At the end of the 19th century, two monographs on empirical psychology were published: W. Wundt’s Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie and F. Brentano’s Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. They set different research standards, indicating a differently defined subject as well as the methodology of the new science. The psychology of the 20th and 21st centuries focused mainly on Wundt’s program, while Brentano’s program was included in philosophical analyses. However, this led to significant changes in psychology, which today can be seen as deep reductionism, narrowing the subject matter, and difficulties in constructing theories. In the article, I suggest that it might be helpful to recall the basic assumptions of Brentano’s psychology and the schools derived from it, such as e.g. the Lvov‑Warsaw School. Therefore, the article aims to indicate the theoretical space that has been emerging for some time, in which the school of Kazimierz Twardowski could present original philosophical and psychological achievements.
Stein’s theory of empathy lies at the intersection of the phenomenological findings of E. Husserl and M. Scheler. By presenting the issue of “empathy” in a broader framework, including intentionality, the originality of experience, the issue of personality and the individual identity, as well as the so-called world of values, namely the culture, I argue for a dynamic, process-oriented concept of dealing with feelings, namely diapathy. ------------- Received: 16/01/2020. Reviewed: 23/02/2020. Accepted: 15/03/2020
PL
Koncepcja Edyty Stein rozumienia drugiego człowieka jest znana z jej dysertacji O zagadnieniu wczucia. Niemniej, gruntowne przebadanie struktury osobowości ludzkiej, jakie podjęła w Filozofii psychologii i humanistyki, rzuca nowe światło na tę kwestię. Stein dokonuje swoistej syntezy Husserlowskiego prymatu prawdy i Schelerowskiej koncepcji miłości, unikając przy tym idealizmu i woluntaryzmu, którym obarczone są te stanowiska. Steinowska koncepcja znajduje kontynuację w fenomenologii Merleau-Ponty’ego i R. Barbarasa. ------------- Zgłoszono: 16/01/2020. Zrecenzowano: 23/02/2020. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 15/03/2020
The aim of this article is to provide a comparative analysis of (i) the act of belief in Jan Łukasiewicz’s conception and (ii) the act of judging in the view of idiogenic theory of judgment. According to Łukasiewicz, the act of belief is not a propositional entity, which reproduces (correctly or not) the states of affairs to which it is intentional directed. Consequently, the act of belief is not a carrier of truth but rather a feeling of reality of something to what it is directed. If one analyses Łukasiewicz’s remarks about beliefs, he would agree that the act of belief is the same as the act of judging understood within the idiogenic theory of judgment. In turn, in phenomenological terms: Łukasiewicz’s belief and idiogenic act of judging could be defined as “thetical moment” or “moment of capturing the reality” (R. Ingarden) or Setzungsmoment (E. Husserl).