Game theoreticians usually deal with standard voting methods such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some complicated non-standard voting methods are used. In this paper the voting method and rotation scheme have been presented used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. We present game theoretical approaches for analyzing this method and different methods of computing the Shapley value for games connected with voting under such rotation schemes.
The expansionary monetary policy of the European Central Bank at the beginning of the 21st century gave rise to a big credit expansion. The expansion was distributed unevenly among the Eurozone member states and it led to an economic boom, especially in the real estate market. The malinvestments from the boom period brought about severe economic crisis. Since the crisis ECB acts (lends banks unprecedented amounts of money, against poor collateral, for extended period of time, at record low interest rates) like his main end is keeping the European banking sector afl oat, not the officially stated inflation targeting.
The voting procedure has been presented with rotation scheme used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. The main game theoretical approaches have been presented elsewhere. That paper considered the Shapley value computed in accordance with these approaches. The Banzhaf value has been analysed and the results compared with the results for the Shapley value.
Purpose of the article is to present in two parts the selected aspects of application of monetary policy in the euro area pre and post 2008 as well as insitutional adaptations brought by the EU legislator. Methodology/methods In order to better explain these points, the article relies partially on a comparison with the framework and application of the monetary policy by the Federal Reserve as well as on a historic method when outlining the influence of definition of financial stability from the ECB/Eurosystem towards other prominent central banks. Scientific aim The article presents selected aspects of the monetary policy in the part of the EU where single currency was introduced in order to outline state of the art governance structure as well as a certain institutional creativity in application of powers conferred upon the central banks by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The goal is to prove (i) the hypothesis of robustness of the framework and (ii) present the limits that can only be pushed further by the legislative power. The conclusions confirm on the one hand that the framework of monetary policy based on strong institutional safeguards such as legislative power and independence is very resilient and can prove efficient and creative enough to stabilise an innovative monetary system, however, on the other hand, validate the hypothesis that certain adaptations can only be performed on the basis of a legislative adaptations.
This article is the attempt to identify the reasons of households debt in countries, which belong to the Eurozone. It presents the socio-economic situation in this countries based on macroeconomic indicators (GDP and unemployment rent). Then this paper shows the tasks of the European Central Bank and shows its politics concerning the interests rates in the period 2003–2014. Next, the author examined, how these interest rates influenced the interest rates which commercial banks offered their clients. Then consumer behavior in selected countries was examined: which society is indebted the most, what is the relation between household debt to GDP and to disposable income, which kind of debt dominates and which society has the biggest problem with timely repayment of the debt. The study of data from the databases of the European Central Bank and EUROSTAT used a comparative analysis.
Since the financial crisis of 2007/2008, we have been dealing - at the level of the European Union - with a special "dialogue" between the European and German courts. The subject of this "dialogue" is the decisions of the European Central Bank on the program for the purchase of public sector assets on secondary markets. The ECB's activity, as well as the involvement of the national central banks of the Eurosystem in the implementation of these decisions, has been met with dissatisfaction by German politicians, culminating in the title judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany. In the paper, the author analyzed the judgments, particularly from the perspective of the process of integration of the European Union financial market and the importance of the judgments for this process taking into account the key principles of EU law: proportionality and supremacy of EU law.
The financial and economic crisis that has hit many economies in recent years has significantly increased the activity of central banks. After using the standard instruments of conducting monetary policy, in view of the obstruction of monetary impulse transmission channels, they reached for non-standard instruments. Among them, asset purchase programs played a significant role. The European Central Bank (ECB) launched the largest asset purchase programme (APP) of this type in 2014 and expired in December 2018. The aim of the undertaken activities was to improve the situation on the financial market and stimulate economic growth. The article reviews the literature and results of research on the effects of the program and indicates the possibility of using the ECB’s experience in conducting monetary policy by the National Bank of Poland.
PL
The financial and economic crisis that has hit many economies in recent years has significantly increased the activity of central banks. After using the standard instruments of conducting monetary policy, in view of the obstruction of monetary impulse transmission channels, they reached for non-standard instruments. Among them, asset purchase programs played a signifciant role. The European Central Bank (ECB) launched the largest asset purchase programme (APP) of this type in 2014 and expired in December 2018. The aim of the undertaken activities was to improve the situation on the financial market and stimulate economic growth. The article reviews the literature and results of research on the effects of the program and indicates the possibility of using the ECB’s experience in conducting monetary policy by the National Bank of Poland.
The aim of this paper is to discuss European Central Bank (ECB)’s powers with regard to maintaining stability in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)’s member states. First, the author examines key tasks of the ECB as a central bank, focusing on its special character and competencies. In the second section, the ECB’s actions during the financial crisis are outlines, as well as some legal limitations on its powers. In the final section, the author discusses issues related to currency, price stability and euro stability.
