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  1. 2 Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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  1. 2 Chrudzimski A.

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  2. 1 2009

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RODERICK CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY (Teoria intencjonalnoSci Rodericka Chisholma)

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Chrudzimski A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2009
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vol. 37
|
issue 3
75-87
EN
Chisholm's theory of intentionality is a version of the Fregean theory. Intentionality is explained in terms of certain abstract entities and the mental capacity of grasping them. According to his first theory the postulated entities were propositions. All types of intentional references were explained in terms of 'de dicto' beliefs. Unfortunately, this theory faced a number of serious ontological difficulties, so in his last book on intentionality Chisholm defines both beliefs 'de dicto' and 'de re' in terms of the attribution of the property to himself. This theory is the essential basis of his epistemological foundationalism.
2

Fundamenty fenomenologicznej teorii wartoĊ›ci

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Chrudzimski A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2020
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vol. 48
|
issue 1-2
87-108
EN
The paper outlines the fundamentals of a phenomenological theory of values. The basic theses have been formulated by Franz Brentano. According to him, what constitutes our epistemic access to values are emotions. Emotions are described as intentional states for which it makes perfect sense to ask about their correctness and justification. In his published works, Brentano was an anti-realist about values, but the phenomenological tradition followed instead the views of Anton Marty. Marty takes values ontologically seriously, even though at the end of the day he construes them as entities supervenient on purely descriptive properties.
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