Search results - CEJSH

1

d > δ > I i š > I w dialektach irańskich

100%

Freiman A.

Rocznik Orientalistyczny

|

vol. Rocznik Orientalistyczny, T. 02, (1919/1924), wyd. 1925

2

Principles and Debates in Iranian Foreign policy

100%

Axworthy M.

|

2014

|

vol. 29

|

issue 4

21-33

EN

Despite characterisation of Iran as an ideologically-driven state, expansionist and dominated by Islamic extremism, conventional interests-based pragmatism has been an important element in Iran’s foreign policy, and has often been dominant. Without being uncritical of the Islamic republic, this article explores the ways that revolutionary, pragmatic and nationalist principles have influenced her foreign policy, and concludes that even the revolutionary principle may not necessarily or always be as inimical to the prevailing international system as is sometimes supposed.

3

Iran-US Relations: Learning from Experience, Marching toward Reconciliation

100%

Amirahmadi H.

|

2014

|

vol. 29

|

issue 4

5-21

EN

With some success in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, hopes have been raised that the US and Iran may be able to conclude a final nuclear deal and then build upon it to ultimately mend relations. Assuming that the US and Iran can cultivate the political will for normal relations, the purpose of this paper is to assist the policy makers and others to realize the shift and prepare the ground for a realistic rapprochement. With this purpose and possibility in mind, the paper offers an overview of US-Iran relations including its historical development, difficulties in the relationship, imperatives for a better rapport, and remedial prescriptions.

4

Michal Alram, Rika Gyselen, Sylloge Nummorum Sasanidarum Paris-Berlin-Wien. Band II. Ohrmazd I – Ohrmazd II., Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Phil.-Hist. Kl. Denkschriften 422 = Veröffentlichungen der Numismatischen Kommission 53, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 2012, SS 610, ISBN: 978-3-7001-6993-2

100%

KETTENHOFEN E.

Historia i Świat

|

2016

|

issue 5

279-282

EN

review

5

Katarzyna Maksymiuk, Geography of Roman-Iranian wars. Military operations of Rome and Sasanian Iran, Siedlce 2015, SS 143; ISBN 978-83-6244-713-8

100%

KETTENHOFEN E.

Historia i Świat

|

2016

|

issue 5

283-287

DE

review

6

Ilkka Syvänne and Katarzyna Maksymiuk, The Military History of the Third Century Iran. Scientific Publishing House of Siedlce University, Siedlce 2018, ISBN: 978-83-7051-894-3

100%

KETTENHOFEN E.

Historia i Świat

|

2020

|

issue 9

157-161

EN

REVIEW

7

New Russian view on Sassanid Empire. Polemic with book: М. Мочалов, Д. Полежаев, Держава Сасанидов 224 - 653 годы, Москва 2016

100%

SIŃCZAK T.

Historia i Świat

|

2017

|

issue 6

189-194

8

rev. Э.Ш. Хуршудян, Государственные институты парфянского и сасанидского Ирана, Алматы 2015

100%

MAKSYMIUK K.

Historia i Świat

|

2017

|

issue 6

187-188

9

Od sankcji do sankcji. Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Islamskiej Republiki Iranu

87%

Fiedler R.

Przegląd Strategiczny

|

2013

|

issue 1

109-124

EN

The article presents sanctions as an instrument in the United States policy to Iran. Washington accuses Iran for sponsoring terrorism and developing intensively its nuclear program. Since 2006 sanctions have been imposed by the United Nation’s Security Council and additionally and the European Union has imposed embargo on buying Iran’s oil. Each of these imposed sanctions regimes against Iran do not bring to a desirable change in Iran’s policy. The article focuses on the problem of sanctions effectiveness, especially in the situation in which not all states agree in imposing hard sanctions and Iran is strongly determined in further developing its nuclear program despite of costs and condemnation and further sanctions.

PL

W artykule omówiono sankcje jako instrument wykorzystywany w polityce USA wobec Iranu. Zarzutami podnoszonymi przez USA wobec Iranu jest wspieranie terroryzmu oraz intensywnie rozwijany program atomowy. Po roku 2006 sankcje zostały nałożone także przez Radę Bezpieczeństwa ONZ oraz embargo UE na zakup irańskiej ropy. Kolejne reżimy sankcji nie doprowadziły ani do zmiany polityki Iranu, ani do zmian politycznych w tym państwie. Ukazano problem skuteczności sankcji, zwłaszcza gdy nie wszystkie państwa godzą się na ich zaostrzenie a władze Iranu są zdeterminowane w dalszym rozwijaniu programu atomowego bez względu na koszty, potępienie i kolejne sankcje.

