Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  INTENTIONS
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

INTENTIONS, AKRASIA, AND MERE PERMISSIBILITY

100%
Way J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 4
588 – 611
EN
Something is wrong with akrasia, means-end incoherence, and intention inconsistency. This observation has led many philosophers to postulate ‘wide-scope’ requirements against these combinations of attitudes. But other philosophers have argued that this is unwarranted. They claim that we can explain what is wrong with these combinations of attitudes by appealing only to plausible independent claims about reasons for particular beliefs and intentions. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers may well be right about akrasia but that they are wrong about means-end incoherence and intention inconsistency. While it is plausibly impossible to be akratic while having no specific attitude (or lack of an attitude) that you should not have, it is possible to be means-end incoherent or to have inconsistent intentions while having no specific attitude you should not have. There is thus a strong motivation for accepting wide-scope requirements against means-end incoherence and intention inconsistency which does not apply to akrasia. This result offers support to a view of means-end coherence and intention consistency I have defended elsewhere.
2
Content available remote

THE ISSUE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL INTENTIONS MEASUREMENT (Problemy pomiaru intencji przedsiebiorczych)

100%
Kurczewska A.
e-mentor
|
2010
|
issue 4(36)
12-16
EN
Recently, the explanations of the entrepreneurship nature tend to expand beyond the boundaries of economic sciences and begin to refer also to human sciences. Taking a decision about launching an economic activity is a final step of the process of prompting one's entrepreneurial activity. The process is preceded by entrepreneurial intentions, shaped by a set of conditions influencing human perception of reality. Familiarity with entrepreneurial intentions has a great significance for creating the programs of economic education. The article presents the possible ways of entrepreneurial intentions measurement and interpretation.
3

READINESS TO TRAINING AND FURTHER EDUCATION UNDERTAKING: TEORETICAL CONCEPTION AND MEASUREMENT METHODS (Gotowosci do podejmowania szkolen i dalszego ksztalcenia. Propozycja ujecia teoretycznego i skal pomiaru)

100%
Kawecka K., Laguna M., Tabor K.
Organization and Management
|
2010
|
issue 140
43-56
EN
The article presents the review of research on the undertaking of training and further education by adults. It shows limitations of existing research findings and proposes the theoretical model based on the model of action phases in the goal realization process. There are also measurement methods described which could be used in further research.
4

SELECTED ISSUES OF THE COPYRIGHT IN MUSICAL COMPOSITION (PART II.) LEGAL ASPECTS OF PERFOMERS' CHANGES IN THE AUTHORIAL WORK FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE SLOVAK AND CZECH LEGISLATION (Slovak title - below)

75%
Adamov N.
Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)
|
2009
|
vol. 92
|
issue 5
427-438
EN
(Title in Slovak - 'Vybrane otazky autorskeho prava v oblasti hudobnej tvorby (II. cast) Pravne aspekty zasahov vykonneho umelca do autorskeho diela z hladiska slovenskej a ceskej pravnej upravy'). A performance of authorial piece of work is not only making of its use, but often the interpretation is connected with some interference beyond the author's intentions. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between 'the use of the work' as a general term, 'an intervention into the work' as a specific term and 'a processing of the work' as the most specific term. Within the processing of the work, parody has a peculiar position. On the one hand, it must stand in relation to the original work; on the other hand, this relationship is specific in that it more or less fundamentally denies the parodied work and simultaneously, so to speak, parasitizes upon it. In the parody of a musical work one must distinguish two levels: the relation of the reworked text to the original text and the relation of the reworked text to the original musical component. Where the relation of both texts is concerned, the parody might be unambiguously another work which does not devalue the original text, even while being its deliberate deformation, because the original text (as a separable part of the musical work) only creates an association on the basis of so-called gradual semiosis. What is fundamental, however, is that the significance of the new work is changed. In this case authorial legal protection could not be applied against such an encroachment, because only the thought included in the work would be affected.
5

UNDERSTANDING OF INTENTIONS, SHARED INTENTIONS: THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL THINKING

51%
Tomasello M., Carpenter M., Call J., Behne T., Moll H.
Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle (Hungarian Psychological Review)
|
2007
|
vol. 62
|
issue 1
61-105
EN
The authors propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: 1. the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and 2. a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.