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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 5
386 – 400
EN
The present article takes up the issue of whether Hegel’s accounts of religion can be regarded as phenomenological analyses. This is a complex issue that concerns both the “Religion” chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. At first, an account is given of how Hegel understands phenomenology. Then this is used as the basis for an evaluation of his analyses of religion in the Phenomenology and the Lectures. The thesis is that these two analyses, although separated by many years, in fact show clear signs of methodological continuity and can indeed be regarded as phenomenological at least on Hegel’s own definition. This reading offers us a way to resolve the long-standing problem of whether the Phenomenology of Spirit can be seen as a genuinely unified text. Moreover, it shows the little-recognized connection between Hegel’s early philosophy of religion and his later philosophy of religion from his Berlin lectures.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 1
54 – 63
EN
Hegel designates the Egyptian religion “the religion of mystery”. This designation involves a hiddenness, which is the opposite of revealedness, i.e., revelation. Similarly, he frequently refers to this religion as a “riddle” or an “enigma” (Rätsel). According to his interpretation, one feature of the Egyptian religion is dualism between the inner and the outer, i.e., an inward hidden sphere, and an outward revealed one. This article explores this characterization and the meaning behind it. What elements of the Egyptian religion did Hegel consider mysterious or enigmatic and what role did this play in his placement of this religion as a transitional one between the religions of nature and those of spirit?
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 6
456 – 471
EN
Globalization and mass migration have raised anew the question of the nature and origin of human rights. There have been a number of works that seek inspiration on this issue from the philosophy of Hegel. Usually, the primary focus of these works has, naturally enough, been the main statement of Hegel’s political philosophy, the Philosophy of Right. Scholars go to this work in search of a principle that can ground human rights in such a way that can be meaningfully used in a political and legal context. This body of literature is important in that it draws attention to this aspect of Hegel’s thought and shows how it is relevant for a problem of some topicality today. However, this approach, I wish to argue, takes up the issue at a fairly advanced stage in Hegel’s thinking and fails to see some much more fundamental elements in his way of understanding the concept of human rights, specifically, that the very idea of human rights presupposes a philosophical anthropology and a theory of history since human rights as a concept did not always exist. These aspects of Hegel’s theory have been generally neglected in the secondary literature on the issue of human rights.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2009
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vol. 64
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issue 8
728-738
EN
Soren Kierkegaard is an author who, due to his creative use of genre, has been difficult to characterize straightforwardly. His unconventional form of writing has at times been understood as a part of his criticism of German speculative philosophy; however, little work has been done to actually understand the nature of his criticism and his precise objection to the form of presentation traditionally used by systematic philosophy. In this article it is argued that there is a close connection between the form and the content of speculative philosophy, and that due to his disagreements with the content of the latter (specifically concerning the question of faith) Kierkegaard was obliged to make use of a different literary form in order to criticize it.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 3
179 – 190
EN
Hegel’s criticism of Schleiermacher represents an important episode in his general critical campaign against Romanticism. In this article the author explores his objections to Schleiermacher’s theory of faith as the feeling of absolute dependency. The different statements of Schleiermacher’s view in On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers and The Christian Faith are outlined. Then an account is given of Hegel’s various criticisms of this view. The author wishes to argue that what is ultimately at stake in the discussion is not just the nature of faith and knowing, but something more fundamental: philosophical anthropology. By focusing on intuition and immediate feeling as the locus for religious faith, Schleiermacher, according to Hegel, reduces the human to the subhuman. For Hegel, by contrast, the faculty of religious faith should not be the lowest but the highest, which in his view means speculative reason.
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