The article explores the reaction of the European Central Bank (ECB) to two major economic crises that the EU had to face in the last two decades: the financial crisis which began in 2008 and the latest crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Although causes underlying both crises were ultimately different, the response of the ECB was based on the same unconventional monetary policy tools. The author analyses the similarities and differences between both of these crises, as well as the ECB’s reaction to them, drawing attention to a shift in the ECB’s monetary policy towards unconventional tools and consequences of such a shift for the position and future policy directions of the ECB.
The aim of this paper is to discuss European Central Bank (ECB)’s powers with regard to maintaining stability in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)’s member states. First, the author examines key tasks of the ECB as a central bank, focusing on its special character and competencies. In the second section, the ECB’s actions during the financial crisis are outlines, as well as some legal limitations on its powers. In the final section, the author discusses issues related to currency, price stability and euro stability.
This article provides an overview of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the recent years. The author begins by introducing the objectives, powers, and strategy of the ECB’s monetary policy. The next section discusses the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy through interest rates and credit channels. Next, monetary policy instruments used by the ECB are covered. The final section looks at the impact of the global financial crisis on the ECB’s operations. Finally, conclusions are drawn from empirical data that are provided by the ECB and Eurostat.
The paper addresses some important dilemmas and factors determining the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). According to the author, in the coming years the ECB’s monetary policy will to a large extent depend on how the ongoing financial crisis affects Europe and the world at large. At this point, it is too early to offer an evaluation of how this policy may change, Wojtyna says. The article attempts to answer a number of questions related to the ECB’s monetary policy. One question is whether or not an evaluation of the effects of the bank’s policy should take into account some general institutional frameworks. Second, did the ECB do the right thing adopting a specific strategy for its monetary policy? Third, to what extent has the Taylor rule proved to be useful in the assessment of the restrictiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy? The Taylor rule, proposed by U.S. economist John B. Taylor in 1993, is a rule that stipulates how much the central bank should change the nominal interest rate in response to divergences of actual GDP from potential GDP and of actual inflation rates from target inflation rates. According to Wojtyna, the effects of the ECB’s policy should be clearly differentiated from the effects of the Economic and Monetary Union as a whole. Second, the notion of “ECB policy” is broader than the term “monetary policy” with regard to the European Central Bank, the author says. Third, it is necessary to draw a distinction between various types of monetary policy depending on their scope, Wojtyna notes. The paper also discusses the latest research on the institutional environment of monetary policy and focuses on selected disputed issues involving the monetary policy strategy adopted by the ECB.
This paper estimates aggregate measures of macroeconomic uncertainty from individual density forecasts by professional forecasters. The methodology used in the paper improves on the existing literature along two dimensions. Firstly, it controls for changes to the composition of the panel of respondents to the survey. And secondly, it assigns more weight to the information submitted by forecasters with better forecasting performance. Using data from the European Central Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters from 1999 Q1 to 2014 Q3, the paper finds that the effects of changes in the composition of the panel on aggregate uncertainty can be large in a statistical and economic sense. It also finds that the estimates of aggregate uncertainty that use performance-based weights differ significantly from the simple averages used in the literature and their dynamics are more consistent with the dynamics displayed by the estimates of uncertainty computed from financial indicators.
This article provides an overview of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the recent years. The author begins by introducing the objectives, powers, and strategy of the ECB’s monetary policy. The next section discusses the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy through interest rates and credit channels. Next, monetary policy instruments used by the ECB are covered. The final section looks at the impact of the global financial crisis on the ECB’s operations. Finally, conclusions are drawn from empirical data that are provided by the ECB and Eurostat.
Niekonwencjonalność polityki pieniężnej może być rozpatrywana w zależności od systemu, w jakim jest ona prowadzona. Mówienie o niekonwencjonalności polityki pieniężnej ma sens w odniesieniu do systemów, które uznają stabilność cen za priorytet, a czynniki kształtujące popyt na pieniądz za instrumenty tej polityki. W niniejszym artykule: po pierwsze, wyodrębniono zbiór wspólnych elementów polityki pieniężnej stosowanych w różnych krajach, które można uznać za czynniki wyznaczające jej konwencjonalność. Po drugie, została dokonana analiza elementów, które wprowadzają cechy niekonwencjonalności. Po trzecie, pokazane są skutki różnych form niekonwencjonalności polityki pieniężnej w odniesieniu do jej efektywności oraz możliwości powrotu do polityki konwencjonalnej. Ostatnia część poświęcona jest skutkom wyboru określonej formy niekonwencjonalności przez EBC.
