Search results - CEJSH

1

Daniel Dennett, Alvin Plantigaa, Nauka i religia. Czy można je pogodzić?, tł. M. Firman, Ł. Kwiatek, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2014, ss. 142.

100%

Jasiński K.

Studia Elbląskie

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2015

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vol. 16

449-452

2

„Zakorzenić się w prawdzie”. Kultura w świetle encykliki Fides et ratio

80%

Wojtyła W.

Studia Ełckie

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2020

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vol. 22

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issue 3

355-367

EN

The effect of rejecting the correspondence concept of truth, adopted in classical metaphysics, is the crisis of modern culture, which is ultimately the crisis of man himself. An important element of it is the belief in the gap between faith and reason. John Paul II claims that stopping this crisis can only happen through the spiritual revival of man, whose condition and foundation is the rediscovery of the universal truth about himself and his ultimate destiny. The Pope is convinced that in the context of contemporary liberal and technical-consumer cultural trends, only thanks to objective truth can a man preserve his identity and the unity of his culture.

3

Restoring the Foundations of Reason and Faith in Religious Education

80%

O’Shea G.

Studia Ełckie

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2012

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vol. 14

41-56

EN

This paper explores reasons for the apparent ineffectiveness of religious education programmes in the Catholic schools of the West. It examines the impact of the anti-realist educational philosophy of Constructivism and the inadequacy of responses to these challenges, including those proposed by Recontextualisation theologians. The paper examines the work of the nineteenth century Eng-lish Cardinal, John Henry Newman, and recommends possible solutions to the crisis in religious education based on the work of his insights. It also argues the case for certitude as a necessary component of religious education.

4

ZAGADNIENIE STOSUNKU ROZUMU I WIARY W ENCYKLICE FIDES ET RATIO

80%

Orbik Z.

Studia Ełckie

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2017

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vol. 19

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issue 2

117 - 129

EN

The task posed by the author of the article is to analyze the problem of the relation of faith and reason in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. He analyzes the importance of the key terms, and indicates their place in the tradition of European philosophy. It does also, on the basis of the content of the papal document, some comments on the nature of the systematic comparison of natural knowledge to Revelation and the philosophy of the natural sciences.

5

These Ultimate Springs and Principles: Science, Religion and the Limits of Reason

80%

Younis R. A.

Forum Philosophicum

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2010

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vol. 15

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issue 2

317-334

EN

The question of the limits of reason, not just within philosophy but also in the modern sciences, is arguably more important than ever given numerous recent commentaries on “life,” “reality,” meaning, purpose, pointlessness and so on, emanating not from philosophers or metaphysicians, but rather from physicists and biologists such as Steven Weinberg and Richard Dawkins. It will be argued that such commentaries concerning the “pointlessness” of the universe, or the purpose of “life,” and other such things, are flawed and unconvincing, not least because they seem to overlook or forget a number of well known and significant philosophical contributions on the question of limits, particularly by Kant, but also by Hume, Russell and Sir A J Ayer.

6

Rozum i wiara jako źródła wiedzy o Bogu według Zofii J. Zdybickiej USJK

80%

Tarasiewicz P.

Studia Ełckie

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2011

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vol. 13

51-64

EN

Considerations, undertaken by the article, lead to a conclusion that reason and faith as sources of knowing God are determined by many factors. Analyses of Zofia J. Zdybicka’ s works show that the rational knowledge about God is conditioned with limits of the human nature, specificity of the nature of Absolute Being, as well as historical and cultural contexts (which contain possibilities of common sense knowledge, and type of philosophical cognition). While the knowledge about God acquired through religious faith is shaped with the historical Revelation of Divine Persons, and forms of its social and personal reception. So if reason and faith have their own autonomy, ie. “spaces” where they can be realized in accordance with their own natures, then it is not possible to give up on any of them without disturbing to know not only God, but man as well.

7

Motywy zabójstw

80%

Niedzielska-Popek S.

Roczniki Wydziału Nauk Prawnych i Ekonomicznych KUL

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2007

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vol. 3

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issue 1

79-100

EN

This article describes main presumptions about the motive, its mechanics and classification. It also presents the way the motive influences on committing a crime. How difficult it is unequivocally to define what the main reason of committing such a horrible crime was. Moreover, there are characterizations of people who committed crimes and are serving a sentence at the moment. Having taken them as an example I tried to show how it works that a man who is actuated by emotions and not only them can take somebody’s life.

8

WIARA A INNE TYPY POZNANIA

80%

SIEŃKOWSKI M.

