Skeptical theism—a strategy for dealing with so-called “evidential arguments from evil”—is often held to lead to moral skepticism. In this paper I look at some of the responses open to the skeptical theist to the contention that her position leads to moral skepticism, and argue that they are ultimately unsuccessful, since they leave the skeptical theist with no grounds for ruling out the possibility of maximal divine deception. I then go on to argue that the situation is particularly bleak for the skeptical theist, since the most prominent ways of dealing with this pervasive type of skepticism are not available to her. Furthermore, since this pervasive type of skepticism entails moral skepticism, it follows that moral skepticism will after all have found a way in “through the back door.” In order to solidify my case, I go on to outline and deal with three potential objections.
Professional skepticism is an essential concept in auditing practice and theory. It has been identified in almost all existing auditing standards, however, the way it should be characterized is still unclear. Both researchers and regulators emphasize the importance of the concept but struggle on how to define and measure it. It is also often difficult to indicate if the lack of skepticism is the primary cause of audit deficiencies and what factors led to the lack of skepticism. The purpose of this paper is to synthesize research related to auditors’ professional skepticism and indicate major characteristics of such an attitude. I organize research studies into six categories related to attributes that a skeptic should possess: a questioning mind, a suspension of judgment, a search for knowledge, interpersonal understanding, self-esteem, and autonomy. These research findings have implications for practice and regulations (standards), but in order to understand how skeptical judgment translates into skeptical action, additional research will need to be conducted.
Contemporary theatrical work often reflects the artists' sceptical view of the relationship between man and the world, or the frustration of the individual existing amidst negative forces outside and within himself, against which he cannot effectively define himself or escape. The present text, using a selected sample of works from Slovak and Czech operas of the 21st century, explores the means based on the poetics of absurd and post-dramatic theatre, which authors use to convey a sense of meaninglessness, banality, and the hopelessness of life, and/or use them in the sense of persiflage, caricature, or nonsense. The author of the study identifies them in the sense of expressing the creators' attitude to the state of society, also in the musical-dramaturgical structure of individual opuses. She also examines them in the relation of the creators to opera as a music-dramatic art, which is, on the one hand, connected with the past, but on the other hand, is created and reciprocated in the current time.
The article compares the philosophies of Ernst Cassirer and Helmuth Plessner concerning the modes of modernity. Plessner is one of those thinkers, who are most consistent in accepting modernity, whereas Cassirer is not. The point that generates this different level is the explicit self-reflection of Plessner in contrast to a systematic silence of Cassirer. One can see this difference by analysing the role of scepticism within these two modes of anthropology.
Ayn Rand and Allan Bloom are among the most well-known American critics of the contemporary universities. They both point out that the crisis of modern university is a reflection of a much broader crisis of contemporary culture. The purpose of this text is to present the arguments of both thinkers, which confirm the diagnosis of the university crisis. In Rand and Bloom’s work we can find the characteristics of a number of symptoms of this crisis. The most important are: 1) the political and ideological entanglement of the university environment; 2) all-encompassing skepticism; 3) the lack of a coherent vision of reality; 4) irrationality and departure from reason; 5) the postulate of neutrality and the avoidance of moral judgments; 6) retreat from philosophy and humanistic education.
Not many readers will recognize Disowning Knowledge: Seven Plays of Shakespeare by Stanley Cavell as either a piece of philosophical writing or literary criticism, so it may be useful to ask what method Cavell uses to read literature, what are the main features of his approach, and whether he has a coherent view on what reading literature means. I examine Cavell’s interdisciplinary eclecticism, the feature which makes his work so original, and I describe his moving away from the British and American analytic tradition in which he was trained to other sources of inspiration, especially Thoreau. I also stress the important fact that Cavell does not avoid autobiographical motifs in his writings, the style of which derives to some extent from the Jewish tradition of storytelling. In his writings Cavell declares his adherence to an ahistorical approach, maintaining that in a sense philosophy is trans‑historical. In many of his books the central issue is the challenge that skepticism poses, and he endeavors to make a convincing case against it. Although Cavell’s work covers a broad range of interests, including tragedy and literature, as well as Romantic poetry, Shakespeare, Henry James and Samuel Beckett, I try to answer the question of why his analyses of skepticism in literature focus especially on the works of Shakespeare.
