The case note is on the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 6 October 2015, SK 54/13, in which that Court ruled that art. 196 of the Criminal Code, to the extent it penalizes insulting the religious feelings of others through public insulting of religious objects of worship, is consistent with art. 54.1 in conjunction with art. 31.3 of the Constitution, which enshrine freedom of expression. The note attempts a wide analysis of the problem of compatibility of imprisonment for offending religious feelings with freedom of expression in terms of proportionality in the strict sense. That problem has been definitively settled by the Constitutional Court in that judgment, however with limited reasoning. The author argues for the incompatibility (in the strict sense), and therefore unconstitutionality of imprisonment for offending religious feelings. That position is confirmed particularly in well-established case law of the European Court of Human Rights with regard to standards of freedom of expression (art. 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) in view of the criminalization and especially punishment through imprisonment for insulting and defamation, which can appropriately be applied to the crime referred to in art. 196 of the Criminal Code.
The article relates to a concept of truth in the light of the legal regulation of defamation crime (Articles 212 and 213 of the Criminal Code). The author describes two issues: firstly the problem of distinguishing by Polish courts facts from opinions from the point of view of the concept of truth in defamation trials, and secondly the problem of criminal liability for true statements on the basis of the defamation crime regulation. In his deliberations the author uses judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, decisions of Polish courts as well as main thesis of the criminal law doctrine and some opinions present in the public debate about the legitimacy of defamation crime. The author comes to the following conclusions. As far as the first issue is concerned, the author takes the view that Polish courts, in defamation trials, do not distinguish facts (which truthfulness can be proved) from opinions (which truthfulness cannot be proved) and as for all statements they require to prove their truthfulness. As far as the second issue is concerned, the author takes the view that on the basis of the defamation crime regulation, it is possible to make someone criminally liable for true statements, which is harmful and should be changed.
The subject of the article contains the issue of order competences related to the proceedings of Polish parliamentary committees. In turn, the aim of the study is to define their basic features, including similarities and differences between the order competences related to the proceedings of Polish parliamentary committees – in the area of their component parts, including the entity holding it, authorisation and subject, as well as in the area of elements related to them, which include the conditions for the admissibility of their application, as well as the appeal procedure against decisions constituting their application. Finally, the aspiration for this aim takes place using a dogmatic method, which includes an analysis of the content of the provisions relating to the competences in question. Its result shapes a list of the above-specified features of order competences related to the proceedings of Polish parliamentary and senatorial committees. The article also compares Polish regulations with those applicable in selected Central European countries, i.e. in Germany, Austria and Hungary.
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