Civitas et Lex

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2014

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issue 4

69-81

EN

The characteristics of the knowledge of God through the religion faith is consequence of subject – that one’s overtopped the epistemic powers of human – which is accessible merely in that way. The aim of Belief is supernatural and it consists in union with God through getting to know his nature. The method of the religious faith is an engagement of the intellect and a will the recognised subject. The religious faith is a different cognition toward other types of knowledge. It is also the cognition which assumes a former natural acquired knowledge. A leap of faith in that what was deemed for truth needs activities of intellect.

9

Thinking Under Extreme Conditions: From Political Philosophy to the Forcing of Politics. A Contemporary Reflection on Book VI of Plato’s Republic

80%

Gava J.-F.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2016

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issue 1

145-154

EN

According to Aristotle, rhetoric stands in the midst of reason and violence. In con-temporary coordinates, this means that there is a mode of action extraneous to reason, which is violence. Up to now, one could plea that the very exercise of reason was noth-ing but action, autotelic activity. Thus the opposition between action and thought was a fake one. Repatriating à la Oswald Ducrot all reason to practical reason allowed us to think on thought as acting. This was the answer to the impracticability of violence. However, action as a mere discourse conceived as auto/hetero transformational practice in itself will not help. We need to take back into consideration action as something ex-traneous to pure/practical reason, to discourse. But this is not violence of the old type. Both the old irenism of the workers’ movement and the armed counter-state as the spec-ular image of the state, supposed to wipe away the latter from the historical stage in the name of universal emancipation, are impracticable. Modern barbarity will soon get rid of the human species unless a new form of vio-lence is found able to compete with the state, without turning into a new form a state. This new form is authoritative, legitimate intimidation. But what are the conditions to speak out authoritatively? Are they not distinctive state conditions? Moreover, does authority lie in the form of discourse? If not, because consentment has superseded mere submission, which are the authoritative sources of discourse which, though neither overtly nor primarily conflicting with the state, nor with corporations, could somehow not completely coincide with the interests of it and even work against it, though like it? We would like to examine all those questions.

10

Wiara i rozum. Spór o status teologii politycznej u L. Straussa i E. Voegelina

70%

Piekarski R. M.

Pieniądze i Więź

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2013

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vol. 16

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issue 1(58)

7-13

EN

In the 50s of the twentieth century Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin conducted an important dispute concerning the status of myth and the relationship of philosophy to theology. As they both remained creative within the broader political philosophy, their argument took the form of discussion on the status of political theology. This discussion seems to be even more interesting as it invokes the controversial position of political theology in the writings of Thomas Hobbes and his followers. In his article the author summarizes both the arguments of overt and directly guided polemics (among others correspondence in the years 1934 to 1964) of both authors, and reconstructs at least the most important evidence of their positions in this dispute. The author wishes also to respond to the subject matter of this dispute, and therefore the relation of philosophy to theology and the relationship between political theology and political philosophy, with reference to recent studies, among others of Merio Scattola and Jacob Taubes, were discussed.

11

Doupting Thomas. Reason on the sidelines

70%

Kulas D.

Anthropos?

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2016

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issue 25 Na uboczu

44-55

EN

The paper concerns the problem of reason and faith on the basis of Christianity. The author points out the Bible as the text, which otherwise is rooted in Judaism and Christianity. The starting point for the analysis of reason and faith is the story of Doubting Thomas. The author interprets it as a scene in which the accent does not fall on lack of faith of Thomas, but the emergence of "reason on the sidelines." It indicates an intimacy of the unparalleled meeting of Thomas and Christ. To present this moment the author interprets the image of Gerard van Honthorst titled The Incredulity of Saint Thomas. The author shows the particular dangers associated with the use of reason and faith, what has an influence on human culture. The paper is an attempt to describe the relationship between faith and reason.

12

Habermas a náboženství

70%

Hlaváček K.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2018

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vol. 66

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issue 1

55-74

EN

This article analyses Jürgen Habermas’ relation to religion. To this end, it focuses on the post-secular phase of this relation: that is, on the period in which Habermas conceives of religion as a partner in dialogue, and makes an appeal for secular reason to learn from religion. In the article I formulate the thesis that Habermas is, in his relation to religion, ambivalent in more ways than one: on the one hand he speaks about the rationality of religion, on the other hand, there remain in his approach traces of the secularizing thesis which sees religion as irrational. On the one hand he is painfully aware of the deficiencies of secular reason, while on the other hand he rejects religiously-oriented philosophy and relies on the concept of translation, which is in many way inadequate. The shift in attitude, making reason receptive towards religion, which is cultivated in Habermas’ contemporary work, is treated, in this article, as inadequate, and a further shift in this direction is recommended.