Scattered remarks on different types of reason can be found in Emil Cioran’s books. In the here presented essay it was shown that all the distinguished varieties of reason are connected to each other and it is possible to talk about emerging of another type from the previous one. These types are: naïve reason, rationalistic reason, negating reason, doubtful reason and expanded reason. Naïve reason is the one that serves life without self-consciousness. Rationalistic reason makes decrees on reality. In his critical remarks Cioran describes rationalistic reason as being dangerous. Two other types of reason are the negating and the doubtful one. Cioran proves that affirmation leads human beings to giving up themselves and that liberation always comes through constant fight for negation. Negating reason is always turned towards something external to itself. Doubtful reason goes much further by actually turning against itself, it is in constant struggle against itself. Cioran describes this process as separating the reason and standing face to face with yourself. Therefore he is aware that only the reason itself can become a judge of reason. The fifth type of reason which can be distinguished in Cioran’s philosophy might be called the extended reason as it is a demand for unfolding the reason. When one realizes that there is nothing permanent in the world and cognition can’t bring any permanent results either, the reason according to Cioran might become active again by turning back towards reality – however without any further dogma of objective truth – and by using “flowing” ideas it can unite with reality.
Skepticism is a doctrine which holds the possibilities of knowledge to be limited. There are many types of skepticism (practical /theoretical, partial/total, moderate/ radical, etc). Scepticism as a philosophy began with Pyrrho of Elis (365–275 BC). The rediscovery of the skeptical texts during Renaissance affected the development of modern sceptical currents. In France philosophical statements of skepticism were offered by Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592). Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) great French mathematician, scientist, inventor an religious thinker was familiar with Montaigne sceptical ideas. Pascal refers to Montaigne as the most illustrious defender of skepticism. Blaise Pascal point of view is original. Whenever he insists that no proof is ever certain but simultaneously he adds that skepticism is untenable because we have reasons to believe.
Skepticism is a doctrine which holds the possibilities of knowledge to be limited. There are many types of skepticism (practical /theoretical, partial/total, moderate/ radical, etc). Scepticism as a philosophy began with Pyrrho of Elis (365–275 BC). The rediscovery of the skeptical texts during Renaissance affected the development of modern sceptical currents. In France philosophical statements of skepticism were offered by Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592). Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) great French mathematician, scientist, inventor an religious thinker was familiar with Montaigne sceptical ideas. Pascal refers to Montaigne as the most illustrious defender of skepticism. Blaise Pascal point of view is original. Whenever he insists that no proof is ever certain but simultaneously he adds that skepticism is untenable because we have reasons to believe.
Marketing społecznie zaangażowany jest coraz częściej praktykowany, jednakże niewiele jest wiadomo na temat sceptycyzmu pokolenia Z. Celem badań jest zrozumienie przyczyn i konsekwencji sceptycyzmu wobec programów CRM wśród Z konsumentów. Badania ilościowe wykorzystano do przetestowania modelu koncepcyjnego za pomocą modelu równań strukturalnych (SEM). Wszystkie hipotezy zostały potwierdzone. Badania dostarczają empirycznych dowodów na to, że altruizm konsumencki i postrzegana motywacja firmy negatywnie wpływają na sceptycyzm wobec kampanii CRM. Ponadto pokazują jego wpływ na intencję zakupu konsumentów pokolenia Z. Wraz ze wzrostem sceptycyzmu zmniejsza się ich skłonność do nabycia produktów wspierających sprawę społeczną. Wyniki badań są istotne zarówno dla akademików, jak i praktyków. Pracownicy naukowi zostaną wzbogaceni o wiedzę na temat prospołecznych zachowań pokolenia Z. Natomiast praktykom badania pomogłyby skutecznie projektować kampanie marketingu społecznie zaangażowanego. Według wiedzy autora w Polsce nie przeprowadzono podobnych badań.
