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Zmiana znaczenia pojęcia małżeństwa w niemieckiej ustawie zasadniczej. O meandrach dynamicznej wykładni postanowień konstytucyjnych

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Łącki P.
Forum Prawnicze
|
2018
|
issue 2 (46)
25-41
EN
On July 20, 2017, the Bundestag has passed a law on the introduction of the right to marry by persons of the same sex. The adopted legislative solution is contro- versial regarding its compliance with the German Basic Law, i.e. with its art. 6 § 1: “marriage and family are under special protection of the State.” The dispute concerns whether the necessary element of the constitutional concept of marriage was – and still is – a difference in the sex of the spouses. This paper has three basic objectives: first, the identification of the essential arguments raised in favour of amendment’s compliance with the Basic Law; secondly, to examine whether the position on the compliance of this amendment with the Basic Law requires adop- tion of a dynamic interpretation of constitutional provisions; thirdly, assuming an affirmative answer to the second question, to identify the process that led to the change in the meaning of the Basic Law in respect to the concept of marriage.
2
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Sprawiedliwość a wykładnia postanowień konstytucyjnych. Dylematy sędziego jusnaturalisty

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Łącki P.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2022
|
issue 5(172)
129–148
EN
Nowadays, constitutional courts, by applying constitutional provisions, resolve disputes involved in the most controversial moral and social issues and thus change legal orders. This happens not only on the basis of provisions directly protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals (human rights), but also on the basis of other constitutional provisions containing evaluative concepts. Given the axiological openness or aspiration of constitutional acts, one may ask whether the adoption of a position affirming (I) the existence of natural law and affirming (II) the requirement of the compatibility of positive law with natural law, has consequences for the interpretation and application of constitutional provisions. In particular, whether – in the light of natural law – a judge of a constitutional court, when interpreting a constitutional act, may refer directly to moral reasoning and his/her own understanding of natural law. In seeking the answer to this question, the author distinguishes three model theoretical positions: (1) a moral reading of the constitution; (2) a positivist reading of the constitution, and (3) an intermediate position. These positions can be illustrated by the jurisprudence of constitutional courts regarding the permissibility of abortion. While asserting the advantages of the positivist model, the author raises doubts about the feasibility of its implementation. For it may turn out that judges are confronted with the abstract terminology of the constitutional act and, at the same time, with the practical impossibility to precisely reconstruct the axiology of the constitution-maker underlying this terminology with the help of analytical legal tools.
3
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Uzasadnienie dynamicznej wykładni Konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności — pytania krytyczne

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Łącki P.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2017
|
issue 2(139)
7–26
EN
In the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Convention for the Protectionof Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is a living instrument “which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”. The basic purpose of the article is an attempt to address critical questions about some of the standard arguments for the legitimacy of the evolutive interpretation of the Convention. The author claims that although the Court’s approach to the Convention as a „living instrument” is fi rmly rooted in its case law and legal theory, an adequate justifi cation for such an approach is still an open question and is considered as an open theoretical issue. The article consists of two parts. In the fi rst part the author briefl y describes the essential elements of treating the Convention as a living instrument, and illustrates, on the example of selected Court’s judgments, the manner in which this idea is applied in practice, i.e. the legal (judicial) reasoning refl ecting such an approach. In the second part, after pointing out the specifi c context in which the legitimacy of the dynamic interpretation of the Convention can be considered, he identifi es and critically examines a number of arguments raised in support of for this interpretation both in the legal theory and in the case-law of the Court.
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