The article concerns the question of dual responsibility of the government in the French Fifth Republic. The first part is devoted to origins and development of the dualistic parliamentary system of government in France. According to this model ministers are politically responsible not only before the monarch, but also before the parliament. In the second part the author discusses the return to this model after the adoption of the current Constitution. In the light of this act the government is politically responsible before the parliament. However, when the dual executive comes from the same part of the political scene responsibility of the government before the president of the Republic is much more important. The situation changes significantly during periods of cohabitation. Under such circumstances the government bears political responsibility for its actions only before the parliament. The head of state is no longer able to dismiss the prime minister and other members of the government at his own discretion. In conclusion, the author points out that in the French political system there is no one coherent model of dual responsibility of the government because its shape is influenced by different configurations on the political scene.
The paper seeks to detect the most recent trends in identifying of social, political and cultural dimensions of liberal thought. Two such ways of theorizing are discussed. On one hand, the conventional conception of liberalism as a language of individuals' entitlement is presented. Liberal theory is associated here with general socio-cultural discourses of pluralism, individual rights, rule of law, constitutionalism, liberty, free market and human rights. On the other hand, a critical stance by I. Wallerstein is analysed. Wallerstein conceives the liberal proposal as a sophisticated project directed towards a development of modern geoculture, an ideological basis for the unequal, worldwide distribution of wealth and power, and baptises it as The Modern (Capitalist) World-System. According to Wallerstein – and the author of this paper shares this view – evolution of structures of the World-System is far from completion, and the recent ,,triumph'' of capitalism and liberalism must be seen as one of the many stages of the evolution, and not as its peak and/or the ,,end of history''.
This essay (given at the PENClub Polska) deals with the relationship between constitutional matters and poetry. The essay takes a closer look at the poetry of Adam Zagajewski, Marcin Świetlicki, Julian Tuwim and Adam Bieszek. “There is nothing on us in the Constitution” – Marcin Świetlicki angrily declaims the bitterness of civil rejection in the poem “Under the volcano”. However, the poet is not right. The Constitution sometimes means more than it says directly. If it is silent about something, that does not always amount to rejection, as Świetlicki claims. The two first parts of the essay explain why the poet could have made such a mistake as to his presence in the Constitution. The third part expounds the change that is taking place in Poland: the rejection of the foundations of the Constitution without changing its text.
The article presents sustainable development in context of the most important ideas of contemporary politics. These are such ideas as political representation, human rights and constitutionalism. These three ideas favors of sustainable development and are related with it. So modern liberal democracies are important for sustainable development.
In Hungarian history, the Crown of St. Stephen was an important relic symbolizing the unity of the Hungarian state. It was not merely a coronation jewel or symbol of royal prerogatives, but a respected element of the country’s historic “millennial” constitution. Although the doctrine associated with it was a unique Hungarian constitutional theory, symbolizing national independence, it was flexible enough to serve various political ideas and ambitions. The Crown has always embodied the monarchical form of the Hungarian State, and its sacred character symbolized the strong alliance of the monarchy with the Catholic Church. Is this historical doctrine compatible with the values and requirements of modern Europe and the requirements of present-day Hungarian constitutionalism?
100 years of constitutionalism of two neighbouring European states – Czechoslovakia, later becoming the Czech Republic, and Poland – encourage a reflection on the paths of development of their respective constitutions, on the historical stages and successive olitical transformations, not just in the context of individual constitutionalisms of each of those states but with an emphasis on the similarities and differences in this domain. And this is what this study focuses on. Starting from the common fate of rebirth of both states after WWI through the inter-war efforts to establish democratic constitutional systems and the obstacles found on the way, followed by the post-WWII period of real socialism ending with the era of transformations and stabilisation as democratic states of law. The text explores all the similarities found in both general aspects – like the references to the European tradition of parliamentary governance – and in certain specific solutions – like the differences in the concept of the two-chamber parliament. But there are also situations occurring in only one of the states, e.g. the federalisation of Czechoslovakia, the emergence of two separate states of the Czechs and Slovaks, or the differences in the course and sequence of events of democratic transformations in each of the states in the 1980s, which brings us to the conclusion that despite all the possible differences, the two constitutional systems have actually been very similar to each other.