EN
The unconventionality of monetary policy can be considered depending on the system in which it is functioning. Talking about unconventionality monetary policy makes sense for systems that recognize price stability, priority, and factors shaping demand for money for instruments of this policy. In this article: firstely a set of common elements of monetary policy applied in different countries was distinguished, which can be considered as factors that determined its conventionality. Secondely, the elements responsible for the introduction the unconventionality are analyzed. Thirdly, the effects of the different forms of political unconventionality in relation to its effectiveness and the possibility of returning to politics conventional is analyzed. The last part is devoted the results of choosing a particular form unconventionality by the ECB.
The article provides an overview of the legal structure of the Banking Union consisting of two pillars – the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism. As a point of departure, it discusses the reasons for the creation of the Banking Union. Then, it analyses the legal structure of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in order to compare it to the legal framework of the Single Resolution Mechanism and shows that the differences in their design are a corollary of disparate legal bases for both instruments. Finally, it argues that the disputed legal basis for the regulation establishing the Single Resolution Mechanism is sufficient in light of Meroni doctrine as formulated in the Short-selling case.
The FCC took the position that it was bound by the judgments of the CJEU as long as the latter applied certain methods of interpretation and its judgments are not objectively arbitrary. In the case at hand, the FCC found that the CJEU manifestly failed to take into account the meaning and scope of the proportionality principle. Ultimately, the FCC independently assessed the ECB’s decisions in the light of primary EU law, while adjudicating on the consequences of finding them to be defective for the German authorities.
The complexity and uncertainty in the application of the European system of financial supervision is due to the fact that its particular concepts were implemented at different times. First, it was the system of European financial supervisors (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA), which was primarily aimed at coordination of national activities. Then, the European Banking Union was established, comprised of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), as well as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which must also be seen in the context of assistance to troubled banks. Difficulties of interpretation are further compounded by a lack of consistency in approach to the institutions subject to examination. Should they include only the euro zone, or the whole EU, only the banks or other institutions as well? If you take into account the SSM, SRM or ESM, it is often not very clear who and when should act what tools should be applied, For example, when the ECB may, and should, correct decisions of national supervisors and what, in the context of increasing involvement of the ECB in the banking union, is the role of the ESRB; whether and when banks can possibly challenge decisions eg. on establishing a capital buffer or inclusion on the SIFI list, etc. Also unclear is the role of the EBA and ESMA in the context of the creation of a banking union, SSM, SRM and ESM and delegation of regulatory powers of ECB and the Commission to regulatory agencies (Meroni doctrine) or creation of regulatory agencies beyond the Treaty (Pringle doctrine).
Purpose of the article is to present in two parts the selected aspects of application of monetary policy in the euro area pre and post 2008 as well as insitutional adaptations brought by the EU legislator. Methodology/methods In order to better explain these points, the article relies partially on a comparison with the framework and application of the monetary policy by the Federal Reserve as well as on a historic method when outlining the influence of definition of financial stability from the ECB/Eurosystem towards other prominent central banks. Scientific aim The article presents selected aspects of the monetary policy in the part of the EU where single currency was introduced in order to outline state of the art governance structure as well as a certain institutional creativity in application of powers conferred upon the central banks by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The goal is to prove (i) the hypothesis of robustness of the framework and (ii) present the limits that can only be pushed further by the legislative power. The conclusions confirm on the one hand that the framework of monetary policy based on strong institutional safeguards such as legislative power and independence is very resilient and can prove efficient and creative enough to stabilise an innovative monetary system, however, on the other hand, validate the hypothesis that certain adaptations can only be performed on the basis of a legislative adaptations.
Complexity and uncertainty in the application of the regulations of the European system of financial supervision are due to the fact that its particular elements were implemented over a period of time. First, it was a system of European financial supervision authorities i.e. the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and the Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), whose main objective was to coordinate national actions. Then there were established the European Banking Union, including the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), as well as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which constitutes also a part of the system of support for endangered banks. Legal interpretation problems are a result of differences in the scope of competences of these entities. For example, there is uncertainty whether the regulations refer to the eurozone or the whole European Union and if they refer to banks only or to other financial institutions as well. An analysis of the SSM, the SRM or the ESM does not always offer a clear answer to questions such as: who, when and using what tools should act; when, for example, the ECB may and should correct the decisions of national supervisors; what is the role of the ESRB, if we take account of the enhanced competences of the ECB in the banking union; if and when banks may question supervisory decisions concerning, for example, establishing a buffer or classifying an institution as SIFI, etc. Similarly, the role of the EBA or the ESM is unclear in the context of the establishment of the banking union, the SSM, the SRM, the ESM and the delegation of power of the ECB and the European Commission to regulatory agencies (Meroni doctrine) or the practice of establishing regulatory agencies outside the bounds of the treaty (Pringle doctrine). Therefore the regulatory landscape in this context requires impact assessment.
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