10

The Iranian Foreign Policyin the Persian Gulf Region under the Rule of President Hassan Rouhani: Continuity of Change

87%

Osiewicz P.

Przegląd Strategiczny

|

2014

|

issue 7

249-262

EN

Although Iran borders with many states and has direct access to the Caspian Sea as well as the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf region seems to be the most vital area to its security and prosperity. Yet since the 70’s Iran’s relations with the Arab states in the region have been rather strained and complex. The main reason for that had been the success of the Islamic revolution in 1979 which later resulted in a new dimension of Sunni-Shia rivalry. Moreover, post-revolutionary Iranian authorities also intended to maintain the regional hegemony from the Imperial State of Iran period. As a result, successive Iranian governments competed for hegemony in the Persian Gulf with the littoral Arab states which consolidated their regional positions due to close links and intensive cooperation with the West especially with the United States. Despite some political and economic initiatives which were undertaken by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, this rivalry was also evident between 2005–2013. The main aim of this article is to find out whether Iranian foreign policy towards the Arab states in the Persian Gulf region has undergone any significant changes since Hassan Rouhani became the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in August 2013. According to Mohammad Reza Deshiri, the Iranian foreign policy after 1979 can be divided into so-called waves of idealism and realism. During dominance of idealism values and spirituality are more important than pragmatism while during the realistic waves political as well as economic interests prevail over spirituality. Iranian idealism is connected with export of revolutionary ideas, Shia dominance as well as the restoration of unity among all muslims (ummah). On this basis both presidential terms of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can be classified as ‘waves of idealism’, albeit some of his ideas were very pragmatic. The question is if Hassan Rouhani’s foreign policy represents a continuity or a change. Is the current Iran’s foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region idealistic or rather realistic? The main assumption is that there will be no Arab-Iranian rapprochement in the Persian Gulf without a prior normalization of political relations between Iran and the West especially the United States.

11

Afghan migrants in Iran in modern times

87%

Modrzejewska-Leśniewska J.

Studia z Polityki Publicznej

|

2020

|

vol. 7

|

issue 4(28)

9-30

PL

Od dziesięcioleci Iran był dla Afgańczyków państwem zapewniającym miejsce pracy. To właśnie tutaj Afgańczycy znajdowali możliwość zarobienia pieniędzy, za które byli w stanie utrzymać swoje rodziny w kraju. Od chwili radzieckiej interwencji w Afganistanie w 1979 r. Iran stał się również miejscem schronienia dla około 3 mln afgańskich uchodźców. Sytuacja afgańskich pracowników i uchodźców ulegała zmianie w zależności od sytuacji wewnętrznej, jak i międzynarodowej Iranu. Stosunek irańskich władz do nich bywał przychylny, by wkrótce zmienić się radykalnie w stronę niechęci i prób pozbycia się afgańskich "gości". Tym samym Afgańczycy w Iranie nie mogli być pewni, jak długo będą mieli prawo tam przebywać, na jaką pomoc ze strony Irańczyków liczyć oraz czy nadal będą mieć pracę pozwalającą im utrzymać rodziny. Stan niepewności społeczności afgańskiej jeszcze bardziej pogłębił wybuch pandemii COVID-19, gdyż ani irański, ani afgański system opieki zdrowotnej nie są w stanie sobie z nią poradzić, a wobec załamania gospodarczego w Iranie pierwszymi ofiarami stali się cudzoziemcy niezależnie od ich statusu - również Afgańczycy. Głównym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie zmieniającej się i niepewnej sytuacji Afgańczyków w Iranie w ostatnich latach. Analiza dotyczy takich obszarów, jak: status prawny, edukacja, życie rodzinne czy też prawo do pracy. Uwzględniono tutaj także, oczywiście w ograniczonym zakresie, sytuację wewnętrzną Iranu, która niewątpliwie wpływała na położenie afgańskich emigrantów. Na podstawie przeprowadzonej analizy dostępnych materiałów można stwierdzić, że położenie Afgańczyków w Iranie było i jest bardzo mocno uzależnione od sytuacji Iranu i dobrej lub złej woli irańskich władz. Jednocześnie, ze względu na skomplikowaną sytuację Afganistanu, afgańscy emigranci znajdują się w sytuacji bez wyjścia i są "skazani" na pobyt w Iranie.