13

“Reason and faith”. The problem of the separation of disciplines

70%

Bugajak G.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2020

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vol. 56

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issue S2

137-155

EN

The paper maintains and reinforces a viewpoint that science and religion (theology) are methodologically and epistemologically independent. However, it also suggests that this independence can be overcome if a “third party” is taken into account, that is – philosophy. Such a possibility seems to follow from the thesis of incommensurability and the thesis of underdetermination formulated and analysed in the current philosophy of science.

14

Sacrum i polityka. Uwagi o elementach teologii politycznej u E. Burke’a i E. Voegelina

70%

Piekarski R.

Pieniądze i Więź

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2012

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vol. 15

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issue 4(57)

7-14

EN

An important issue arising with regard to the relationship between politics and religion is the question: on what the authority of secularized political power is based? Already in XVIII century E. Burke, with a clear consciousness of the process of power secularization in the context of anticipated terror in post-Revolution France, did realize that a legitimization of power referring directly to material interests or violence is extraordinarily weak. He also grasped the role of the myths and manipulations, which are very useful for power-holders seeking popular legitimization. On the other hand, Eric Voegelin, who witnessed magical rituals and bloody violence of the Nazis in the '30ies of the XX century understood earlier than other political philosophers, that in the basis of totalitarian ideologies there are a sort of quasi-religious praxis and a kind of political gnosis. Yet, in the last decades there have been ever more noticeable attempts to produce a kind of so-called civic political theology, which sets aside inherited Christian contents and effectively eliminates the experience of sacrum. Both authors hold that such processes are dangerous and have negative consequences.

15

The relationship between will and reason in the moral philosophies of Kant and Aquinas

70%

Rowan A. M.

Logos i Ethos

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2015

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issue 1(38)

93–130

EN

Both Kant and Aquinas ground moral action in reason and will; however, this seems to be the end of the similarity in their approaches with respect to the role of reason and will in moral action. The goal of this essay is to show that Aquinas’ notion of the will as the rational appetite is superior to Kant’s notion of good will in providing the foundation for moral action. To this effect, I analyze the relationship between will and reason in their moral philosophies. I discuss Kant’s notion of will in both its moral and phenomenal modes, and Aquinas’ notion of will as the rational appetite and of human act. I argue that Aquinas’s notion of will and moral act is superior to that of Kant for several reasons. First and foremost, the notion of morally worthy action accommodates human nature with its inclinations, tendencies, and desires. It is not divorced from human physical and emotional nature. Second, in contrast to Kant’s will, Aquinas’s will retains its own identity. That is, it avails itself of reason’s search for truth and meaning, yet it does not collapse into reason, specifically logic. Third, Aquinas’ will is dynamic. In contrast to Kant’s, which in order to be moral simply follows the laws of logic, Aquinas’ will desires the good and propels a person to action. Finally, Aquinas’ notion of human act, in the sense that it involves both the counsel of reason and will’s capacity to desire the good, offers a more holistic understanding of human moral act and its possible consequences. In contrast to Kant’s will’s rigid command to obey the law, Aquinas’ notion of will and human act also gives reasons why we need to be moral. We must act morally, not only because our action would otherwise be self-contradictory or not live up to the letter of the law, but because our choices and our actions have real consequences in the world.

16

Why Thinking in Faith? A Reappraisal of Edith Stein’s View of Reason

70%

Palade T.-B.

Forum Philosophicum

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2010

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vol. 15

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issue 2

401-412

EN

This paper intends to question the conventional wisdom that philosophy should limit its endeavours to the horizon of modern transcendentalism, thus rejecting the presuppositions of faith. By reappraising Edith Stein's views of faith and reason, which are also shared by the magisterial document of John Paul II, Fides et ratio, an argument for the possibility of “thinking in faith” is put forward. But why would it be important nowadays to engage in rational research in philosophy in a quest for truth which also draws its inspiration from faith? First of all, as I shall argue, because the two great modern transcendental projects, namely the Kantian and the Husserlian one, which were both in tune with Spinoza's project to liberate philosophical reason from theology, have failed. Secondly, because “faith” (fides) is not based on “irrational sentiments,” but is “intellectual understanding,” as Edith Stein argues. Third, because the natural light of the created intellect is, as was shown by St. Thomas Aquinas, a participated likeness of the supernatural light of the uncreated divine intellect. Therefore, even the natural philosopher gets their own light from the eternal Truth of faith. Finally, by following another Thomistic stance, one may argue that the end of human life is an intelligible one: the contemplation of God. In order to attain this end, the human being should endeavour to attain as much as is possible, in an intelligible way, the thing desired. Even if the philosophical inquiry has its own limits, it may however sustain such progress towards the end of human life.