Constitutional model is a broad concept combining different political and legal aspects, among which two main aspects (namely negative and positive ones) can be distinguished. The constitutional lawgiver avoids negative models, bearing in mind bad experiences of its own country and/or other countries, and at the same time willingly draws inspiration from positive model. It should be noted that, in this context, three models may be used, a systemic model which involves the reception of the entirety of values and constitutional arrangements (both formal (in book), contained in the provisions of law, and actual (in action), arising out of political practice), or institutional, referring to one or more specifi ed institutions in the country, and political, which shows the standards of behavior in specifi c situations of political life. The author characterizes each of these models using the examples of system of government existing in constitutional modern states.
The article concerns the place of the English Great Charter of Liberties in the teaching of law in Poland. The presentation of the ways of describing this document and its provisions in the most important Polish handbooks on the history of political systems, is preceded by the short historical analysis of the position (still significant) of the history of law in the curriculum of the teaching of law at Polish universities. The English Magna Carta from 1215 became one of the most important documents in the history of constitutionalism. This privilage, delivered to the English barons by king John Lackland, began to play, since the XVIIth century, the foundamental role for the concept of civic liberties and then became the basis of English parlamentarism. In that double sense Magna Carta has for 200 years been present in the education of Polish lawyers. In the article the author analizes from that viewpoint the content of the most influent Polish handbooks on the history of political systems as well as on constitutional law.
The article deals with the ideological and theoretical foundations of the French constitutionalism of the Third Republic. The author notes that the Constitution of the Third Republic was a result of the continuous struggle between the supporters of the republican form of government and monarchists in the National Assembly. A compromise, reached by legislators in 1875, led to the uniting of different approaches to the organization of French governmental power in the Constitution. The views of Duke V. de Broglie, E. Laboulaye and L.-A. Prévost-Paradol were reflected in the Constitutional Law of the Third Republic. As a consequence, there was an acceptance of the institutions and authorities of public law specific to a dual monarchy. However, those public and legal institutions turned out to be indifferent to the form of government, that, in its turn, determined the longevity of the main constitutional and legal institutions, established in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
The word ‘constitution’ had only a descriptive meaning in the United Kingdom, being synonymous with the frame of government in existence before the American revolutionaries changed its sense by identifying it with the supreme law of the land. The United Kingdom does not, and indeed has never had, a constitution. And yet, it does have one, as its government operates under supreme general rules. Those rules are constitutional conventions. The word ‘constitution’ started to change its meaning in the United Kingdom when constitutional conventions emerged as rules that constrained, first, the monarch and then the parliament, in the exercising of their legal powers. In the 18th century the constitution was synonymous with law and unconstitutional behaviour was illegal. This changed in the first half of the 19th century when the British constitution became conventional. What it actually meant in the new environment was that to act in an unconstitutional way meant to act against the established convention, even if a given action was perfectly legal. Nevertheless, the British constitution is predominantly political because the supreme constitutional rules are non-legal and are not enforceable in the courts of law.