EN

For many decades Iran was a destination of economic immigration for Afghans. There, they could earn money to provide for their families at home. Since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, Iran also became a place of refuge for some 3 million Afghans. Their situation was changing according to the changes in the internal and international position of Iran. Sometimes the Iranian authorities were sympathetic; other times they were fiercely unsympathetic and keen to remove the Afghan "guests." So, the Afghans in Iran could not be sure how long they would be allowed to stay there, if the Iranians would be willing to support them, and if they would have work to provide for their families. This state of uncertainty of the Afghan community was worsened by an outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Both the Iranian and Afghan healthcare systems are unable to effectively deal with the problem. And the economic collapse in Iran affected primarily the foreigners there of whatever stance, in this particular case, the Afghans. The main aim of the article is to present the changing and unstable situation of Afghans in Iran in recent years. The analysis covers areas such as their legal status, education, family life, or the right to work. It also takes into account, to a limited extent, the internal situation of Iran, which undoubtedly influenced the situation of Afghan migrants. Based on the analysis of the available materials, it can be concluded that the position of the Afghans in Iran was and is strongly dependent on the situation of Iran and the good or bad will of the Iranian authorities. At the same time, due to the complicated situation in Afghanistan, Afghan migrants find themselves in a hopeless situation and are "doomed" to stay in Iran.

12

Wpływ sankcji gospodarczych na przemysł naftowy Islamskiej Republiki Iranu w latach 2011-2020

85%

Wolny K.

Academic Review of Business and Economics

|

2022

|

vol. 3(2)

61-75

EN

The aim of the article is to investigate the impact of signature sanctions im-posed by the US, UN and EU in 2011-2020 on the oil industry of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The article indicates the determinants of the effectiveness of sanctions and shows changes in economic indicators caused by stoppage of investments in the energy sector in that region and the slowdown in imports of the raw material by third countries. Analy-sis of the collected data led to the search that sanctions on crude oil, kerosene, indexes in ten EU processes recorded indexes that they recorded in real rate indices and rates, the stock market and stock exchange rates. The insufficient weakening of the economy did not materialize despite its collapse. The reasons for this were found in the way Iran di-versified its exports at that time.

PL

Celem artykułu jest ocena wpływu sankcji gospodarczych nałożonych przez USA, ONZ i UE w latach 2011-2020 na przemysł naftowy Islamskiej Republiki Iranu. Analizie podlegają determinanty skuteczności sankcji oraz zmiany wskaźników ekonomicznych spowodowane zatrzymaniem inwestycji w sektorze energetycznym tego kraju i zahamowaniem importu ropy naftowej przez kraje trzecie. Na potrzeby badań dokonano kwerendy literatury przedmiotu (polsko- i anglojęzycznej) oraz przeanalizo-wano dane statystyczne OPEC. Uzyskane wyniki pozwalają stwierdzić, iż po przyłącze-niu się w proces sankcjonowania krajów UE nastąpił spadek stopy wzrostu realnego PKB Iranu, zmniejszyły się dochody z eksportu i irańska waluta uległa deprecjacji. Po-mimo znacznego osłabienia gospodarki irańskiej nie doszło do jej całkowitego załamania wskutek zmian w strukturze geograficznej irańskiego eksportu.

13

Korpus strażników rewolucji w systemie politycznym i polityce bezpieczeństwa islamskiej Republiki Iran

85%

andrusiewicz k.

Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego

|

2013

|

vol. 7

357-371

EN

The 1979 Islamic Revolution has brought changes not only within country’s political structure but also influenced the internal Iranian security system. The Iranian regime from the beginning made an effort to establish its own, strong structures adoptable to defend internal and external threats and loyal towards the leader and revolutionary ideas . It alsofrequently aimed its activity to support foreign political andmilitary groups with the goal to export revolutionary ideology promoted by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, established by the Supreme Leader of Iran – the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, since the end of the war with Iraq, have gradually converted their structures and more frequently played a significant role not only within Iranian contemporary security system, but also influenced economy gaining power within the entire Iranian political sphere. The subject paper is published with the writer’s intention to clarify the role of the formation (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) within the interior security system as well as the whole country’s societal and political system. The research is also structured to verify assumptions whether the threat from the formation were possible for the Regime bearing in mind its strength, organizational capabilities, equipment and combat readiness. Sources used to prepare this publication were of Persian and English origin pertaining to the contemporary Iranian legal framework.

