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1

HUSSERLOVA TEÓRIA INTERSUBJEKTIVITY AKO ALTEROLÓGIA. NOVÉ TEÓRIE A TRADIČNÁ MÚDROSŤ VO SVETLE GENETICKEJ FENOMENOLÓGIE

100%
Depraz N.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2007
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vol. 62
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issue 5
403-412
EN
In this paper, the autoress has twofold aim: First she wishes to show to what extent the Husserlian Theory of Intersubjectivity can be relevant for contemporary empirical research and for ancestral wisdom traditions, both in their experiences and in their conceptual tools; and secondly she intended to rely on some empirical results and the experiential mystical/practical reports in order to bring about some more refined phenomenological descriptions first provided by Husserl. The first aim will be the main concern here, while the second will only be broached by way of initial steps towards further development.
2

Actions as a Context for Realization of Meaning

80%
Duraj J.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2007
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vol. 16
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issue 1(61)
281-290
EN
The article shows how 'early' Heidegger approached the problem of intentionality. It begins with a reconstruction of Husserlian concept of intentionality understood as a perceptive act in which the object of experience is first constituted. The author shows subsequently that the Heideggerian understanding of intentionality does not apply to objects of perception but to meaning which can be 'grasped' in the practical attitude only. This attitude determines the pre-theoretical context of intentionality. In consequence, an overcoming of Husserl's 'methodical solipsism' is required if such a context of intentionality is to be understood. The experienced meanings express past intersubjective practices and the knowledge developed within it. An understanding based on the participation in the common world determines the perceptual situation. In consequence Husserl's idea of identifying the bare experience data becomes very questionable in this context.
3

The Concept of 'Lebenswelt' in Husserl's Phenomenology

80%
Lukasiewicz D.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2005
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vol. 14
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issue 2(54)
149-162
EN
The world of everyday life is a central concept in Husserl's philosophy. Its origins are not clear, however. It is often claimed that Husserl proposed the concept of 'Lebenswelt' rather unexpectedly (in 1936) and at the cost of destroying the continuity of his thought as a reaction to the growing popularity of the concept of 'Dasein' that had been introduced by Heidegger in the 'Being and time' (in 1927). The author finds this interpretation too simple and superficial. In his opinion problems subsumed under the notion of 'Lebenswelt' had been present in Husserl's writings at least twenty years before the name was first used. Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, books and lectures often referred to problems that directly or indirectly hinged on the idea of 'Lebenswelt'. Taking all of this into account plus the fact that 'Lebenswelt' is a private and individual experience for every human being, it is clear that we should accept as a logical possibility that different experiences of the world can be incommesurable, and their truth, though it appears unshaken to those who experience it directly, may in fact be no more that a sum of highly relativised visions of the world. But the author does not find this difficulty insurmountable.
4

HUSSERLOVA TRANSCENDENTÁLNA FENOMENOLÓGIA A DESCARTES I

80%
Ješič M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2006
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vol. 61
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issue 5
387 - 402
EN
Similarly to Husserl's gradually developing view of the fundamental phenomenological questions also his relationship to the philosophy of R. Descartes and to the history of philosophy as a whole underwent several changes. There is for example his shift from stressing (Descartes') 'universal attempt at doubt' to 'misunderstanding of Descartes' own discovery of ego'. Husserl sees Descartes' methodical skepticism as a crucial historical impulse for articulating his own conception of 'epoché'. Descartes' methodical skepticism and Husserl's putting in brackets the general thesis about the existence of the world show the closest parallel between their philosophical doctrines. Further, similarly to Descartes Husserl also aims at reforming the philosophy of his time; in Descartes' 'Meditations on first philosophy' he finds the way leading to transcendental phenomenology. However, there are also differences in their projects of universal philosophy. While for Descartes the model of his 'mathesis universalis' is mathematical science, Husserl aims - with far reaching consequences - at creating transcendental phenomenology as a strictly scientific philosophy which must offer a fundamental organon to all other sciences and thus enable them to undergo fundamental reforms.
5

