Search results - CEJSH

1

Sentenced to Remain Free

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Schoenwalder-Kunze T.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2005

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vol. 14

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issue 4(56)

155-164

EN

In Sartre's own words, we are 'thrown into liberty' (nous sommes jetés dans la liberté) or condemened to freedom (condamnés a la liberté). These phrases indicate that freedom can be experienced as burden or penance. First the authoress reviews opinions on liberty expressed by Descartes and Kant. Then she contrasts them with the conception worked out by Sartre, who emphasizes that freedom is something more than the power to choose. It is also an obligation to view oneself as a differentiating and discriminating subject called upon to assign meaning and value to different situations in the world. By taking up this task human individuals create in nature a whole new world of purposes and ends. If, however, they fail to execute this responsibility, they slide back into the status of passive and irresponsible parts of nature.

2

On Sartre in Poland in 1948 - 1969

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Bednarz I.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2005

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vol. 14

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issue 4(56)

97-121

EN

Sartre was an immensely popular intellectual figure in Poland for over two decades. He had shown much interest in social experiments that were conducted in the communist countries at that time but, perhaps wisely, he never made clear what he thought of them. His interest was appreciated and welcome. His seminal pamphlet 'L'existentialism est un humanism' made a great impact on some of the Marxist in Poland who began to suspect that communism may tend to suppress individuality, responsibility and a sense pride in strong individuals. As a champion of personal liberty Sartre was an ally to liberally oriented communists, and a foe to dogmatic party bosses. Sartre approved of social changes and strong party rule in economic and political fields. But he also valued personal independence and freedom. For this reason he was a menace to those Marxists who thought he would demolish the system of strict authoritarian rule. The article presents several opinions on Sartre that exemplify these conflicting attitudes.

3

Podmiot wobec struktur społecznych. Jeana-Paula Sartre’a i Pierre’a Bourdieu konceptualizacja podmiotowości społecznej

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Pomiankiewicz Ł.

Studia Socjologiczne

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2013

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issue 2(209)

46-69

EN

In this paper, based on two theoretical conceptions, the author presents the most important dichotomy in sociology, agency/structure, which reflects core issue of the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity. The dichotomy is a theoretical approach to demonstrate the relationship between social agents and social structures in which the former operate. In the main part of the text, the author compares Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of freedom, as a phenomenological analysis of consciousness, which is the starting point for making statement about social agency on the basis of his social ontology, with Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, which is an attempt to overcome the dichotomy in the field of French sociological theory. Comparing these approaches, the author tries to present their methodological advantage for the study of agency/structure problem, which is the basic criterion applied in their assessment.

4

PRVNÍ ZÁSADA SOUKROMÉHO PRÁVA (ZÁSADA AUTONOMIE VŮLE: RESPEKT KE ZPŮSOBILOSTI ČLOVĚKA TVOŘIT SI VLASTNÍ ŽIVOTNÍ POMĚRY)

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Eliáš K.

Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)

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2019

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vol. 102

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issue 5

375 – 389

EN

Autonomy of will (private autonomy) is the first value of private law and the principle of private autonomy is its first principle, because private law would not exist without them. Many other principles adhered to by private law (respect of good morals, honesty, neminem laedere, prohibition of abuse of rights, pacta sunt servanda, etc.), would lose its function without autonomy of will. By the way, also private law concepts can be understood and interpreted on the basis of the principle of autonomy of will. “Autonomy is the ground of the dignity of the human and of every rational nature” (Kant). Private autonomy is derived from personal freedom. The article notices that this key term disappeared from Slovak and Czech law of the socialist era, because also civil law then perceived an individual as a component of a social “machine” building up communism. Freedom and hence private autonomy are now protected by constitutional safeguards that limit the public power. The author takes note of the contradictory phenomena of modern times and the contending trends of protection of freedom of an individual to mould his or her own private affairs independently and on his or her own responsibility according to his or her own will, but also its limitation under the slogan of public interests, security and public order.