PL

Islamska Rewolucja roku 1979 przyniosła ze sobą zmiany nie tylko w obrębie struktur politycznych, ale także wewnątrz irańskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa. Irański reżim starał się przygotować własne, silne i lojalne wobec przywódcy i zdobyczy rewolucji struktury, przystosowane do zwalczania zarówno wewnętrznych, jak i zewnętrznych zagrożeń, niejednokrotnie za cel stawiając sobie wspieranie także zagranicznych ugrupowań militarno-politycznych, co służyć ma idei eksportu rewolucji, promowanej jeszcze przez Ajatollaha Chomeiniego. Jednak stworzony przez Najwyższego Przywódcę Korpus Strażników Rewolucji Islamskiej (Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi/Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution), od czasów zakończenia wojny z Irakiem stopniowo przekształcał swoje struktury, coraz częściej odgrywając istotną rolę nie tylko w systemie bezpieczeństwa współczesnego Iranu, ale także w jego gospodarce, tym samym zyskując na sile i znaczeniu w obrębie całej irańskiej sceny politycznej. Publikacja jest próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie o rolę formacji zarówno wewnątrz irańskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa, jak i w obrębie całego systemu społeczno-politycznego. Jest także formą weryfikacji założenia, dotyczącego możliwości zaistnienia zagrożenia dla reżimu ze strony samego Korpusu biorąc pod uwagę jego liczebność i zdolności organizacyjne oraz wyposażenie i przeszkolenie. Artykuł powstał w oparciu o literaturę persko- i anglojęzyczną, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem aktualnie obowiązujących irańskich aktów prawnych. Wszelkie cytowane fragmenty tłumaczone były bezpośrednio z języka oryginału przez autorkę.

14

Małgorzata Abassy, Modernizacja w cieniu Allaha. Współczesny Iran, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2019, ss. 142

85%

Dobrowolski M.

Alcumena. Pismo Interdyscyplinarne

|

2020

|

issue 2(2)

145-148

15

Przyszłość stosunków Unii Europejskiej z Iranem – szanse i zagrożenia wynikające z porozumienia nuklearnego

85%

Diawoł-Sitko A.

|

2019

|

issue 1

111-132

PL

Celem artykułu jest analiza współpracy Unii Europejskiej z Iranem w kontekście porozumienia nuklearnego, w tym szans i zagrożeń na poziomie politycznym, ekonomicznym i bezpieczeństwa wynikających z jego osiągnięcia. W artykule podjęto także temat oceny efektywności i udziału dyplomacji unijnej w procesie negocjacji oraz pozycji negocjacyjnej Unii na tle najważniejszych międzynarodowych aktorów, a także implikacji zawieszenia porozumienia nuklearnego przez administrację amerykańską dla przyszłości stosunków z Iranem oraz roli Europy w utrzymaniu dialogu z tym państwem. Artykuł podzielony jest na 4 części. Pierwsza, dotyczy znaczenia Iranu w polityce bliskowschodniej i dla Unii Europejskiej. Druga, genezy programu nuklearnego oraz roli Unii Europejskiej w osiągnięciu kompromisu z 2015 r. Trzecia, nowego otwarcia współpracy z Iranem po roku 2015. Ostatnia, oceny strategii i działań Unii wobec Iranu w kontekście zawieszenia porozumienia nuklearnego przez administrację amerykańską.

EN

The aim of the article is to analyze the European Union’s cooperation with Iran in the context of a nuclear agreement, including opportunities and threats at the political, economic and security level resulting from its achievement. The article also addresses the assessment of the effectiveness and participation of EU diplomacy in the negotiation process and the Union’s negotiating position against the background of the most important international actors, as well as the implications of the suspension of the nuclear agreement by the US administration for the future of relations with Iran and the role of Europe in maintaining dialogue with that country. The article is divided into 4 parts. The first concerns the importance of Iran in Middle East and for the European Union. The second genesis of the nuclear program and the role of the European Union in reaching 2015 compromise. The third is devoted to the new opening of cooperation with Iran after 2015. The last part evaluates Union’s strategy and actions towards Iran in the context of suspension of the nuclear agreement by the American administration.

16

Internal Factors and its Impact on Iranian Foreign Policy

80%

FIEDLER R.

Przegląd Strategiczny

|

2018

|

issue 11

211-220

EN

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a political structure with co-shared and competitive activity in the field of foreign policy. There are two power centres the president and the supreme leader. Iranian political elite is composed of factions of the conservatives, moderates, pragmatists, and reformers. Each faction has influence on the course of Iranian foreign policy. The dominant faction, conservatives, has caused isolation and imposition of severe sanctions on Iran during Ahmadinejad’s presidency Although domestic sources of foreign policy reveals competition among different factions there is consensus in principal goals of Iranian foreign policy.

