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EN
Transmission easement began to exist as a legal institution with the entry into force of the provisions of the Civil Code which established it. Such easement could not have existed before the date of entry into force of the provisions of the Civil Code constructing this limited right. "Easement that corresponds to transmission easement" could not also have existed, as the terms "transmission easement" and "easement that corresponds to transmission easement" have exactly the same meaning. There could not also have been an "easement appurtenant" which as a result of a "dynamic" or "modern" interpretation acquired characteristics of the transmission easement. "Easement that corresponds to transmission easement" is only a misleading name given to the transmission easement. Since the easement could not have existed before the date of entry into force of the provisions that establish it, it could not also have been acquired either by legal action (in particular by an agreement), or by usucaption. The period of usucaption of such easement runs from the date of entry into force of the provisions constructing the easement, and is reduced — by a maximum of half the time required by the law — in the case in which prior to the entry into force of these provisions there existed a status on the property which after their entry into force would justify the establishment of transmission easement. At the same time, the entry into force of the provisions on transmission easement does not affect any other types of easements. In particular, it does not have any effect on the interpretation of the provisions on the easements appurtenant. All of these arguments are radically contrary to the well-established judicial decisions of the Supreme Court. The Court, concealing the real intention of its decisions (which, let us recall, is the protection of consumers against price rises of utilities, especially electricity), introduces disorder into the legal culture. It breaks the rules of interpretation and inference established in this culture, considers those standards valid which almost certainly would be recognized by the Constitutional Co
EN
The paper, refuting objections formulated in a polemic, upholds fundamental points worded in the previously published article, according to which "easement corresponding to transmission easement" and "transmission easement" have exactly the same meaning. Such easement could not have existed before the date of entry into force of the provisions of the Polish Civil Code constructing this limited right. Since the easement could not have existed before the date of entry into force of the provisions that construct it, it could not have also been acquired either by legal action (in particular by an agreement), or by usucaption. The period of usucaption of such easement runs from the date of entry into force of the provisions constructing the easement, and is reduced — by a maximum of half the time required by the law — in the case in which prior to the entry into force of these provisions there existed a status on the property which after their entry into force would justify the establishment of transmission easement.
EN
The article discusses issues related to the systematisation of legal events, indicating that it is not possible to create an uncontested systematisation of legal events. Systematization units distinguished in civil law must meet certain methodological standards. Forgiveness should be classified as an act similar to legal acts. Classifying forgiveness as an emotional act is not accurate. The mere use of the category of “emotional acts” is incorrect. The correct classification of a particular legal event (e.g. forgiveness) at least facilitates the correct interpretation of the provisions linking specific legal effects to such an event (e.g. forgiveness). The thesis of the Supreme Court's resolution that forgiveness excludes the effectiveness of disinheritance even if it has been effected after the drawing up of a will containing disinheritance, regardless of the form in which it was effected (Article 1010 of the Civil Code), seems pertinent. However, it was very unconvincingly substantiated.
EN
There is an ongoing disagreement both among legal science representatives and in court verdicts concerning the possibility of the purchaser to use warranty claim based on legal defects, when the legal title to the object had been obtained in the light of the Art. 169 of the Polish Civil Code. The aim of the article was to demonstrate that it is unacceptable for the purchaser to initiate an action on warranty because of legal defects of the movable property in case of the purchase from the subject who had no legal title to sell it. Specifically, it has been attempted to prove the inaccuracy of the popular belief that Art. 169 of the Polish Civil Code was established to protect the purchaser and not the vendor who is usually dishonest . The analysis leads to the conclusion that ownership (treated as a set of legal norms) could be perceived as a function assigning property (domain of a function) to certain civil law subjects (antidomain of a function).
EN
The concept of the retroactive application of case-law is ambiguous. This may relate to a change in the interpretation of a given provision and classifying previ- ous facts based on the new interpretation or the application of provisions that the legislator itself has made retroactive. It happens that courts apply a certain provision retroactively, despite the fact that the legislature did not give it a ret- roactive nature, or apply, as a basis for a resolution, a provision different from the one that is actually retroactively applied. In the paper, the lawful and unlawful retroactive application of law was distinguished. The retroactive application of law is lawful when it is based on a provision which has been made retroactive by the legislature. The conceptual analyses presented selected adjudicatory prac- tices of a retroactive nature. It was considered that the retroactive application of law was unlawful. It pursued social objectives that were only seemingly worthy of approval, thus, undermining trust in the codified law and entities that apply that law, and causing a whole range of other, strongly unfavourable and difficult to foresee consequences.
EN
This article attempts to answer the question whether election promises made by the candidates for public functions in the course of election campaign, may be considered as public pledges within the meaning of the Civil Code. A positive answer to this question would imply acceptance of civil law claims raised against those candidates for fulfilment of promises made in the course of election campaign. For purposes of this analysis, the following categories of promises made by candidates may be distinguished: pre-election promises (the promised award is to be delivered before the election day, e.g. promise of snacks for those who attend the election meeting.) and post-election promises. The latter included concrete promises (where the promised award is an element of the election programme of the candidate, that he wishes to carry out after the election) and abstract (where the promised award is to be the consequence of achievement of the election programme. The examination of the problem of classification of election promises in the context of the institution of public pledge, first of all required an answer to the question whether election promises has the nature of declaration of will under civil law. Contrary to the popular view, it was established that election promises have, in principle, the nature of declarations of will. This is because now there is no binding custom which would compel to give the made promises the sense other than that defined by semantic rules of general language. However, only election promises may be considered as public pledges and they cause any legal consequences specified by Article 919 et seq. of the Civil Code. Additionally, from a structural point of view, election promises differ from public pledges, because the promised award depends on the occurrence of a particular state of affairs, ie. electoral victory of the candidate or a political party, and does not depend on performance of a particular action (as secret voting cannot be considered as such). Moreover, candidates do not make specific promises on their on account, but on the account of the State Treasury, even if they are not authorised to do so. As concerns abstract promises, granting of an award would depend on issuance of particular normative acts, but issuance of such acts cannot be the subject matter of performance in civil law.
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