PL
Brak konstytucji w formie ustawy zasadniczej nie oznacza, że ustrój brytyjski nie przybiera formy rządów konstytucyjnych. Zasadniczy postulat konstytucjonalizmu, jakim jest wyeliminowanie arbitralności władzy przez poddanie jej niezależnym od piastunów władzy normom, realizowany jest w Wielkiej Brytanii przez konwenanse konstytucyjne, będące normami konstytucyjnymi o charakterze pozaprawnym, niemożliwymi do wyegzekwowania w postępowaniu sądowym. Pojęcie konstytucji zaczęło nabierać w Wielkiej Brytanii normatywnego znaczenia w pierwszej połowie XIX w. wraz z kształtowaniem się konwenansów, na których oparte zostało funkcjonowanie kluczowych instytucji ustrojowych: gabinetu i premiera. Wcześniej konstytucja była synonimem systemu rządów. Wielka Brytania ma więc współcześnie konstytucję w znaczeniu normatywnym, ponieważ ustrój tego państwa oparty jest na normach wyższego rzędu determinujących sposób wykonywania władzy państwowej, znajdujących się poza zasięgiem tych, których postępowanie regulują. Konwenanse konstytucyjne stały się normami eliminującymi arbitralność władzy nie tylko dlatego, że determinowały relacje pomiędzy egzekutywą a parlamentem, ale dlatego że wprowadzając do brytyjskiego ustroju zasadę suwerenności ludu, nałożyły na władzę ustawodawczą parlamentu ograniczenia konstytucyjne. Konwenanse konstytucyjne stały się podstawą politycznej konstytucji Wielkiej Brytanii. Wciąż stanowią one podstawę rządów konstytucyjnych w tym państwie mimo dostrzegalnego w ostatnich latach dążenia do również prawnego ograniczenia władzy państwowej.
The aim of the article is to discuss the prominent features of French constitutionalism that were formed in the last quarter of the 19th century. The author underlines the particular importance of the constitutional experience of France and notes that the form of government and the several political institutions established with the proclamation of the Third Republic also exist in general terms at the present time. Further in the text, the author observes that the practice of the state and legal construction of the French Third Republic was in many ways rather distant from constitutional establishments. It is emphasized that in the practical implementation of the Constitution, the Parliament (mainly the Chamber of Deputies) came to play a major role in the system of government and that in turn has been largely responsible for the durability of the basic constitutional and legal institutions of the Third Republic.
There is no doubt that the United States were not created as a purely democratic state. On the one hand, it established basic rules and principles of democratic government such as free elections, sovereignty of the nation, fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals or independent judiciary. All of these principles were, however, enjoyed only by the part of American society: free elections were guaranteed for white men, excluding women and blacks; sovereignty belonged to the nation, i.e. white women and men, because slaves were not considered citizens; fundamental rights and freedoms were guaranteed only for whites; institutional independence of the judicial branch did not prevent the system from injustice towards the blacks. Furthermore, one of the most important values of democratic society, equal protection of law, was absent in the original constitutional document of 1787, as well as the provisions of Bill of Rights. The clause became part of U.S. constitutional reality yet in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, as a direct result of social and political changes caused by the civil war. After introducing the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, which abolished slavery, the government took a step forward by making all citizens equal in 1868 and by providing black Americans with suffrage rights in 1870. For former slaves it meant a milestone step in their fight to destroy the social and political boundaries which limited their basic rights and freedoms. However, before the above mentioned events took place, the period of injustice and exploitation occurred with the U.S. Supreme Court in the middle of social and political tensions. The main purpose of the article is to show the changing attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to the social and political status of African‑Americans. This attitude influenced historical and contemporary social relations among the American society proving one of the most controversial aspects of U.S. democracy.
In this article, the author considers the Azerbaijani state as a subject of constitutional and legal relations. The definition of constitutionalism is also analyzed, in which the main value in the state is the freedom of the individual and the provision of fundamental human rights and freedoms.
There are countries in Europe that are characterized by atypical solutions related to the head of state. An example presented in this article is the Principality of Andorra, which head of state is dualistic – hosted by the French President and the Spanish Bishop of Seo de Urgell. Both are described as co-princes, which shows the closeness of solutions to those adopted within the monarchy. This article seeks to show not only the systemic solutions related to their functioning but also the practice, especially in view of representatives they are ruling by.
