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GENDER DIFFERENCES IN TRUST, REACTIONS TO TRUST VIOLATION, AND TRUST RESTORATION

100%
Macko A.
Decyzje
|
2020
|
issue 33
EN
This study examined the impact of gender on the propensity to trust, responses to the violation of trust and apologies, and the pace of subsequent trust restoration. It was hypothesized that women would respond more positively to an apology but restore their trust at a slower pace than men. Results revealed no gender differences in level of trust immediately after an apology for trust violation, but there was a significant difference in the pace of trust restoration, with women returning to their pre-violation levels of trust later than men as hypothesized. There were also significant gender differences in levels of trust before trust violation and after an apology.
2
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No Trust vs. Some Trust in a Game Framed as Trust or Investment: Avoiding the Distrustor

100%
Macko A.
Central European Management Journal
|
2020
|
vol. 28(4)
67-85
EN
Purpose: The study aimed at examining how observing a person showing no trust or some trust, in interaction framed as a trust or an investment, influences two variables: anticipated dissatisfaction from cooperating with the trustor and willingness to avoid such a person in future cooperative tasks. Additionally, the perception of the trustor and anticipated feelings in the role of the trustee were analyzed. Methodology: A scenario describing the trust game framed as trust or investment was used in the study. Participants (N = 166) were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: 2 (amount sent in the game: zero vs. one-tenth of the endowment) x 2 (game framing: trust vs. investment) and after reading the scenario made three types of evaluations: (1) their feelings in the position of the trustee from the scenario; (2) the trustor’s sociability, morality, and competence and (3) anticipated dissatisfaction from cooperating with the trustor in the future, and finally (4) willingness to avoid the trustor in future interactions. Results: Interaction effects were found for evaluations of anticipated dissatisfaction from cooperating with the trustor and willingness to avoid the trustor in future interactions. Observing sending nothing in the trust game framed as trust, rather than investment, resulted in stronger anticipated dissatisfaction from cooperating in the future with the trustor, and stronger willingness to avoid such a person as a partner for cooperation. Moreover, independent of the framing of the game, in condition of no trust, participants reported stronger negative feeling when imagining themselves in the role of the trustee and perceived the trustor as less sociable and less competent. Surprisingly, the perception of trustor’s morality did not differ across the conditions. Conclusions: Observing distrust, particularly when the interaction is interpreted in social terms as trust, rather than in economic ones as non-investing, with all other aspects of the situation the same, results in different attitude towards the distrustor on the side of observers. Distrust, in comparison to just non-investing, evokes in observers a stronger propensity to avoid such the distrustor as a partner for cooperation and lowers their anticipated satisfaction from cooperation with him/her.
3
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Przedsiębiorczość i ryzykowanie

63%
Macko A., Tyszka T.
Decyzje
|
2005
|
issue 4
PL
Chociaż zgodnie z definicją i z potoczną obserwacją przedsiębiorcom można przypisać większą niż innym ludziom skłonność do podejmowania ryzyka, to jednak ze względu na wysoką motywację osiągnięć przedsiębiorcy nie są skłonni do podejmowania bardzo wysokiego ryzyka. Przedsiębiorcy nie są też skłonni do podejmowania każdego rodzaju ryzyka, jeżeli już, to podejmują ryzyko związane ze sprawnością raczej niż z losem. W konfrontacji z owym ryzykiem zależnym od sprawności przyjmują postawę aktywną i starają się ryzyko kontrolować. Wobec zdarzeń od nich niezależnych przedsiębiorcy nie wydają się bardziej optymistami niż inni, tj. nie przeceniają bardziej niż inni ludzie prawdopodobieństwa pozytywnych zdarzeń. To, co jednak zdaje się wyróżniać przedsiębiorców, to zauważona już przez Knighta większa niż u innych wiara w siebie.
4
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Belief in others’ trustworthiness and trusting behaviour

51%
Macko A., Malawski M., Tyszka T.
Polish Psychological Bulletin
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2014
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vol. 45
|
issue 1
43-51
EN
Data from surveys indicate that people, in general, do not trust others. On the other hand, in one-shot trust games, where the player decides whether to send money to an anonymous partner, the actual rate of trust is relatively high. In two experiments, we showed that although reciprocity expectations and profit maximization matter, they are not decisive for trusting behaviour. Crucial factors that motivate behaviour in trust games seem to be altruism and a type of moral obligation related to a social norm encouraging cooperative behaviour. Finally, we were able to divide participants into specific profiles based on amount of money transferred to the partner, altruistic motivation, and belief in partners’ trustworthiness. This shows that the trust game is differently perceived and interpreted by different participants.
5

Dan Ariely – „Potęga irracjonalności”

20%
Macko A.
Decyzje
|
2010
|
issue 13
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