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EN
In this article psychological knowledge of the functioning of autobiographical memory is confronted with folkloristic theories associated with the concept of memorat, which designates narrations of personal experiences with supernatural beings and phenomena. Human memory is not a vessel in which static information is deposited and later retrieved. It is a dynamic process of repeated construction and reconstruction of memories, which is subject to outside influences. This knowledge corresponds to folklorists’ findings: that the elements of traditional ideas are already part of narratives about personal experiences and they are not inevitably a mere result of the changes in stories during their further transmission. The author links the findings of the folklorist Lauri Honko (1964) with the present-day knowledge of psychology concerning so-called false memories. Subsequently, using the results of his own research focused on memorats, he documents this connection.
EN
The goal of this article is to provide a cognitive explanation of some aspects of conspiracy theories which influence their spread in society. One important human mental capacity is the ability to produce beliefs about mental states (intentions, motivation, emotions etc.) of others. This ability, also called the Theory of Mind, enables humans to produce complex social interactions and effective cooperation but it is also crucial in creation of coalitions, cheater detection and in prediction of threats from other conspecifics. Previous research shows that socially spread explanations of world phenomena, which trigger these mental mechanisms (i.e. they propose human like intentions as causes of these phenomena), have better inferential potential whereby they become intuitively more relevant as alternative explanations. In this context the author argues that conspiracy theories, just because of how they are defined, are cognitively attractive as they postulate a potential threat as a result of hidden intentions of some group of people.
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