EN
Although cause-related marketing (CRM) is being increasingly applied, little is known about GenZ skepticism. This study aimed to understand the antecedents and consequences of skepticism towards CRM offers among GenZ consumers. Quantitative research was used to test the conceptual model using structural equation model (SEM). The analysis confirmed the proposed hypothesis. The author's findings provide empirical evidence that altruism and the perceived company’s motivation negatively affect skepticism toward a CRM campaign. This study further proves the effect of consumer skepticism on purchase intention. As skepticism increases, the willingness to buy cause-related products decreases. The findings are relevant for both scholars and marketers. Scientists will be enriched with knowledge about the prosocial behaviour of Generation Z. From a managerial perspective, this research could help practitioners to design CRM campaigns effectively. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no such study has been conducted in the context of Poland.
The article analyses the argument from the justified use of force, put forward against jusnaturalist skepticism by Stephan Kinsella. This argument is intended to show that skepticism about natural rights has become entangled in a performative contradiction, because in order to prove that no natural rights exist, it must assume the existence of such rights. The defeat of jusnaturalist skepticism, in turn, is to prove apagogically the existence of natural rights, including the libertarian private property rights. The article shows, using Hohfeld’s analysis method, that the anti-skeptical argument from the justified use of force does not achieve its goals.
PL
Artykuł analizuje argument z uzasadnionego użycia siły wysunięty przeciwko sceptycyzmowi jusnaturalistycznemu przez Stephana Kinsellę. Argument ten ma za zadanie wykazać, iż sceptycyzm odnośnie do uprawnień naturalnych wikła się w sprzeczność performatywną, ponieważ aby dowieść, że żadne prawa naturalne nie istnieją, musi on założyć istnienie takich praw. Porażka sceptycyzmu jusnaturalistycznego ma z kolei dowodzić apagogicznie istnienia uprawnień naturalnych, a więc i libertariańskich praw własności prywatnej. Artykuł wykazuje za pomocą metody analizy hohfeldowskiej, że antysceptyczny argument z uzasadnionego użycia siły nie osiąga swoich celów.
Cyrano de Bergerac’s comic narratives provocatively grant speech to animals and plants, radically decentering anthropocentric perspectives. While animal enunciation has been extensively studied, vegetal discourse in Cyrano’s works remains underexplored. This article focuses on the Demon of Socrates’ encomium praising the intellectual superiority of cabbages in the Lune. Beyond its materialist subversion, the speech act raises ethical concerns about appropriating and translating vegetal silence. Though fiction allows cabbages a voice, their muteness persists, foregrounding the incommensurability between human and plant communication. Cyrano’s burlesque world paradoxically highlights the violence inherent in ventriloquizing mute beings.
The paper analyzes the strategy of refuting skepticism by virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Responses to skeptical challenge are overviewed. The philosophical and meta-philosophical strategies are outlined. The solution based on distinguishing between reflective knowledge and animal knowledge is considered. The internalist assumptions of skepticism are critically exposed. The notion of web of belief is further used to support an anti-skeptical position. Shane Ryan’s notion of epistemic grace is put forward in defense of the virtue epistemology approach.
Philosophical interests of Joseph Życiński (1948-2011) in the domain of the philosophy of science were focused on the debate concerning the nature of science and philosophy of science that followed the Einstein-Planck revolution in science. The unexpected discovery of the philosophical, extra-scientific presuppositions in science, as well as of the extra-rational factors determining the way these presuppositions are accepted in science were to be explained within the meta-scientific framework. It is the aim of this paper to present ˙ Życiński’s diagnosis of this post-revolutionary situation in the philosophy of science as well as his critique of the metascientific answers to this challenge. The reasons will be given why all those answers are put under two dichotomous rubrics of internalism and externalism. It will be also explained how Życiński intends to supersede this false in his opinion opposition with a new concept of the doxatic rationality. However, the details of the metascientific proposal of Życiński will be given only in the subsequent paper. In order to perform the aim of the paper the metatheoretic tools set out by Popper (1979) will be used.
