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1

KANT A FREGE O ANALYTICKOSTI

100%
Sedlár I.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 4
336-347
EN
The question, whether there is a sharp difference between an analytic and a synthetic proposition, is one of the famous philosophical topics of the 20th century. The question, however, urges one to ask following questions: 'What is an analytic proposition?', or 'What is a synthetic proposition?'. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the discussions of the analyticity in that it tries to answer the first of the two. However, the author does not offer his own conception of analyticity. He rather offers a more detailed view on the definitions and characteristics of an analytic proposition (or an analytic judgment) in Kant and Frege.
2

Kontinuum v zrcadle analytické filosofie

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Kolman V.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2008
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vol. 56
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issue 1
5-27
EN
In this article I trace the development of the concept of the continuum from Eudoxus to Brouwer from the perspective of analytical philosophy or, more particularly, from the perspective of two turns that analytical philosophy has brought with it. The first of these is the linguistic turn which states that if we wish to answer questions like 'what sort of class of objects is such and such?' we must first of all investigate the relevant linguistic context and, in particular, we must describe the admissible representations. Only in establishing the criterion of identity do we establish names of something-that is of corresponding objects. The second turn is the pragmatic turn which responds to the above questions always with an eye to how the given expressions (representations) are used in the framework of a certain stable linguistic praxis. In relation to arithmetic we thus take as our starting point Frege's characterisation of a cardinal or real number as a response to the question 'how much of what?', or 'how great is the given quantity in relation to a unitary quantity?'
3

O fikcji poważnie. Koncepcja poetyckiej fikcji według Fregego

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Rygalski A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2012
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vol. 40
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issue 4
49 - 73
EN
This paper is a monograph about the categories of “Scheingedanke” and “Dichtung” in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege. The author argues for the objective character of such thoughts. Finally, he points out two possibilities of a scientific analysis of sentences which express thoughts that belong to the domain of fiction.
4

FREGE’S EQUIVALENCE THESIS AND REFERENCE FAILURE

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Hawkins N.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 1
198 – 222
EN
Frege claims that sentences of the form ‘A’ are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘it is true that A’ (The Equivalence Thesis). Frege also says that there are fictional names that fail to refer, and that sentences featuring fictional names fail to refer as a result. The thoughts such sentences express, Frege says, are also fictional, and neither true nor false. Michael Dummett argues that these claims are inconsistent. But his argument requires clarification, since there are two ways The Equivalence Thesis has been formulated, according as the thesis equates the senses or the referents of the relevant sentences. I have two aims in this paper. The first is to demonstrate that a sameness of sense thesis is inconsistent with Frege’s other theses. The second is to argue that a sameness of reference thesis is consistent with them. Thus, all else being equal, Frege ought to endorse a sameness of reference, rather than a sameness of sense thesis.
5

FREGE ON IDENTITY AND CO-REFERENCE

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Corazza E.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2022
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vol. 29
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issue 1
26 - 46
EN
In “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892) Frege raises a problem concerning identity statements of the form a=b and he criticizes the view he holds in the Begriffsschrift (1879, § 8). In building on a suggestion by Perry (2001/12, ch. 7) I will show how Frege’s Begriffsschrift account can be rescued and how Frege’s 1892 criticism of his Begriffsschrift’s position somewhat miss the point. Furthermore, the Begriffsschrift’s view can be developed to account in quite an elegant way to the so-called Frege’s Puzzle without committing to the sense/reference (Sinn/Bedeutung) distinction Frege introduces in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”. To do so we have, though, to give up the idea that all the relevant information conveyed by the utterance of a simple sentence is encapsulated into a single content. I will show of that this can be done in adopting a Perry-style pluri-propositionalist model of communication.
6

Lingua characterica

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Rygalski A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2017
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vol. 45
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issue 1
141-156
EN
The paper investigates the impact of Leibniz’ thought on contemporary philosophy. It focuses on two philological issues: (1) the debate on the misunderstandings connected to the formula “lingua characterica”, used by Gottlob Frege to describe of Leibniz’ philosophy; (2) an interesting interpretation of “ars inveniendi ” as formulated by Hans Hermes.
7
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FREGE'S CRITICISM OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

100%
Gut A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2005
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issue 1
31-62
EN
The paper reconstructs Frege's criticism of the ontological argument for the existence of God on the basis of various remarks scattered in his writings. The material is organized in such a way as to: (a) reveal a logical structure of the argument; (b) show and discern various presupposition of a logical, semantical and ontological character; and (c) indicate some essential weaknesses of the ontological argument. It is argued that Frege's critical commentaries on this argument are essentially connected to four solutions, stating that: (1) the difference between a name and a predicate is categorical; (2) the existential judgement possesses a different logical structure than the singular judgement; (3) in the characteristic of concepts marks and properties should be distinguished; (4) the ascription of number contains the statement about a concept. In order to make Frege's argumentation as understandable as possible it is confronted with Kant's criticism of ontological argument. The analysis carried on in the above-described way reveals a number of shortcomings which discredit the ontological argument. For example, the paper shows that the analysis of predication of oneness (Einzigkeit) does not lead to the affirmation of God's existence. Moreover, it shows that in that argument the term God is used in two different semantic roles; that some theses that should constitute the argument's conclusion, are already assumed; and that sense-condition and truth-conditions are not distinguished.
8