Husserlian Lebenswelt as a metaphysical structure

80%
Rolewski J.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2005
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vol. 14
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issue 2(54)
163-174
EN
In his 'Crisis of European Sciences' Husserl reports that he has made a discovery of the 'deep structure' of the experienced world (a priori 'Lebenswelt') which plays a fundamental role in cognition. It is the most essential condition of knowing the truth about the world and it is a metaphysical structure that determines the world's mode of existence. Husserl defined this structure as the 'primary ratio' that underlies all forms of rationality, including also scientific rationality.
6

HUSSERLOVA TRANSCENDENTÁLNA FENOMENOLÓGIA A DESCARTES II

80%
Ješič M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 6
453-464
EN
The appearance of 'the transcendental motif' in the history of philosophy is, by Husserl, related to the situation, in which the naive determination of the world became problematic. By the universal character of this motif we cast doubt on the world and also on the sciences, which examine it. 'Descartes, however, does not comprehend the object in its meaning'; hence the main Husserl's reproach against Descartes: instead of the meaning of the object Descartes sees 'in cogitatum' a visual object. Husserl sees this 'self-misinterpretation' as Descartes' misunderstanding of his own promising origins. This self-misinterpretation culminated in identifying ego, which Descartes discovered due to reduction, with 'I' - the human being. Husserl made use of Descartes in transcendental phenomenology to justify the claim of phenomenology to be a universal strict science. 'Thus we get a picture of Descartes for phenomenology' (Husserl's Descartes), while the historical character of Descartes' philosophy (Descartes' Descartes) is diminishing. It is one of the deformations caused by Husserl' effort to get foundation for a strictly and apodictically transcendental phenomenology. One of its victims was also Descartes' philosophy, whose greatness is in being this victim.
7

SATUROVANÝ FENOMÉN

80%
Marion J.-L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 5
378-402
EN
The author tries to outline the new possibilities the phenomenology offers for the considerations of a specific type of phenomenality which in some respects goes beyond the rules of phenomenalization as defined by Husserl in connection with 'the principle of principles' as well as exploring the horizon, i.e. the constitutive condition of any giving. While the phenomenon - equally with Kant and Husserl - gives itself to the extent corresponding its intuition inadequacy or 'lacking' of intuition, the author tries to outline (with all consequences included) such a conception of a phenomenon, which would be marked by a 'surplus' of intuition. Drawing on Husserl and especially on Kant, the definition of the 'saturated phenomenon' proceeds step by step on the ground of a critical interpretation of some Kantian concepts. Such an unconditioned and irreducible phenomenon transcends in its nature everything the intentional meaning is able to comprehend. From this it is obvious, that the concept of a saturated phenomenon urges us to revise also the phenomenological concept of subject as a constitutive instance (facing the saturated phenomenon the subject on the contrary becomes a constituted instance). Further, the phenomenological analysis borders here a certain type of religious experience.
8

TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF RUPTURE

80%
Lipták M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2025
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vol. 80
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issue 5
682 – 696
EN
What makes phenomena such as birth, death, creation or fate specifically “limit phenomena” within Husserl’s phenomenology are not simply their difficulty, but also that they seem to threaten phenomenology as a transcendentalist project. As a transcendentalist project, phenomenology tries to overcome contingency by seeking the apodictic and necessary, leading Husserl to focus on normal, optimal, typical phenomena. It is at the margins that phenomenology is threatened by collapsing back into contingency. In my paper, I propose the concept of “rupture” as that which best expresses the limit-character of limit phenomena. The rupture in the normal course of experience calls for re-configuration that introduces novelty. I suggest that a systematic investigation into phenomenology of rupture may help phenomenology to address the problem of novelty.
9

