Wydanie publikacji dofinansowane przez Komitet Badań Naukowych
RU
Научные публикации касающиеся польско-советских отношений периода после октября 1917 г., изданные в Польской Народной Республике и СССР, специфически. В них многие сюжеты умолчены или только затронуты, что связано с деятельностью цезуры. В новой обсталовке, когда историки и Польши, и Российской Федерации могут прямо высказываться о самых сложных вопросах касающихся взаимоотношений, возникает потребность критически переоценить существующую до сих пор историографию, указать ее достижения и пристрастия. Шагом в этом направлении является - по намерению автора - настоящая статья. Автор, конечно, рисует упрощенную картину, не охватывает множества публикаций, которых число огромное. Сделанный автором отбор во многом, вероятно, дискуссионный, но окончательный вывод кажется правильный. В области истории польско-советских отношений историкам много еще надо поработать, чтобы выйти на правильный, целостный синтез. Совместные работы историков Лодзинского и Московского университетов могут содействовать этому делу.
he State Social and Political History Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow include a very interesting document, dating back to April 1944. It is a statement made by Włodzimierz Sokorski, back then the deputy leader of the Polish 1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division, addressed to the Soviet authorities. In a servile, obsequious form, he assures about his absolute loyalty towards the Soviet state and the communist ideology. He explains how comrades from the Union of Polish Patriots and the Central Bureau of Polish Communists falsely accused him of political assaults and wanted to throw him out of any power over post-war Poland’s fate. He guarantees his utter loyalty towards Moscow. This document is connected to the once famous argument among Polish communists about the shape of the post-war state, inspired by the announcement of the so called Theses no. 1. In that conflict, Sokorski stood against the majority of the Union of Polish Patriots’ leaders, presenting a solution for Poland as a vassal to the Soviets, with the army having the same political role as the communist party. Sokorski lost the case, but thanks to Moscow’s support, he did not leave the game yet. The Kremlin probably assessed, that he would be useful after the war. After a short quarantine, he came back to the so called first echelon of Polish communist authorities. I am publishing this statement along with accompanying documents found in an archive portfolio.
Soon after the Soviet authorities had confessed to have committed the Katyn murder and had made public some of the documents connected to the case the Polish government made the legal claim addressed to the government of the Soviet Union to conduct the full rehabilitation its victims. The Military Prosecutor General’s Office of the Soviet Union commenced the investigation of the case (1990–2004). The issue seemed self-evident and yet it provoked and still is provoking a strong resistance on the part of Moscow – despite the documents whose meaning is evident and supports the claims of the Polish government. Moreover, in the first ten years of so after the claim its realization was legally easier than it is now. After 2004 there is a formal obstacle to it in the form of the closing formula of the investigation conducted by the Military Prosecutor General’s Office of – first Soviet Union and then – the Russian Federation. The Katyn Families attempts to conduct the rehabilitation of the Katyn murder victims in the Russian courts of law all failed which made the Katyn Families appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg. The case is still open (the appeal procedure) yet taking into consideration the Russian government’s stance its success is doubtful.
This article attempts an assessment of the Soviet Policy towards Poland in all the inter-war period. On the basis of a detailed analysis it demonstrates radical changes in this policy which in turn resulted from the changes within the Soviet Empire. In the years 1918-1939 'The New State' underwent three phases: ideological, pragmatic and imperial. Respectively, Poland was in turn: an obstacle, an ally-to-be and an object of some wider political designs aiming at Paris, Berlin or Geneva. Up until the mid-twenties the Bolsheviks had their active policy towards Poland which ended when 'The Rapallo Line' was finally established. Nevertheless, after Locarno and the Berlin Treaty Poland grew unimportant and secondary: therefore, to understand the policy of this period one should concentrate on the Soviet activity in all Europe, especially along the lines Moscow-Paris and Moscow-Berlin. In the 1930-s Poland was for the Soviet Empire only a part of these two political triangles and its importance kept decreasing. Finally, the question of Poland in the Soviet policy was settled in the Soviet-German Agreement of September 28, 1939 which is generally and justly viewed as a founding stone of 'The Fourth Partition of Poland'.