Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

INGARDEN AND THE PUZZLE OF MATERIAL CONSTITUTION

100%
Kakol T.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2008
|
vol. 36
|
issue 2
45-62
EN
In this paper the author would like to present the current research in contemporary analytic philosophy related to the so-called problem of material constitution. This topic was investigated in ancient philosophy, as evidenced by such old puzzles as the Ship of Theseus puzzle, Chrisippus's Dion and Theon, and the Debtor Paradox (also known as the Growing Argument). In addition, Gibbard's fairly contemporary puzzle should also be mentioned here. Theories that try to solve the puzzles can be divided into those that presuppose the so-called 3D-ontology (or substance ontology) and the 4D-ontology (or process ontology). On the other hand, these conceptions can be divided into solutions that assume the absolute character of the identity relation and those that deny it, that is, that relativize identity to various parameters. After briefly discussing the theories of Alan Gibbard, David Lewis, Peter Thomas Geach, George Myro, Ted Sider, Roderick Chisholm, David Wiggins, and Mike Burke, the author tries to specify how Roman Ingarden's approach is related to the aforementioned accounts.
2
Content available remote

PERSONAL IDENTITY AS DETERMINED BY A SELF WITH A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE (Ja z pierwszoosobowa perspektywa jako wyznacznik tozsamosci osobowej)

100%
Kakol T.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 7
71-87
EN
In this article the author presents a theory of personal identity (PI) that appeals both to Lynne Baker's approach and to Antonio Damasio's neurophilosophical theory. He discusses Damasio's theory of self relevant to the problem of PI (from his work The Feeling of What Happens) and Baker's description of first-person phenomena. Her distinction between making and attributing first-person reference and critical remarks related to her conception that have appeared are also pointed out. Finally, taking into account ontogenetic development of a human being, the author sketches a theory of PI according to which PI is determined by a so-called self with a first-person perspective. He uses here Ingarden's notion of a core/coreless object.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.