On the existential analysis

70%
Marosan B. P.
Magyar Filozofiai Szemle (Hungarian Review of Philosophy)
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2004
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vol. 48
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issue 4
495-523
EN
The essay tries to give a Husserlian interpretation of the existential analysis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'. Though in the period of 'Being and Time' there was already an extreme distance between the phenomenological method of Heidegger's and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, on closer examination Heidegger's phenomenology of that time turns out to be in a certain way compatible with Husserl's methodology. If we interpret the phenomenological results of 'Being and Time' in the Husserlian terminology of intentionality then the methodology of existential analysis is proved to be a macro-phenomenology: the phenomenology of human life-story's horizon as a whole in contrast to the husserlian micro-phenomenology of the life of consciousness. On a thematic level the sharpest difference of the transcendental phenomenology and existential analysis seems to be the concept of self. Heidegger often criticizes the traditional phenomenal-phenomenological view of the self-identical, 'empty' I-pole, saying that that view interprets the self like something 'present-at-hand' (vorhanden). This paper deals mostly with this charge. At the 'Being and Time' to give a phenomenon the interpretation of presence-at-the-hand (Vorhandensein) means to uproot this phenomenon from its real context in the life-world. The author tried to show on one hand that we can interconnect the Husserlian concept of transcendental ego with the Heideggerian here-being through the concept of the here-being's 'ever-mineness' (Jemeinigkeit), on the other hand that the context of being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein) is approachable in the same manner or a Husserlian interpretation.
10
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Kartezjańska droga Edmunda Husserla do redukcji transcendentalnej

70%
Kaniewski M.
Filo-Sofija
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2007
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vol. 7
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issue 7
141-162
EN
This article intends to bring up the very core of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, it means the issue of the transcendental reduction, which, according to the idea of the creator of phenomenology, could solve the problems like: the correlation between subject and object, the issue of transcendence, and the precision of philosophy as well. The present text is tied only to showing the transcendental reduction, conducted by Husserl by the Cartesian way. This method of doing reduction is the most fundamental, because of the fact that philosopher intends to break the new ground of sure, imperturbable, irreducible and resistant to any doubt base of recognition. Similar searches were conducted by René Descartes. The author shortly describes the issue of the correlation between subject and object in the point of view of George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant; these philosophers concentrated on the pretences of recognition. Edmund Husserl was inspired by their philosophy. Then, author describes the way to the transcendental reduction, the pretence of the “natural world” and concentrates on showing the issue of reduction- the most controversial point in Husserl’s philosophy. The article is finished by the short philosophical meditation, which is the try of realization the theoretical think.
11

Fenomenologia jako horyzont normatywności

70%
Maciejczak M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2017
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vol. 45
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issue 2
35-49
EN
My aim is to put together Husserl’s main ideas on the phenomenological method, to show the phases of its development as the consciousness’ reflection about itself. The condition of possibility of such reflection is that there be a point of view which guarantees access to the intentional domain, and also that the subject be able to enquire into the ways its intentional experiences are connected to the world. This condition, it is argued here, should be considered to be a regulative idea. Phenomenological reduction, which enables phenomenological reflection, is really an unending process, a series of reductions that lead to evidence. Looking for evidence is the source of the dynamic of consciousness; this primary curiosity, this striving to fulfill intentions lies at the bottom of all its interests and purposes. Cartesian clara and distincta perceptio motivates the positing of each object as real or unreal, possible, probable, or dubious. The search for evidence is, therefore, the character of consciousness as such; striving for evidence makes life of the mind rational, i.e., oriented toward truth and objectivity. Phenomenology, seen as reviving the norms of cognizing and acting, makes it possible to think of the unity of philosophy, science, and life, and is still worth being treated as a cure for today’s irrationality and subjectivity.
12
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Ideen I von Edmund Husserl im Lichte der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin

