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1

E. Levinas: o bliskości, która oddala

100%
Hernas A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2018
|
vol. 46
|
issue 3
75-87
EN
The article undertakes a critical reflection on the notion of proximity, which is one of the basic categories of Levinas’s philosophy of the Other. This notion is present in the work of Levinas at all stages of its development. In a way, it is a meta-category that takes on various functions, but is always used to emphasize the impossibility of achieving a permanent closeness with another. Proximity first occurs as a significant moment in the very genesis of the subject in the movement of hypostasis, then it becomes the hedonic closeness of the subject to himself in the act of delight (jouissance), but in the next step it takes the form of home proximity, which paradoxically leads to the separation of the subject. But this formation process of the egotistical subject is a preparatory phase needed to achieve ethical maturity through the encounter with the face of the Other. As it turns out, this encounter also has the structure of achieving both proximity and distance. Proximity is a necessary stage of transcending, and it reaches the very height of paradox: the face is physically close, and at the same time unattainable metaphysically. The Other, represented by another human being, is within the reach of your hand as a concrete person, but is, at the same time, infinitely distant and unknown as an absolute. The aporias of proximity are not, however, an element of Levinas’s method, such as the use of hyperbole or contradiction. He eliminates proximity as impossible, though its descriptions testify to the fact that he had knowledge of radical closeness and used the notion of proximity in the sense of a fulfilled community with another. In my interpretation, Levinas’s thinking is burdened by the trauma of loss of his loved ones, who cannot be brought back and therefore become the hidden object of metaphysical desire.
2

Metafizyczne warunki możliwości myślenia aksjologicznego

100%
Hernas A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2018
|
vol. 46
|
issue 4
179-191
EN
The initial thesis of the article is that axiological thinking is possible on condition that it is preceded by a constituent experience or a metaphysical settlement. After the rejection of thinking in values by Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger, only a strong metaphysical base can legitimize an axiological vision. Such are the philosophies of the good of Emmanuel Levinas and Józef Tischner, which assume the source experience of the absolute Good. I therefore define them with a common term "vertical agatology". According to Levinas, this happens through the encounter with the face of Another. According to Tischner, the experience of the good which takes the negative form of a preferential revolt is decisive: "There is something that shouldn't be." Acorrding to Barbara Skarga, on the other hand, the good appears unexpectedly in human relationships. It comes from man as something surprising and accidental: “It is something that did not have to be”. This type of understanding I call a “horizontal or small agatology”. The distinctive feature here is the affirmative astonishment. Another perspective on the traditional understanding of values is the axiological universality of Władysław Stróżewski. In his view, value as Logos is the keystone of the whole preference order. The Logos is understood here as the highest value, or (in analogy to Plato’s concept of idea) as the value of values. At the same time, value means to him the triad of the transcendentals – goodness, truth, and beauty. In this way, value is located in the middle of metaphysics. The pre-axiological dimension also sets out two basic experiences: love and hope. Although they are not the values themselves, they shape a certain starting topos in which we move and which determines our preferences. Love as an experienced fulfillment allows us to desire other fulfillments and to keep a hope for the unexpectable future.
3

Czy odpowiedzialność za drugiego może być imperatywem rozumu? Kant a Levinas

100%
Hernas A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2014
|
vol. 42
|
issue 2
117-129
EN
This article is an attempt to confront Levinas’s ethics of responsibility with Kant’s theory of the categorical imperative and the autonomy of the mind on some crucial issues. Pointing out differences and similarities, I consider a number of hypotheses regarding their mutual relations. I propose the following options: the categorical imperative as a foundation of the principle of responsibility; responsibility for another as a condition of ethical sensibility in a subject capable of acting rationally and morally; Kant’s rational ethics as an elimination of ethics built on desire; responsibility for another as a fundamental questioning of the autonomy of the mind and free will; a possible synthesis of both ethics by limiting Kant’s concept of the autonomy of the mind and Levinas’s concept of absoluteness. While not deciding which stand is best justified, one must note Levinas’s symptomatic favoring of Kant, even though he is well-known as a thorough critic of European philosophy.
4
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Konstytucyjne prawo do prywatności a bezpieczeństwo państwa i porządek publiczny

44%
Hernas A.
Państwo i Społeczeństwo
|
2009
|
issue 3
167-177
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