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Struktura aktu moralnego w ujęciu Mieczysława Krąpca

100%
Karaś A.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
|
2011
|
vol. 47
|
issue 2
157-173
EN
The article analyzes the structure of the moral act as understood by Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec. He bases the structure of the moral act on the structure of the human being. In his analysis of the moral act, he enumerates three elements that constitute it internally; these are the cognitive, volitional and motivating (relating to some real or seeming value) elements. These elements are analyzed in the article. The article shows that the structure of the moral act as understood by Krąpiec is expressed in the concrete content of a practical judgment, which is an element of the act of decision. A practical decisive judgment may be consistent or inconsistent with theoretical judgment(s) about the world of things and people. An act is morally positive when the practical decisive judgment is consistent with the theoretical one.
PL
W artykule podjęto analizę struktury aktu moralnego w ujęciu Mieczysława Krąpca, który strukturę tę opiera na strukturze bytu ludzkiego. W analizie aktu moralnego Krąpiec wymienia trzy elementy, które go wewnętrznie konstytuują: poznawczy, wolitywny i umotywowania, czyli związania z jakąś realną lub pozorną wartością. Elementy te wyznaczają poszczególne części artykułu i stanowią przedmiot analiz. Artykuł ukazuje, że struktura aktu moralnego w ujęciu M. Krąpca wyraża się w konkretnej treści sądu praktycznego, która jest składnikiem aktu decyzji. Praktyczny sąd decyzyjny może być zgodny lub niezgodny z sądem (sądami) teoretycznym, jaki ma człowiek o świecie rzeczy i ludzi. Pozytywna moralność aktu decyzji zachodzi wówczas, gdy sąd praktyczny decyzyjny jest zgodny z sądem teoretycznym człowieka.
2
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Św. Anzelma z Canterbury ontologiczno-teologiczny system moralności

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Karaś A.
Studia Redemptorystowskie
|
2013
|
issue 11
69-81
EN
St. Anselm’s moral thought is based on such concepts as reason, rectitude (uprightness), justice, truth, should/ought to, freedom of the will and love. Human being was endowed with right reason able to find the truth. The latin term ‘rectitudo’, which is exactly connected with the reason, means ‘rightness’ or ‘rectitude’ as well. This term emphesizes not only the dependence on the right reason, but fi rst of all the concordance with God’s order. ‘Rectitudo’, ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ define themselves through each other, and rectitudo defines should (ought to, debere). Another important concept in Anselm’s system of morality is ‘freedom’. He views freedom as freedom of choises (libertas arbitrii) and defi nes it as the ability to keep rectitude of the will for the sake of that very rectitude (potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem). This is the ability that a willing and rational subject has for keeping or preserving rectitude (or uprightness) of the will by using their will to will rightly, to will the right things and in the right way. The central component of the freedom is precisely willing that one will rightly, for the sake of preserving this very rectitude of will. Anselm speaks of ‘keepeing’ rectitude of will because in his view being able to will rightly and being able to will rectitude of will means that one already possesses rectitude of will. The rectitude of the will is also called justice. God bestowed rational being with the will for hapieness (voluntas beatitudinis) and will for justice (voluntas justitiae). This twofold charakter of the will, which depends on rectitude, does not mean that there are two kinds of will in human being. There is the only one will, which causes that rational being desires both: hapieness and justice (rectitude) for its own sake. The will becomes unjust when it desires good without rectitude. Keeping the rectitude of the will for its own sake is nesessary to be just.
3
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Sprawozdanie z Ogólnopolskiego spotkania naukowego Stowarzyszenia Teologów Moralistów „Teologia moralna wobec ekologicznej perspektywy ochrony środowiska" (Warszawa-Bielany, 14-16.06.2015 roku)

100%
Karaś A.
Teologia i Moralność
|
2015
|
vol. 10
|
issue 2(18)
197-201
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