Modern Democracy (alongside with the Rule of Law and human rights) is usually considered as the part of constitutionalism. However, traditional understanding of democracy is usually focused on procedural aspects (as the form of election of people’s representatives and special procedures for decision-making that ensure majority rule with the implementation of minorities’ interests). The proposed paper aims to analyze modern democracy and its shift from the procedural to the material aspects. The modern interrelation between the rule of law and democracy is analyzed (on the example of rule of law and democracy indices) and despite some exceptions (the case of Singapore), direct interrelation is found. This paper also analyzes modern democracy problems, including referendums imperfection as a form of democracy and its Ukrainian experience. The role of bodies of constitutional review (that being less formally democratic than representatives elected by people still play an essential role in restraining democracy) is analyzed. Therefore, the conclusion that modern democracy remains an element of constitutionalism but shifts to material aspects (conformity with the rule of law and human rights) is made.
While the debates of the first term of Iranian Parliament- the National Consultative Assembly, or Majles (1906-1908) - have long been an important source for historians and other scholars, no serious effort has ever been undertaken to try and properly understand this historical source. As a result, a number of misconceptions exist about the debates of the early parliament and what survives as their minutes. The present paper aims to dispel some of these misconceptions by focusing on two issues: 1) whether - and to what extent - what survived to our day (by the virtue of being published in the Majles newspaper) should be considered the official minutes of the parliament; 2) what were some of the characteristics of the later edition of the minutes published as the supplement to the Official Gazette of Iran. This is achieved by the careful analysis of a number of sources, mainly the debates themselves, legal documents, periodicals and memoirs.
The subject of the article is the idea of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. The essay does not concern any specific legal order but takes the perspective of a general theory/philosophy of law. The study is divided into two parts. The first part briefly describes the theory and practice of applying the idea of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. The second part reveals and analyzes the basic assumptions of the theory of unconstitutional constitutional amendments: “the assumption of the stratification of powers” and “the essentialist assumption.” As a result of the analysis, it is concluded that on the grounds of democracy and constitutionalism the inadmissibility of amendments to the constitution should be linked not to the difference between the establishment of the constitution and its amendment, but to the difference between the degree of democratic legitimacy of the indicated law-making activities. Therefore, the article also formulates a postulate that the admissibility of declaring the unconstitutionality of constitutional amendments should be limited to cases where the amendments were adopted in a procedure with an evidently lower degree of democratic legitimacy.
The future of constitutionalism revolves around two critical issues which we see against the backdrop of the crisis of liberal democracy. The first issue concerns the conflict between the “judicial” constitutionalism and “political” constitutionalism. The “judicial” constitutionalism assumes a strong role of courts in a democratic system. Only courts can decide on compatibility of law with the constitution. In turn, the “political” constitutionalism assumes that the parliament decides on constitutional law. The rivalry between these two constitutionalisms seems to be the matrix of contemporary political dilemmas. The result of this rivalry is important for the efforts to end Polish constitutional crisis, as we will have to decide on the constitutional benchmarks applicable after the crisis. The second issue concerns the limits of constitutionalism. The author argues that the current digital era created a new phenomenon of digital constitutionalism. It operates in the sphere of private law relationships, dominated by private entities (big corporations). The relevant provisions for the digital world are the private law provisions. Comparative law and comparativists are crucial for answering the questions on the future of constitutionalism. The conflict of the two visions of constitutionalism and the extension of its limits are a great “training ground” for the comparativists.
The aim of the article is an attempt to formulate main assumptions of the concept of integral legitimacy of the constitution. The first one is an opinion that the integral legitimacy is included in the nature of the constitution and is a necessary element of the core of constitution. The second one is an opinion that there is an unbreakable bond between the form and the content of the constitution, which decides about legitimacy of the constitution. The third one is an opinion that the integral legitimacy of the constitution is two-stage legitimacy. The first degree is a necessary element of each constitution. It provides the overall framework of the constitutional order. The second degree is an extension of the first degree of legitimacy and results from the decision of the society concerning the form and the content of the constitution. The last one is an opinion of multidimensional character of the legitimacy of the constitution. The legitimacy is based on belief in social acceptance for the principles of the idea of constitutionalism, which are reflected in rules and values creating the core of the constitution.
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