5

SARTRE ON THE AUTHENTICITY, REQUIRED IF MY CHOICES ARE TO BE TRULY MINE

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Weberman D.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2011

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vol. 66

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issue 9

879 – 889

EN

My making choices and acting on those choices in a way that might count as my being free would seem to require that those choices are truly my choices. Furthermore, for my choices to be truly mine, it would seem that these choices must reflect my true self. So it seems that choosing and acting freely depends in a robust sense on such choosing and acting being authentic. Yet the concept of authenticity seems problematic. What or where is that true self which would be the basis for authentic choosing, acting and living? Perhaps there is no such true self. This problem is central to the philosophies of both Sartre and Foucault. For the philosophers freedom authenticity or self-hood were central. The paper aims to show that, in spite of Foucault’s criticism, Sartre does not fall back on the idea of a true or deep self that is given to us. Sartre can appeal to the idea of authenticity without holding on such a dubious construct as a given, true self. Therefore the exploration of bad faith, good faith and authenticity in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, where the problem is posed but left unresolved, is necessary. Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, where a more concrete problem – the problem of authentically identifying oneself with a group of human beings − actually opens up a way how to overcome the problem of authenticity.

6

SÚKROMNOPRÁVNA AUTONÓMIA A JEJ LIMITY (INAUGURAČNÁ PREDNÁŠKA)

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Dulak A.

Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)

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2018

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vol. 101

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issue 1

3 – 26

EN

Private autonomy has been always considered as a significant indicator of the personal freedoms of an individual. It is the fundament of private law; any interference with the freedoms of an individual triggers a debate about the character and duty of law - not only of private law. To many, consumer protection in private legal relationships features a significant interference of the freedom of contract. This article performs an analysis of some of the big changes within private law, and, based on their substance, the author attempts to redefine the concept of private autonomy in the conditions of our current society.

7

ÚVAHY O SLOBODE KANTOM KONCIPOVANEJ GENIALITE

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Haško Š.

ESPES

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2012

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vol. 1

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issue 1

74 – 78

EN

The gravity of freedom, as one of the main features and privileges of Kant’s genius, can be verified by the fact, according to which his artistic creation reveals itself within the so-called Beautiful, Free Art. Despite all that, the work originates from reflections, which present themselves as reasons to reassess the main themes and characteristics in Kant’s aesthetic theory. In the paper, I deal with the analysis of a narrowed down understanding of genius; i.e. by interpreting freedom as ‘solely’ the liberation from rules of art creation and at the same time, in respect to Kant's conception of disinterestedness, from all outside-art objectives. In respect of concepts of genius specified by Kant, we can ask ourselves about the issue at hand; is it even possible for a genius to be unsatisfied with the mechanics of his own genius, in other words him being a genius per se.

8

The Old Polish Conception of Freedom and Its Evolution in the Political Thought of the Eighteenth Century

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Grzeskowiak-Krwawicz A.

Kwartalnik Historyczny

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2006

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vol. 113

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issue 1

57-84

EN

The liberty of the gentry has been identified with a set of estate privileges although it also comprised a wider vision of liberty to which the Polish gentry referred already since the sixteenth century. This republican conception rendered civic liberties dependent on participation in governance. Only people who decided about themselves could be certain of individual rights. In accordance with contemporary terminology only positive liberty guaranteed its negative variant - an unhampered realisation of the individual's targets and wishes. Republican thought carried certain threats - the absence of a distinct division of individual liberties and the right to take part in political life obliterated the boundaries between the freedom of the individual and the community, between public and private good. Free participation in public life was no longer interpreted as the right to decide about oneself and the protection of the free state, but exclusively as the protection of the freedom of individual citizens. Such an interpretation was suited to the idea of the liberum veto conceived as individual protest against the decisions passed by Parliament. In the second half of the eighteenth century such authors as Józef Wybicki, Antoni Poplawski and, later on, Hugo Kollataj embarked upon a polemic with this comprehension of liberty. By referring to Western conceptions they began to distinguish between two levels of political freedom: political liberty, which denoted participation in governance, and civil freedom, which allowed the citizen to enjoy his property and commit deeds not prohibited by the law. This distinction made it feasible to separate the individual liberties of the individual perceived as a man, and his political rights/liberties as a citizen, as well as to include the question of the freedom of other estates into political reflections. Considerable importance was attached also to the reception of the theory of freedom as a law of nature, in which liberty was no longer a privilege of the citizen-member of the gentry, but the natural right of every man and thus also the peasant-serf. This notion was inserted into the old vision of republican freedom which, albeit modernised and adapted to new circumstances, survived to the end of the First Republic.

9

Spełnić się w wolności

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Mizdrak I.

Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie

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2012

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issue 887

57-71

EN

The problem of freedom considered in the broad context of self-fulfilment is in my view not merely an intellectual challenge, but also one of the most difficult existential experiences. Dealing with issues concerning the reality of human freedom and self-fulfilment directs us to the anthropological concept of the subjectivity of the individual and the questions it prompts. That is so because if we assume freedom to be a fundamental property of man’s subjectivity, embedded in its extremely complex structure, it then turns out to be among the fundamental conditions for the realisation of his humanity. By capturing more and more closely the specifics of individual subjectivity, we will achieve a deeper insight into what man really is. Karol Wojtyła’s concept of freedom is another voice in the philosophical discourse on man, his nature and the sense of his worldly pilgrimage. As we follow the successive stages and elements of Wojtyła’s phenomenological analyses, we may observe how freedom is constituted in the individual and how it can become the foundation of man’s self-fulfilment; how creative and dynamic was Wojtyła’s personal activity may perhaps also come to light.

10

THE DRAMA OF HUMAN EXISTENCE: FROM DESPAIR TO FREEDOM (LESYA UKRAINKA AND J.-P.SARTRE) (Drama luds'koho buttia: vid vidchaiu do svobody (Lesia Ukrainka i Zh.-P.Sartr))

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Shmorgun O.

Філософська Думка

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2010

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issue 4

87-102

EN

A comparative analysis of existential drama by Lesia Ukrainka and J.-P. Sartre allows one to show philosophical problems of humanistic existential measuring of freedom of the contemporary man, common for the both authors. A special feature of creation of Lesia Ukrainka in comparison with J.-P. Sartre consists in the absence of moral rigorism, abstract philosophical sketchiness in representation of heroes and situations, that gives her drama more expressive, actually humanistic existential sounding.

11

ANDRZEJ WALICKI'S CONCEPTION OF SELF-DISINTEGRATING TOTALITARIANISM (Andrzeja Walickiego koncepcja 'samo-dezintegrujacego sie' totalitaryzmu)

100%

Sitek R.

Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki

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2010

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vol. 9

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issue 3(28)

467-485

EN

Various research interests of Andrzej Walicki include the problem of the concept and practice of totalitarianism, as well as of the conceptualization of the process of detotalitarianization. The author devoted a lot of space to these problems in his fundamental work 'Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom. The Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia'. Following the steps of Hannah Arendt, George Orwell, and Czeslaw Milosz, Walicki underlines the force of communist ideology 'from within' as a specific 'secularized, immanentized version of millenarist terror of the collective salvation on Earth'. Totalitarianism, understood as the combination of terror with the ideocratic coercion leading to the internalization of the 'New Faith' culminated in Poland in 1954. The developments caused by 'Polish October 1956' liberalized the system, by constraining the scope of the state's power and increasing the range of negative freedom available for Poles. The subsequent de-ideologization of the system not only did increase the autonomy of Poles in their private life, but also opened new spheres of freedom in intellectual life and culture. In the economic sphere, the detotalitarianisation of the system was supported by pathological phenomena, i.e., corruption, 'clientelism', dirty business 'connections' that effectively disintegrated the mechanisms of state central planning and control

12

BETWEEN FREEDOM AND PATERNALISM. LATVIAN SOCIETY IN SEARCH OF BALANCE

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Ostrovska I.

Humanities and Social Sciences: Latvia

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2008

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issue 3(56)

69-91

EN

EU integration requires increasingly active participation of EU citizens in the decision-making process and local governance in order to overcome the 'democracy deficit' and achieve greater legitimacy of European and national governance. The central actor in this process is civil society, which has to reconcile two mutually exclusive desires that are dominant in each society, namely, the desire of society to be independent from the state and, at the same time, its desire to be under national guardianship. A fragmented and weak civil society cannot balance both desires. The aim of this article is to ascertain the opinions of the wider unorganised society of Latvia on the relations between society and state, on the state's contribution in facilitating the consolidation of democracy, on negations for which, according to society, the state is to blame, as well as on the prospects for developing a civil society. Latvian society believes that the present confrontation of the state and society could be reduced if public institutions were more actively involve society in the decision-making process and if they facilitated the development of a civil society, reduced social fragmentation and improved the quality of services offered to society. However, society's opinions on possible ways to improve the quality of services differ among people belonging to the two largest communities - Latvians and non-Latvians.

13

KONIEC SUBJEKTU? OTÁZKY A OTÁZNIKY VO FENOMENOLOGICKEJ KONCEPCII MORÁLNEJ ZRELOSTI HUBERTA L. DREYFUSA

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Muránsky M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2006

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vol. 61

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issue 9

714-725

EN

The aim of the paper is to analyze Dreyfus' phenomenological conception of moral maturity in a critical relation to the Kantian tradition of the ethics. A special attention is paid to the refutation of the Cartesian subject and a radical elimination of the subject-object relationship. These two points make the starting point of Dreyfus' philosophical reflection on the ideal of moral behavior, as well as on its implications for the ethics of the everyday life. The main objective of the paper is to show the problem of the freedom and choice as a crucial challenge of the Dreyfus primordial understanding of the ethical ways of the being.