The opposition between the climactic thought of René Descartes and that of Blaise Pascal, although not very explicitly expressed at the time, is considered to be some kind of dispute between “reason and the heart.” An attempt at the relativization of these compartmentalizing poles brings the author of the study to a starting point that is common to Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy and Pascal’s Pensées (Thoughts): the act of skepticism and radical doubt. Despite the differences in their skeptical pathways and their goals, the roots of the “systems” of thought of both philosophers grow from this act. The paper attempts to outline how the role of doubt can shape the problem of human knowledge, both on a general level and on the level of the highest, concrete knowledge of Divine Existence.
CS
Kontradikce vrcholného myšlení Reného Descarta a Blaise Pascala, byť ve své době nepříliš explicitně vyjádřené, bývají pokládány za jakousi rozepři „rozumu a srdce“. Pokus o relativizaci těchto škatulkujících pólů autorku studie přivádí k výchozímu bodu, jenž je společný Descartovým Meditacím o první filosofii i Pascalovým Myšlenkám: k aktu skepse a radikálních pochybností. Přes odlišnost jejich skeptických cest i jejich cílů vyrůstají právě z tohoto aktu kořeny myšlenkových „systémů“ obou filosofů. Příspěvek se pokouší načrtnout, jakým způsobem může role pochybností formovat problém lidského poznání, a to jak na obecné úrovni, tak v rovině konkrétního nejvyššího poznání Božské existence.
The article aims at uncovering reasons why philosophy may become conducive to dogmatism which inevitably leads to the failure of philosophy. In the light of Gilson’s considerations contained in his The Unity of Philosophical Experience, the author concludes that philosophy is always exposed to the influence of dogmatism when it is done from a non-philosophical standpoint. For each time when the engagement in the philosophical enterprise is driven by non-philosophical needs, it is usually the case that the goal of philosophy is misconstrued as merely that of providing an instrumental ontology to non-philosophical areas of knowledge. To avoid such mistakes as logicism, theologism or psychologism, philosophy must recover its proper object that is the real world of persons and things, and its proper method that is metaphysics.
Modern mathematical physics often claims to make philosophy obsolete. This presentation aims to show that the modern concept of wisdom fundamentally diverges with the thinking of Descartes, that, strictly speaking, at least in his metaphysical first principles, if not in his chief aim, he may be a sophist and no philosopher at all. Descartes denies the classical understanding of philosophy and thereby reduces the human person to an intellect separate from the body. Descartes initiated a popular understanding of sophistry that reverberates to today in our modern institutions of philosophy and science. But St. Thomas Aquinas anticipated this divergence and gave a defense of true wisdom in his writing against Averroes. This presentation concludes with what constitutes real philosophy and science as presented by St. Thomas Aquinas, namely sense wonder that creates a search for the true knowledge of the unity responsible for true causes of true effects. For a true restoration of philosophy and science we will need a reemergence and recovery of this understanding of wisdom.
Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, że filozofię Blaise’a Pascala można odczytać w taki sposób, że sceptycyzm zostaje w niej przezwyciężony nie za pomocą nadprzyrodzonej intuicji, ale za pomocą rozumowania o charakterze pragmatycznym. W tym celu zostają kolejno przedstawione: (1) metoda geometryczna jako najlepsza dostępna metoda uzasadniania twierdzeń, (2) cechy, które sprawiają, że ludzki rozum jest zawodny, (3) obrona przed sceptycyzmem wskazująca, że poza rozumem mamy jeszcze intuicyjne poznanie pierwszych zasad, (4) uwagi wskazujące, że takie poznanie nie może być źródłem pewności, (5) argumentacja, że powstałe sprzeczności nie są dla Pascala problematyczne, bo służą apologetycznemu celowi jego dzieła, a przedstawione argumenty sceptyczne nie uniemożliwiają racjonalnego działania.
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.