FREGEHO DER GEDANKE AKO KONKURENČNÝ PROJECT K WITTGENSTEINOVMU TRAKTÁTU

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2025
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vol. 80
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issue 3
285 – 299
EN
Based on the contents of the correspondence and an analysis of Der Gedanke and the Tractatus, and a comparison of the two, particularly in terms of the question What is fact and What is the world, we have attempted to provide a justification for the hypothesis that Frege’s essay Der Gedanke was conceived as a rival project to Wittgenstein’s nascent Tractatus. Our hypothesis explains Wittgenstein’s long-lasting animosity towards the contents of this particular treatise even decades after Frege’s death. We consider the key difference between the two projects to be the question of the explication of the concepts of fact and world. For Frege, the external world of sense-perceptible things (the World 1) is only the ground for objective facts, which are true thoughts that are composed exclusively of abstract entities. On the other hand Wittgenstein says that the world itself is the totality of facts which are special complexes.
9

Intelektualny testament Fregego

88%
Rygalski A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2017
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vol. 45
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issue 2
129-143
EN
At the end of his life Gottlob Frege made his last attempt to ground mathematics. An essential role in this unfinished project was given to the analysis of the sources of knowledge. This last attempt reveals Frege's epistemological views. First of all, it shows the scope and the direction of changes his views took in comparison with Kant's conception. Besides, it allows us to see exactly what views Frege held at the end of his life. The unfinished character of Frege's attempt invites a continuation of this way of grounding mathematics.
10

CONCEPTS MAY STILL BE OBJECTS

88%
Noonan H.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2022
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vol. 29
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issue 3
376 – 388
EN
In his book (2021) Trueman attempts to provide a solution to the problem of the concept horse, which according to Frege’s published writings is an object, not a concept. In the course of doing so Trueman rejects Wright’s response (1998) according to which some objects are also concepts, for example, the concept horse, so the categories are not exclusive. Trueman’s argument for exclusivity (Chapter 4) is the heart of the book, and as he says, it is his response to holders of differing views, like Wright. I think that there is a gap in Trueman’s argument which needs to be filled if Wright is to be considered refuted.
11

JE ČÍSLO VLASTNOST VNĚJŠÍCH VĚCÍ? MILL – FREGE - KESSLER

88%
Sousedík P., Svoboda D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2014
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vol. 21
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issue 1
45 – 62
EN
In this paper we deal with the problem, whether number is a property of external things. It is divided into three parts. Firstly Mill’s empirical concept of natural numbers is summarized, then Frege’s arguments against this conception are put forth and finally viewpoints of some contemporary analytical philosophers (first of all G. Kessler), who reject Frege’s critique, are set out. Kessler and his followers in fact revive the abandoned theory of Mill.
12

SUBJECT AND PREDICATE IN EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS: A SURVEY OF FREGE’S PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTIONS

88%
Asadi S.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2020
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vol. 27
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issue 4
522 – 538
EN
Frege argues that considering Socrates as an object in the proposition “Socrates exists” raises two problems. First, this proposition would be uninformative. Second, its negation entails a contradiction. Attempting to solve these problems, Frege claims that Socrates is representing the concept of a man whose name is Socrates. Therefore, existence is a second-order concept. This paper surveys the main modern theories about the types of existence, in order to find another response to Frege’s problems. For, if Socrates’ existence differs from the type that “exists” implies, “Socrates exists” is informative and its negation is not a contradiction. At last, this paper argues for an idea, in which “existence” is not a concept or property. Existence is the principle of the objects. So, “Socrates exists” is in fact “the existence is Socrates,” and “Socrates does not exist” is “there is no existence that is Socrates.” This idea could be an alternative for responding to Frege’s problems.
13

MILLOVO POJETÍ ČÍSLA

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Sousedík P., Svoboda D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 2
201 – 221
EN
According to the positivists, all our knowledge is based on experience which is the foundation not only of every empirical science, but also of those disciplines that are usually considered to be a priori. The paper consists of two main parts. Firstly, a positivist concept of number defended by J. S. Mill is presented; secondly, it is shown how this conception can settle some objections coming from apriori-oriented philosophers. Mill’s theory of number is interesting for at least two historical reasons. It is developed in connection with a relatively rich scholastic logic which is why its methodology is similar to the contemporary philosophy of language; it is indispensable for an appropriate comprehension of the concept of number that was proposed by Mill’s most famous opponent G. Frege.
14