70%
Cyciura P.
Filo-Sofija
|
2009
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vol. 9
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issue 9
133-154
EN
Transcendence is understood by Husserl as a being for consciousness. This means that it is ontically not self-reliant. Availing myself of Husserl’s qualification of the constitution as Erzeugung, Produktion – I reinterpret the concept of transcendence as a concept of product. Moreover, I reinterpret the concept of Husserl’s teleology in the light of Thomas’ analysis of act. It appears that responsibility implies the being for others, not simply for consciousness; it implies the being not of the product itself, but of the gift for the person. The products are really not self-reliant, as they can always be deprived of the gift-character and became man-hostile (alienation).
13

Wewnętrzna świadomość czasu muzycznego w ujęciu Edmunda Husserla

70%
Krawiec A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2017
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vol. 45
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issue 3
27-48
EN
The article discusses the problem of musical time presented in Edmund Husserl's On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. The author of this article aims to describe the basic properties of immanent time on the basis of an analysis of the musical, resp. sound examples given by Husserl. Husserl's reflections on inner time-consciousness – preceding Roman Ingarden's examination of musical time included in The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity – constitute an important stage in the reflections on immanent time in a musical work. The article, as a study belonging to the phenomenology of music, is a critical analysis of the basic terms of phenomenology of time, such as original impressions, retention, protention, consciousness, perception, and intentionality.
14

Theory of Intentionality in 'Logische Ungersuchungen' by Edmund Husserl

70%
Plotka W.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2008
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vol. 17
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issue 1(65)
111-123
EN
The article examines the problem of intentionality in the Husserlian philosophy. The author is interested especially in the theory of intentionality, which is presented by the philosopher in the 'Logical Investigations'. According to Husserl phenomenology is the science which is founded on the genuine knowledge. The genuine character of knowledge means that it has direct character. Also scientist would have infallible and unmediated link to the reality. Consideration about relationship between the structures of intentionality and the language, could question legitimacy of the postulate of the direct experience. Syntactical and semantical structures of language seem to determine Husserl's considerations about the intentionality of consciousness. If it was so, knowledge about the intentionality always would be indirect. The knowledge mediates in the earlier pre-reflective understanding of expressions. The postulate of the direct character of knowledge had been specific to the 'Logical Investigations', but Husserl's attitude to that postulate was changed in his mature philosophy. The author suggests that we could find in Husserl's mature philosophy the new model of science. The new science is founded on the confidence that the knowledge is always indirect.
15

PROBLÉM VNITŘKU VNITŘNÍHO VĚDOMÍ V HUSSERLOVĚ FENOMENOLOGII SE ZŘETELEM K POJMU VNITŘNÍHO U PLATÓNA

70%
Rybák D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2025
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vol. 80
|
issue 5
635 – 649
EN
This study explores parallels between Plato’s soul structure and Husserl’s intentional consciousness regarding the “inner.” It argues Plato’s “inner” is a relational view of soul and world via action, surprisingly connected to Husserl’s overcoming psychologization and dynamic intentionality. This path suggests that what appears as subjectivist or Cartesian legacy within phenomenology has deeper roots, namely Husserl’s central motif of the inner as inner consciousness, the ground in which all constitution occurs. Despite parallels, the study notes key differences in their architectonics (soul vs. immanent consciousness, ideal, theory). Ultimately, it shows phenomenology’s approach to the “inner” as unveiling external meaning’s presuppositions offers a distinct yet complementary perspective to Plato’s soul structure in the order of Forms.
16

Eugenii Blausteinowej z Ginsbergów krytyka Husserlowskiej teorii całości i części na tle tez ontologii egzystencjalnej Romana Ingardena

61%
Barska K.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2019
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vol. 47
|
issue 2
25 - 42
EN
The purpose of this article is to reconstruct Ginsberg's critique of Husserl's (semi-formal) whole and part theory. In order to clarify Ginsberg's position I refer to the terms introduced into ontological discourse by Roman Ingarden. Unfortunately, neither Husserl's whole-parts theory, nor Ginsberg's work on inseparability/separability, despite their undeniable merits, has attracted strong interest among many philosophers. But one could, for instance, fruitfully investigate whether their detailed analyses of whole-part theory, inseparability/separability, different kinds of relations, and forms of dependence, have something of value to offer in the current discussions in continental philosophy, or even in analytic philosophy of modern ontology. According to Husserl's intuition, these topics are fundamental to ontology and therefore they are still relevant; there is still much to learn from those painstaking investigations of ontological relations. In this article, I do not discuss Ginsberg's criticism of the intentional or “psychologistic” approach to the question of inseparability/separability, because it is worth discussing in a separate paper.
17

