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PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest polemika z tezą M. Loughlina, iż konstytucjonalizm jako filozofia rządzenia może być urzeczywistniona tylko w jednej formie. Odwołując się do teorii światopoglądów stwierdzić można, że style interpretacji konstytucji wyrastają z odmiennych doświadczeń i towarzyszą odmienny praktykom. Aczkolwiek różnorodne doktryny łączyć może przywiązanie do demokracji, to nieredukowalny pluralizm społeczny determinuje nieustający spór o najlepszą interpretację konstytucji. Demokracja konstytucyjna może stanowić jedną z form konstytucjonalizmu, jeżeli ujmuje się go jako pojęcie interpretacyjne.
EN
The subject of the article is a polemic with M. Loughlin’s thesis that constitutionalism as a philosophy of governance can be realized only in one form. Referring to the theory of worldviews, it can be said that the styles of constitutional interpretation stem from different experiences and accompany different practices. Although various doctrines may be united by a commitment to democracy, irreducible social pluralism determines the constant dispute over the best interpretation of the constitution. Constitutional democracy can be one of the forms of constitutionalism, if it is perceived as an interpretative concept.
PL
THE ATTITUDE OF JEHOVAH WITNESSES TO THE WARS OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURYThe tragic war experiences of the Researchers of the Holy Scripture, and since 1931 of Jehovah Witnesses, were the direct result of the doctrine professed by them as well as the moral precepts which were accepted by them on its basis. They made eschatology the foundation of their teaching and created a complete conception of an apocalypses which was to have been realized in the present. Thus it was not only awaiting for the inevitably approaching end, but in fact experiencing it in accordance with the earlier scenario which was just being discovered. By forecasting an imminent end in accordance with a strictly defined “order of events” and a precise “arithmetic of ultimate matters”, the Jehovah Witnesses demanded that their followers adhere to a definite lifestyle. They professed the principle of “neutrality” towards every type public institution which expressed itself in contesting any participation in the society’s organized life, such as all kinds of political, social, cultural or even sporting institutions and in extreme pacifism.Among the few religious and lay pacifist movements which existed between the year 1914 and 1945, the Jehovah Witnesses were characterized by extreme radicalism in refusing to participate in any activities which had something to do with war operations (including the medical and first aid services or e.g. the digging of anti-tank trenches). Adopting such an attitude, at a time of great military conflicts and growing nationalistic tendencies had led to numerous repressions against the Jehovah Witnesses which were both organized and spontaneous in character.During the II World War, the Jehovah Witnesses were usually arrested for their refusal to do military service or work for the army; or else they were punished for any activities which were regarded as clandestine (printing and distribution of literature or missionary activity). Depending on the country, they were either imprisoned in concentration camps, or else were put on trial; the courts usually  issued very severe sentences, including capital punishment; if the accused refused to renounce his faith, he was usually sent to a concentration camp. It is worth noting here that the convicted Jehovah Witnesses could be released instantly the moment they signed a document in which they renounced their faith.
PL
Overall, from the perspective of H. Kelsen’s pure theory of law the constitutional guarantee means “ensuring the conformity of the state’s actions with the law.” A particularly important issue is the compliance of legislature with the constitution, as in view of the classic form of the doctrine of division of powers, it is the legislative power that occupies a distinctive position in that system. The issue of constitutional guarantee arises from the assertion that if the norms of the constitution outrank the norms of the “common law” they cannot be altered by them (“expressly or tacitly”). Pure theory of law demonstrates that the very structure of modern rationalised and specialised law causes that this problem is, in a sense, rooted directly in the meaning of the constitution in modern legal systems. According to H. Kelsen it is possible to distinguish three models of guarantee of compliance of law with the constitution (constitutional guarantees): model 1: the constitution does not contain any definition as to who should control the constitutionality of law, whilst in practice there are bodies that the constitution authorises to enforce the law; model 2: the constitution does not define an entity authorised to control the constitutionality of law and, moreover, it excludes such a possibility in the case of bodies applying the law, thus the legislative body itself is entitled to decide whether the law passed by it is constitutional; model 3: the constitution may appoint an organ other than the lawmaker and empower it to review the constitutionality of law, i.e. authorise to control the adoption of acts that are incompatible with the constitution. None of the above models fully secures the provisions of the constitution, however, model 3 reduces the shortcomings of models 1 and 2, namely it diminishes the uncertainty or illusory nature of constitutional guarantee of legislative acts. Model 3, which provides for a different organ examining the constitutionality of law than the lawmaker, “gives priority” to the legislative procedure governed by the Constitution. It is to prevent the emergence of “alternative legislation” (the consequence of model 2), i.e. the primacy of political power over the constitution, imposing its “alternative legal order” that is not based on “supreme law” but on pure political will. The guarantee of constitutionality of acts expressed by means of model 3 refers mainly to the legislative procedure specified in the constitution. Hans Kelsen postulates the restraint of the control body in matters of interpretation of fundamental constitutional principles such as justice, freedom or equality. Model 3 postulates a balance between the legislature and the control body: the basic criterion for the legislator may rest in political validity or effectiveness, while for the controlling body such a criterion consists in compliance with higher law, as far as it can be accurately interpreted. This excludes the dominance of any of the said bodies.
PL
Autorzy wskazują argumenty prawniczej wykładni Konstytucji, które uzasadniałyby możliwość zawarcia w ustawie wyrażającej zgodę na ratyfikację umowy międzynarodowej (art. 89. ust. 1 Konstytucji RP) dodatkowych przepisów. Warunkiem takiego poszerzenia treści omawianej ustawy byłby bezpośredni związek dodatkowych treści z realizacją umowy międzynarodowej oraz możliwość przyjęcia dodatkowych treści w zwykłej procedurze ustawodawczej. Przepisy takie nie mogłyby także, co oczywiste, naruszać postanowień Konstytucji RP. Autorzy wskazują także argumenty pozaprawne, które w określonej sytuacji mogłyby uzasadniać takie działanie ustawodawcy. Opowiadają się jednak za wyjątkowością takiego rozwiązania oraz osadzeniem go w konkretnym kontekście ustrojowym.
EN
The authors point to arguments of legal interpretation of the Constitution that would justify the possibility of including additional provisions in the statute agreeing to ratify the international agreement (Article 89(1) of the Polish Constitution). A condition for such an extension would be the direct link between the additional content and the implementation of the international agreement and the possibility of adopting additional content in the ordinary legislative procedure. Such provisions could not violate the provisions of the Polish Constitution. The authors also point to non-legal arguments that could justify such action by the legislature in a particular situation. However, they favour the uniqueness of such a solution and its embedding in a specific systemic context.
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