RIGORISATION OF THE INFINITESIMAL CALCULUS AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN

88%
Sousedik P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2006
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vol. 13
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issue 1
32-54
EN
Mathematics in the 19th century underwent explosive development. The discussion among philosophers was motivated by the new results which conflicted with Kant's very influential conception. One of the most important areas which lead to the meeting of philosophy and mathematics was a rigorous account of the infinitesimal calculus. In his article the author shows that considerations of this type found in Bolzano and Frege are important not only for the overcoming of the Kantian conception, but as for what we today call the linguistic turn.
15
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCEPTS FOR SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE'S THEORY. (Znaczenie pojec dla samowiedzy wedlug Christophera Peacocke'a)

88%
Pacholik-Zuromska A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2008
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issue 7
53-70
EN
Christopher Peacocke is supporter of the standpoint, which claims, that the connection between the content of mental states and concepts, which are constituents of the content, has implications for self-knowledge. Without an answer to the question, 'What is it for a subject to posses a concept?' we cannot answer the question, 'How does a subject acquire self-knowledge?'. The connection between a concept, its possession conditions, and semantic value Peacocke explains in Fregean way. This connection leads also to the specific model of self-knowledge constructed by Peacocke
16

NEOFREGEOVSKÁ REINTERPRETÁCIA TRAKTÁTU A POJEM HOLÉHO INDIVÍDUA

88%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2025
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vol. 80
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issue 6
810 – 825
EN
In the article “Frege’s Der Gedanke as a Rival Project to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” we considered the question of the explication of the concepts of fact and world to be the key difference between these projects. Tichý proposed reconciling the two by reinterpreting Wittgenstein’s complexes as abstract procedures that rely on the modal concept of the bare individual. Russell’s misunderstanding of Frege’s distinction between the sense and denotation of an expression significantly influenced Wittgenstein. Tichý’s concept of an abstract procedure closely resembles Frege’s concept of compound thought. We supplement Tichý’s explanation of the concept of the bare individual by distinguishing between two suppositions of proper names, de dicto and de re. This distinction brings us closer to Frege’s own distinction between the sense and denotation of proper names. Finally, we present an explanation that the core of the semantic error of logical atomism is the assumed tropism.
17

NAOZAJ FREGE PLAGIZOVAL STOIKOV?

75%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 7
499 – 520
EN
The similarity between logic and semantics of the Stoics and Frege has long been known, and it can be explained in various ways. In 2021, Susane Bobzien published a work in which she explains this similarity rather surprisingly: she hypothesizes that Frege helped himself generously with the foundations of Stoic logic as it was published in the first volume of History of Logic in the West by Carl Prantl. However, this hypothesis encounters various problems. The key point of the whole accusation is founded on the formulation of a general proposition in language using implication and anaphora, which Frege took supposedly from the Stoics, although in Prantl’s text there is only one example of a sentence with this structure. On the contrary, there are many examples of such sentences in contemporary professional (e.g. legal) texts. Many examples of semantic similarities that Bobzien presents are based only on the similarities between isolated concepts; however, that is regularly the case for such concepts with the same conceptual basis. Bobzien presents a significant number of matches only on the basis of results that could be inferred allegedly from the texts. However, this cannot be considered as a proof of plagiarism. Bobzien does not consider many sources for the continuity of interpretation such as the so-called hypothetical syllogism found in available textbooks of logic. Last but not least, her claims do not consider many differences between Stoic and Frege’s logic. All this leads us to the conclusion that Bobzien does not present sufficient facts and connections between them that would confirm her hypothesis about Frege’s plagiarism of the Stoic logic: Frege simply was not a plagiarist.
18

Schemat predykacji Fregego i problem uniwersaliów

75%
Wojciechowski E.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2018
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vol. 46
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issue 1
131-151
EN
Stanisław Leśniewski is the author of the famous verbal argumentation claiming that the universals do not exist. Bolesław Sobociński expressed this argumentation, in accordance with its author`s intentions, in elementary ontology, enriched with an additional assumption (TL1), which is of key importance for it. In the framework of the theory of universals sketched in this way, the above-mentioned conclusion occurs (TL7). The paper shows that this argumentative assumption (TL1) is unacceptable. It is artificial and incompatibile with the assumptions adopted implicitly by the supporters of the existence of universals. Based on elementary ontology enriched with Frege`s predication scheme (OEsub), we shall introduce the functor universal by definition (DP). In the framework of OEsub system one can talk of universals in a coherent way and it is impossibile to reconstruct the above argumentation (TL7 is not these here)
19

KANT A FUNKCIONÁLNÍ TEORIE PREDIKACE

75%
Šebela K.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue suppl. 1
166 – 177
EN
This paper focuses on the roots of a functional theory of predication, which is represented primary by Frege and Russell. After a brief presentation of the theory of Frege, the author concentrates on the philosophical motivation of this theory. The example of the influence of F. H. Bradley on Russell’s conception of the categorical judgements shows a common epistemological position of both authors, which he recognizes also in Frege. The point of the article is to find common grounds in Kant noetics, especially in his conception of synthetic judgement. Replacement of the problematic Kant’s notion of transcendental schema by the functional application subsequently allowed flourishing of the theory. In conclusion, the author outlines potential problems associated with the challenge of philosophical assumptions on which this theory is based.
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