Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
Studia Psychologica
|
2013
|
vol. 55
|
issue 2
123 – 138
EN
The article uncovers the role of aging of monetary saving proposition in its topical mental accounting. The monetary saving propositions were formulated from the first- and the third-person perspective to investigate whether a self-other discrepancy impacts on an aging of saving proposition. Also, the absolute and relative amount of monetary saving was varied in two stages (high vs. low), and two dates of the beginning of a sell-out were applied (past and present). The discrepancy between aging of propositions formulated from the first and the third person perspectives appears to have a different impact on the high and low relative monetary savings, which seems to be almost opposite. A high relative saving proposition ages quicker than a low relative one, but only when it is formulated from the first person perspective. When a saving proposition is formulated from a third-person perspective, aging runs quicker for low relative saving, and a high relative saving proposition seems to age slower. Correspondingly, the framing effect is modulated by two factors: 1) aging of monetary saving proposition and 2) personal perspective in formulation of saving proposition.
Studia Psychologica
|
2014
|
vol. 56
|
issue 4
253 – 265
EN
The research study reveals a subjective readiness to wait for an advertised monetary savings presented from the first- and third-person perspectives. The properties of simple waiting were studied in relation to the personal perspective on savings proposition and the level of monetary savings. Findings for the first-person perspective replicate our previous results, the propositions in the present time mode with high and low relative savings have high preference and lead to the framing effect, similar to the one described by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). When they are formulated in the future time, both of them loose their attractiveness because of the need of waiting. Unlike savings propositions formulated in the present time mode from the third person perspective, in this case the classical framing effect is eliminated. When the tasks are formulated from the third person perspective with a savings proposition in the future, a pronounced framing effect was found. This result is attributed to the differential impact of waiting time on the propositions with different levels of relative savings. The discrepancy found by this study is the key property of the differentiation between the first- and the third-person perspectives in terms of waiting for a savings proposition made in the future.
Studia Psychologica
|
2016
|
vol. 58
|
issue 3
171 – 183
EN
The study examines the properties of cognitive representations of situational and propositional time flow in relation to the first- and the third-person perspective on monetary saving proposition. The subjects made decisions whether to accept a monetary saving proposition. Despite the equal distance to the beginning of saving possibility and equality of saving amounts the subjects made significantly different decisions depending on whether a situational or a propositional time flow was activated. The newly found temporal framing effect (Polunin, 2015) was confirmed and its new version for the propositions formulated from the third-person perspective is described. The results specify the features of situational and propositional time flow and the consequent discrepancies in the decision outcomes. In general, the discounting of the saving proposition made from the first- and the third-person perspective runs slower when situational time flow is activated.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.