TRANSCENDENTÁLNA FUNKCIA UMENIA V HUSSERLOVSKEJ FENOMENOLÓGII

61%
Lipták M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 9
779 – 789
EN
In the paper the anticipation of the transcendental function of art and artistic production in the phenomenological system of Edmund Husserl is under scrutiny. Despite the strong links between art and Husserl’s phenomenology, explicitly Husserl himself never considered art as having philosophical significance for his system. Thus I start by describing the way in which the “principle of art” closes up another transcendental system – that of Immanuel Kant. Then the author proceeds to show the close parallels between Kant’s reasoning in transcendental deduction and Husserl’s genetic analyses. He continues by analysing the possible reasons why Husserl has not applied the “principle of art” in the way Kant did and then he looks for possible places of application of this principle in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally the author shows how Husserl actually prepared the ground for such application for the further generation of phenomenologists.
18

DILHEYOVSKÝ OBRAT FENOMENOLÓGIE: RICŒUR A HUSSERL

61%
Petit J.-L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 9
741 – 751
EN
The author’s focus is on the comparison of two phenomenologists, one of them being the founding father of phenomenology and another French phenomenologist of the second generation. The key issue of the comparison is the constitution of the cultural world implying the confrontation with human sciences. This is something tried already by Husserl, who was influenced in his endeavour by Dilthey (the evidence of it is one of the last volumes of Huserliana (No XXXIX). Ricœur’s hermeneutics of culture also aimed at a dialogue with humanities, although for him this “Diltheyan turn” remained unnoticed: the above mentioned volume of Husserliana has not been at his disposal when he was opening the phenomenology to humanities.
19
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U źródeł krytyki teorii poznania w szkole frankfurckiej

61%
Płotka W.
Filo-Sofija
|
2011
|
vol. 11
|
issue 2-3(13-14)
769-790
EN
The author argues that the Frankfurt School’s critique of phenomenology as the theory of cognition (as defined by Theodore W. Adorno) is unjustified. The article is divided into five main parts. In the first part, historical, as well as theoretical relations between the two philosophical currents are reconstructed. In the second part, Adorno’s critique of the theory of cognition is defined with regard to Husserl’s phenomenology in particular. The third part of the article analyses why Adorno’s critique seems to be unjustified. The author shows that Husserl denied the theses which Adorno criticized. In the fourth part, the author enlarges the argument by showing that Husserl’s critique of scientific rationality is similar with Adorno’s proposition. Nonetheless, in the fifth part the author stresses main differences between the two critiques of rationality. .
20

Naukowa obiektywizacja i doświadczenie winy – lektura listów Kartezjusza w świetle uwag Husserla

61%
Nawrocki A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2012
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vol. 40
|
issue 1
59 - 71
EN
This article is devoted to the correspondence between Descartes and Princess Elizabeth. In the first part the author presents and analyzes the passages about guilt (the sense of sinfulness, regret, remorse, contempt for oneself). Attention is drawn to Descartes' reluctance to undergo feelings of guilt and to convince the Princess that the experience of guilt is necessary for man. The second part presents some of the remarks of Edmund Husserl on the philosophy of Descartes and the possibility of experiencing the sense of reality, contained in the book: "The Crisis ...". The author highlights some parallels between the statements of Husserl and Princess Elizabeth. These similarities lead him to believe that Princess Elizabeth was aware that the removal of the experience of guilt prevents a person from experiencing the sense of reality. The author argues for the hypothesis that feelings of guilt are a condition of experiencing the sense of reality.
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