17

Iranian Women. Quest for Freedom and Equality

80%

Włodek-Biernat L.

Polish Sociological Review

|

2011

|

vol. 172

|

issue 4

503-510

EN

The Islamic Republic of Iran is known in the world as a country of oppression and discrimination against women. Ironically, Iranian women are very active in public life and fulfil important social roles. Not only do women represent a majority of Iranian university students but many are respected academic teachers, lawyers and journalists. Educated Iranian women once backed the Islamic Revolution. However, the system that ensued restricted their freedom by introducing anachronistic regulations based on literal understanding of Islamic law (the Sharia) but, on the other hand, it opened up personal growth opportunities for women from poorer and more traditional social strata. Many of today’s Iranian feminists are the beneficiaries of the post-revolutionary education system. The Islamic Republic has given them an opportunity to get education but fails to provide them with rights that would match their qualifications: women are discriminated against at courts and married women are made dependent on their husbands who are often less educated than their wives. The Iranian regime views the quest for gender equality as a way to oppose the current political system. The proponents of equality are persecuted and imprisoned in very much the same way as dissidents who demand political liberalisation and abolishment of censorship. Simultaneously, the idea of equal rights has been incorporated into political programmes of all opponents of the current Iranian government

18

Gospodarcza i społeczno-kulturowa rola Iranu w kształtowaniu bezpieczeństwa na Bliskim Wschodzie

80%

Troszczyńska L.

Obronność – Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania i Dowodzenia Akademii Sztuki Wojennej

|

2016

|

issue 2(18)

14

EN

The aim of the article is to explain Iran’s role in the context of security in the Middle East. This region, due to a large number of conflicts generated by geopolitical, economic, social and cultural factors, is a strategic point on the international security map. In the dynamically changing situation in the Middle East, Iran strengthens is political situation. Decisions taken by this country’s authorities may significantly affect security in the Middle East. Thus the following areas should be researched, firstly factors influencing the shape of security in the Middle East and secondly, economic, civilizational and cultural conditions resulting in its political moves in the area of security in the Middle East region.

19

CHILD, EDUCATION AND LOVE. CHILD FOCUSSED REFLECTIONS FROM AN IRANIAN PRACTITIONER

80%

Estemadi S.

Society Register

|

2017

|

vol. 1

|

issue 1

147-151

EN

The following paper is dedicated to theories connecting children, their upbringing and their education with living and working praxis based on love and understanding of children. This is just the first of a series of updates about educational activities of Donya Children Research Institute, based in Tehran (Iran), that will occur as an ongoing feature in Society Register creating a window of communication between 'distant' lands, connected through common interest in children's wellbeing.

20

Estimation and forecast of carbon dioxide emission in Iran: Introducing a new hybrid modelling

80%

Tavan M.

Journal of Economics and Management

|

2019

|

vol. 36

144-167

EN

Aim/purpose – The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new hybrid modelling to predict carbon dioxide emissions in order to make the correct decision to reduce air pollution in Iran. While there are not many data available for some variables, in this modelling, the goal is to make accurate predictions even with low data. Design/methodology/approach – In the present paper, CO2 emissions in Iran in the period of 1980-2014 was predicted using three models of Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL), Fuzzy Linear Regression (FLR) and hybrid model based on combination of ARDL and FLR models, and then the prediction accuracy of the models is compared. Findings – Comparing prediction accuracy of models showed that the Fuzzy Auto- -Regressive Distributed Lag (FARDL) is more accurate than the initial patterns for predicting carbon dioxide emissions. Finally, the results showed that GDP and energy consumption has a positive and significant correlation with carbon dioxide emissions in short run. Also, the carbon dioxide emission indicated a low elasticity towards GDP and low energy consumption. Research implications/limitations – When the number of data is low, the FARDL model provides a more accurate prediction than ARDL and FLR Models. FARDL’s combined model reduces the problems that exist in the ARDL and FLR models. One of the problems with the ARDL model is the need for many tests; the problem with the fuzzy regression model is also the high fuzzy distance length that makes decision making difficult. The FARDL model eliminates these constraints as much as possible. Originality/value/contribution – This paper has been able to confirm that Fuzzy Auto- -Regressive Distributed Lag (FARDL) is more accurate than the initial patterns for predicting carbon dioxide emissions.

Refine search results