17

Kantian morality by the Freedom: the critic of critic

70%

Borges Meneses R. D.

Prosopon. Europejskie Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne

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2016

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issue 3(16)

23-30

EN

Freedom play a very important role in Kant’s ethics, because the possibility of moral judgment presupposes it. Freedom is a regulator idea of reason that serves an indispensable practical function as modus agendi of practical reason. Without the assumption of freedom according to Kant reason cannot act. We cannot help but think of our actions as the result of an uncaused cause if we are to act at all and employ reason to accomplish ends und understand the moral world, that is the agendi modus of reason.

18

The Feeling Brain - The Thinking Soul

70%

Gáliková S.

Human Affairs

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2010

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vol. 20

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issue 3

203-209

EN

Recent advances in neuroscience have dramatically improved our understanding of human emotional states. With the help of new technologies and models, scholars are beginning to unravel the "mystery" of emotional life. Confusions in contemporary emotion studies are due to the traditional model of a person as a rational conscious agent. The paper highlights two problematic aspects of this prevailing model: the relation between emotion and reason and the relation between emotion and consciousness. Firstly, it is claimed that the difference between emotions and thoughts does not transcend their mutual interconnectivity. Secondly, conscious content and emotional responses are both products of specialized emotion systems that operate unconsciously. Both claims are supported by experimental findings and clinical practice.

19

Hobbesova literární technologie závaznosti rozumu

70%

Maršálek J.

Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

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2017

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vol. 39

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issue 1

7-29

EN

Does a perfectly established proof also imply, for its beholder, a commitment to account for the proof’s conclusion in further reasoning and action? In the herein presented study, I treat Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan as a “literary technology” that seeks to position the reader into the role of the author of Leviathan’s argumentation. The interpretations of Hobbes’s scientific style offered by S. Shapin and S. Schaffer are thus critically developed alongside Q. Skinner’s analysis of Hobbes’s rhetorical practice. It is suggested that, with regard to his readers, Hobbes does not content himself with merely demonstrating a scientific proof, but strives to involve his readers in his argumentation and make them participate in the creation of scientific arguments and their conclusions.

CS

Vyplývá z bezvadně provedeného důkazu také závazek počítat ve svém dalším rozvažování a jednání s jeho závěrem? V předložené studii se zabývám Hobbesovým Leviathanem coby "literární technologií", která čtenáře staví do role autora v Leviathanu rozvíjené argumentace. V tomto smyslu kriticky navazuji jednak na interpretaci Hobbesova vědeckého stylu, kterou nabízejí S. Shapin a S. Schaffer, jednak na výklad Q. Skinnera, který se podrobně zabývá Hobbesovou rétorickou praxí. Nabízím tezi, podle níž se Hobbes v kontaktu se svým publikem nespokojuje s předvedením vědeckého důkazu, nýbrž své čtenáře nechává na vytváření vědecké argumentace a jejím závěru osobně participovat.

20

Mediated Recognition and the Quest for a Common Rational Field of Discussion in Three Early Medieval Dialogues

70%

Palmén R., Koskinen H. J.

Open Theology

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2016

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vol. 2

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issue 1

EN

Using interpretative resources from contemporary recognition theory with a special focus on the notion of mediated recognition, this paper discusses the nature and degree of methodological agreement as manifested in three twelfth-century dialogues. The first source to be considered was written by Gilbert of Crispin, and known as Disputatio Christiani cum Gentili (Disputation of Christian with a Pagan), ca. 1093. The second source was composed by the Christian convert Peter Alfonsi, whose dialogue Dialogi contra Iudaeos (Dialogue against the Jews) was written about 1110. The third source to be considered is Peter Abelard’s treatise Collationes, a dialogue with three participants and the narrator, written between 1127 and 1132. In particular, the paper discusses the role of reason, the principles of argument, and the potentially-shared set of rules these dialogues employ, thereby bringing the agreement among conflicting parties into focus. In this respect, the novel interpretative approach based on recognition theory also differs markedly from the standard reading of apologetic texts, which usually emphasizes conflict and disagreement.

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