, an objection based on the phenomenon of moral disagreement. If people widely and deeply disagree about what is the moral truth, it is doubtful whether we have a reliable way of discovering it. In his reply, he claims that in ideal conditions for thinking about moral questions, we would all have sufficiently similar moral beliefs. However, we often find ourselves in less-than-ideal conditions due to various factors that distort our ability to agree. Therefore, differences in moral opinion can be expected. In this paper, I draw a connection between these parts of Parfit’s theory and comment on them. Firstly, I argue that Parfit’s analogy with mathematics and logic and his answer to the disagreement objection are in tension because there are important epistemic differences between morality and these fields. If one would try to account for the differences, one would have to sacrifice some measure of similarity between morality and them. Secondly, I comment on Parfit’s reply to the disagreement objection itself. I believe that, although his description of ideal conditions has some potential for reaching moral agreement, it may be difficult to tell if ideal conditions prevail. This obscurity spells further trouble for Parfit’s overall theory.
2

SKEPTICKÉ INTUÍCIE

100%
Greif A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
vol. 71
|
issue 9
733 – 745
EN
The goal of this paper is to provide answers for two key questions concerning epistemic intuitions in the context of sceptical arguments: (1) What is the nature of these intuitions? (2) Do they provide evidence or justification for the premises of these arguments? In contemporary literature on scepticism, the precise propositional contents of our „sceptical“ intuitions are rarely identified. The author considers several possible ways of identifying them and concludes that our intuitive answers to various sceptical thought experiments are the best means of capturing the propositional content of our intuitions. This conclusion is based on the argument from philosophical usage of the terms „intuition“, „intuitive“ and the like. Moreover, the author proposes a theory of the origin of sceptical intuitions. He argues that these intuitions are products of our language competence. Further, he shows that if this theory was true, it would not lend support to the idea that sceptical intuitions provide evidence or justification for the premises of sceptical arguments.
3

DRUG LAWS, ETHICS, AND HISTORY

100%
Greif A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 2
95 – 110
EN
In this paper, I present and criticize several historical arguments in favour of prohibition and criminalization of illicit psychoactive substances. I consider several versions of Charles Brent’s argument from drug harms and an argument from addiction based on Kantian view on autonomy. My criticism will mainly rely on empirical evidence on drugs, drug use, and addiction. I think that in light of this evidence, all of the arguments lose their cogency or can be refuted altogether. Moreover, the evidence reveals an inconsistency in the international drug law framework. Therefore, I provide in conclusion a general argument challenging the legitimacy of the existing distinction between licit and illicit drugs based on the inconsistency.
4

MORALITY OF EUTHANASIA

100%
Greif A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2019
|
vol. 26
|
issue 4
612 - 634
EN
In this paper, I defend the view that the requested euthanasia of adults is morally permissible and should be legalised; I use an argument from analogy which compares physician-assisted euthanasia with morally less ambiguous and, in my opinion, an acceptable instance of mercy killing. I also respond to several objections that either tries to prove that the instance of mercy killing is not acceptable, or that there is a fundamental difference between these two cases of killing. Furthermore, in the remainder of the paper I defend the moral permissibility and legalisation of euthanasia against several objections that appeared in local disputes on this issue, based on the concepts of the limits of freedom, the slippery slope, and the needlessness of euthanasia.
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