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PL
Artykuł rozważa problem integracji w nauce i jego rozmaite aspekty. Obok integracji wyróżnione są także inne podobne procesy, mianowicie to, co określa się mianem interdyscyplinarności oraz unifi kacja. O ile integracja i interdyscyplinarność dotyczą nauki w sensie socjologicznym, wyrosłym na gruncie praktyki akademickiej, unifi kacja wiąże się z nauką w sensie metodologicznym, tj. określoną przez kryteria metodologiczne.
EN
This paper considers the problem of integration in science and its various aspects. Besides integration, two other processes are distinguished, namely interdisciplinarity as well as unifi cation. Whereas integration is related to science in the sociological sense, that is, growing upon academic practice, unifi cation is connected with science in the methodological sense, that is, defi ned by methodological criteria.
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Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2018
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vol. 66
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issue 4
183-196
EN
This paper is inspired by Marcin Tkaczyk’s works and discusses the problem of the necessity of the past (is the past determined?) and its role in the analysis of future contingents. The discussion centers on the statements (accepted by Tkaczyk, but slightly paraphrased)) firstly, that every past state of affairs is determined, and, secondly, that at least some some future states of affairs are contingent. The paper argues that because the first assertion is not justified, the antinomy of future contingents does not arise. The argument uses modal and metalogical devices.
PL
Praca niniejsza jest inspirowana twórczością Marcina Tkaczyka i omawia problem koniecz-ności przeszłości (czy przeszłość jest zdeterminowana?) i jej roli w analizie przyszłych zdarzeń przy¬godnych. Dyskusja skupia się na stwierdzeniach (zaakceptowanych przez Tkaczyka, ale nie¬co spa¬rafrazowanych): po pierwsze, że każdy dotychczasowy stan rzeczy jest ustalany, po drugie, że przynajmniej niektóre przyszłe stany są przypadkowe. Artykuł dowodzi, że ponieważ pierwsze twierdzenie nie jest uzasadnione, nie powstaje antynomia przyszłych zdarzeń przygodnych. Argument korzysta ze środków modalnych i metalogicznych.
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Analyticity and Metamathematics

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PL
Chociaż rozróżnienie sądów analitycznych i syntetycznych pojawiło się po raz pierwszy u Kanta, to pokrewne pojęcia można odnaleźć już u Hume’a i Leibniza. Autor zestawia i analizuje różne definicje i charakterystyki pojęcia analityczności, jakie proponowali m. in.: Kant, pozytywiści, Frege, Carnap, Strawson i Quine. Wskazuje się, że w badaniach nad zagadnieniem analityczności często odwoływano się do takich pojęć metalogicznych, jak: prawdziwość, niesprzeczność czy dowiedlność, a te z kolei zostały scharakteryzowane na gruncie metamatematyki przez tzw. twierdzenia limitacyjne, w szczególności przez twierdzenia Godła o niezupełności i twierdzenie Churcha o nierozstrzygalności. W związku z tym referowano dyskusję nad związkiem ww. twierdzeń z zagadnieniem rozstrzygalności prowadzoną przez samego Godła, a także przez Turquette'a, Copiego, Kemeny’ego, Borkowskiego i in.
EN
Contemporary decision theory is a highly specialized field involving advanced mathematical devices. On the other hand, it is linked with other disciplines, like economics or psychology. The present paper analyses some basic issues connected with the concept of decision. I consider them as philosophical in the analytic sense. After an introductory and historical survey, the paper passes to problems of defining decisions, the structure of decision processes and, finally, kinds of decision theories. The problem of the rationality of decisions is taken as one of the most important. The paper tries to show how the analysis of decisions is related to logic, epistemology and philosophy of science.
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Zdania aksjologiczne z perspektywy naturalizmu

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EN
This paper discusses axiological sentences and views about them. Simple axiological sentences fall under the scheme (1) „a is P ”, where a stands for a proper name or a description and P corresponds to an axiological predicate, such as „is good”, or „is beautiful”. However, there are several reasons that justify a modal approach to axiological sentences. Then their form is represented by another formula (2) which in the case of ethical and aesthetic sentences looks as follows: is this good that A, that the letter A is a propositional variable. Using (2) we can investigate axiological sentences as being subject to logical relations displayed by the logical square and its generalizations. Logical analyses of axiological sentences illuminate problems related to cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Finally, axiological presentism is proposed as a view consistent with naturalism.
EN
This paper outlines an approach to the principle of bivalence based on very general, but still elementary, semantic considerations. The principle of bivalence states that (a) “every sentence is either true or false”. Clearly, some logics are bivalent while others are not. A more general formulation of (a) uses the concept of designated and non-designated logical values and is captured by (b) “every sentence is either designated or non-designated”. Yet this formulation seems trivial, because the concept of non-designated value is negative. In order to refine the analysis, the class of anti-designated values has been distinguished. The non-trivial version of the principle of bivalence is expressed by (c) “every sentence is either designated or anti-designated”. The last part of the paper mentions some extralogical reasons for considering the principle of bivalence with truth being a designated value as intimately connected to human thinking and behavior.
EN
Ingarden began his university studies in Lvov, under Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS, for brevity). However, he moved on to Göttingen after one semester. In Germany he studied with Husserl between 1912 and 1918, and obtained his PhD in Freiburg. He then returned to Poland in 1919, obtained his habilitation in Lvov in 1924, and became a full professor in 1933 at Lvov’s Jan Kazimierz University. Ingarden always remained a faithful phenomenologist, although he did not accept the transcendental phenomenology of late Husserl. One can say that Ingarden worked in an environment dominated by LWS in the years 1924–1939. Clearly, Ingarden’s philosophy was radically opposed to that represented by Twardowski and his students: there was really no possibility of compromise between the two styles of doing philosophy. Both sides of the debate, Ingarden as well as members of LWS, often underlined this fact. Yet there are many passages in Ingarden which can be understood as either direct or indirect critiques of LWS, particularly on the subject of logic and its role in philosophy. Similarly, some fragments of the writings of LWS might be interpreted as critical allusions to Ingarden, for instance, concerning a priori or intuition as devices for the cognition of essences. We could speculate that Ingarden’s realism was partially inspired by the realistic attitude of LWS. However, the personal relations between Ingarden and LWS were rather cold, at least before 1939. He accused some members of LWS of blocking his academic carrier. The situation changed after 1945 – their relations improved as they all fought against the dominance of Marxism, and also thanks to the natural solidarity between Lvovians.
EN
This paper offers an analysis of a conversation between Zagłoba and Roch Kowalski, two characters from Henryk Sienkiewicz’s The Deluge. The analysis was inspired by the occurrence of (deontic) terms within this dialogue. The question arises of whether both interlocutors are appealing to some principles of deontic logic. To answer this question, a fragment of deontic logic is reconstructed. It is shown that some parts of the conversation in question can be analyzed with help of formal-deontic devices.
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