The author of the article concentrates on the issue of the role of humour and jokes in the social life of a person and the qualitative jump which that person makes in understanding humorous situations at around 3-4 years of age. Supporting his argument with theses from the realms of psychology and evolutionary sociology, he points out the possible lines along which laughter and humour could have developed in the primates, including Homo Sapiens. The key concept in these deliberations is the theory of mind module, the mental capacity which makes possible empathy, the manipulation of the partner in the interaction and the understanding of the false convictions which seem to be the foundations of understanding humorous situations. While referring to his own observations the author tries to outline the principles governing human laughter depending on the presence of the theory of mind module. He points out that it is that which enriches interaction and the exchange of information which is important from a social point of view. The conclusions drawn from the concept of the theory of thought also allows for acknowledgement of the fact that understanding the punch line is based on the same mechanisms as understanding the essence of culture, as a result of which the thesis can be put forward that there is a very strong tie between a person's level of culture and their ability to perceive humorous situations.
The paper deals with the relationship between human nature and culture, taking into account the return of the philosophical anthropology back into the intellectual discourse and indicating the motifs of this paradoxical return. The linkage between human nature and culture is examined as related to the position of the human species in nature, as well as to the social-cultural evolution of the humans. The classification of the metaphysical and empirical-scientific approaches leads the authoress to the conclusion that due to new empirical findings and technological innovations (neurosciences, artificial intelligence, evolutionary psychology, and genetic engineering) it is necessary to redefine the concepts of the corporeality and human nature.
Pierre L. van den Berghe was born in 1933 in Congo, Africa. He was awarded United States of America citizenship in 1955 and lives in Seattle with his German wife. Fluent in French, English, Spanish and German, Prof. van den Berghe is a child of a mixed marriage, who also speaks Swahili, Dutch, Afrikaans and Portugues. He studied at prestigious universities of Stanford, Sorbonne and Harvard. He had lectured across the U.S., in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Israel, Australia, Germany, etc. He is Professor Emeritus of the University of Washington. Professor van den Berghe is a sociologist, but considered controversial because of his insistence on the necessity to expand the social scientist's knowledge of natural sciences, especially biology. For many years he has been involved with the so-called sociobiology, a discipline that does not strictly separate the study of humans from the wider context of the evolutionary theory. Within the field of nationalism studies, van den Berghe is often labelled a 'primordialist'. This term is used for those who seek for causes of nationalism not only in relation to the past two centuries of human existence (the so-called 'modernists') but dig for answers deeper into the human history. The still very vibrant and exuberant professor visited the University of Ljubljana in May 2005, where he gave a few lectures on sociobiology.
From the very outset sociology has waged a fight for its survival against 'reductionism': it resists the interpretation of social phenomena through other levels of reality (demographic, biological, geographic), because allegedly that would deny the specificity of social life and the singularity of humans as a unique biological species. However, the current state of knowledge, especially dynamic developments in biology (socio-biology, neo-Darwinism, evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology), has forced sociology to re-think its relationship to reductionism in general - accepting it as a possible principle of interpretation - and specifically - precisely specifying when it is possible and useful to apply the reductionist principle. Although it is possible to respect criticism of radical reductionism (Frankl, Bertalanffy), today it is necessary to search for new ways of cooperating with the natural sciences and probably even to re-design study curricula in the field. By accepting the reductionist principle sociology is not losing its specificity, as long as it takes into the account the distinctiveness of the social and natural sciences (some social phenomena really cannot be described or explained in reductionist terms).
The article - based on the latest results - reconstructs the main steps of human evolution. It identifies the most important 'revolutions' and analyses their effects on the 'behaviour-programmes' of the Homo. These 'programmes' are built on each other, and determine the individual and social behaviour of humans. These evolutionary steps and behaviour-programmes are analysed by different social sciences, such as human ecology, sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and subsequently by cultural anthropology. The article argues that it is useful to differentiate between the steps of the emergence of the modern human and symbolic 'revolution' and later, between the neolith and institutional revolution.
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