14

Freedom, Legislation and Mutual Constraint: Intersubjective Character of the Concept of Freedom in Kant

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Kloc-Konkolowicz J.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2004

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vol. 13

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issue 4(52)

213-226

EN

The main objective of the paper is to examine relations between three Kantian ideas: freedom, law and constraint, as they have been presented in the 'Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals'. The author argues that the close relationship between the three ideas testifies to a deeply social nature of Kant's philosophy. The possibility of mutual and universal constraint is crucial to the understanding of external freedom, whereas the possibility of self-constraint is fundamental to the understanding of inner freedom. Mutual constraint manifests itself as the negative side of the mutual acknowledgement of everyone's freedom. Coordination of freedoms is a liberal, but not a libertarian, concept; one's aim must not be a moral perfection of the others, but their happiness, in so far as it does not interfere with the moral law .

15

How is Freedom Possible? An Answer from Chrysippus of Soloi

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Jarzebiak J.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2005

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vol. 14

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issue 2(54)

67-83

EN

The question of freedom was first raised in the Hellenistic times by the Stoics, or more specifically by Chrysippus, the well-known teacher and the creator of the school. He faced the question: How is it possible for a man to be free in the world which is fully determined and which is made up of things and events that were anticipated and included in an everlasting plan called Fate? Chrysippus' solution to the problem is based on the logical distinction between the necessary and the possible and results in the assertion that freedom means being able to express positively individual attitude towards the things and events taking place in the world. The key-term is 'synkatathesis' (the characteristics of human beings only) which is the act of approving or disapproving of the events occurring in our life and by means of which we exercise our freedom.

16

ŠABAT JAKO ZNAMENÍ SVOBODY

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Pacner S.

Studia theologica

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2013

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vol. 15

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issue 1

1–23

EN

The article addresses the following issue: Is the command to refrain from work on this day a limitation for a person or, on the contrary, does it provide an individual with space of freedom? The author explores the etymology of the term Shabbat and asks a question regarding the origins of celebrating this day. He finally deals with the texts in which the term appears. It follows from these texts that the Old Testament perceives this command in a positive manner, namely as an instruction which serves a person’s freedom. It is not concerned, however, with the instruction to refrain from work alone; this is primarily a positive effort to bless this day. By refraining from work and blessing this day, people imitate their Creator. The Shabbat thus becomes a visible sign of Israel’s relationship with the Lord and the Lord’s relationship with Israel; it is a day of freedom and joy.

17

KOMPATIBILIZMUS BAÑEZIANIZMU

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Volek P.

Verba Theologica. Teologický časopis

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2017

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vol. 16

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issue 2

5 – 11

EN

In this article the author shows that the understanding of free will in Bañezianism is compatible with God’s influence on human action. He also proposes modifications to selected interpretations of Bañezianism in order to render these more intelligible. This view will be presented in relation to Molinism, which proposes a different solution to the question of God’s role in human action, one that coincides with libertarianism.

18

MANIPULÁCIA AKO MOC, MANIPULÁCIA A SLOBODA

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Buraj I.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2018

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vol. 73

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issue 9

742 – 754

EN

Manipulation as a specific form of power is characterized by a close connection with freedom. This makes it a very complicated and at the same time unusually interesting concept (especially in the current context). In the first part, the author aims to clarify the correlation of manipulation with its related categories such as coercion, compulsion, violence, etc., pointing out the complexities of relations between them, when they differ in principle or resemble each other or even overlap. Even more complicated are the relationships between manipulation and freedom. On the one hand, manipulation seemingly a priori denies freedom, and on the other hand it presupposes its presence, which is succinctly expressed by the term "voluntary slavery."

19

O SLOBODE AKO POLITICKEJ HODNOTE

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Sedová T.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2021

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vol. 76

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issue 2

81 – 96

EN

The aim of the article is to investigate the issue of freedom as a political value, its relationship to the so-called reflexive freedom and its two historical forms: freedom as autonomy and freedom as an authenticity. The introduction examines the problem of whether freedom belongs more to the domain of metaphysics or political philosophy, and discusses the ideas of existentialist understanding of freedom. The idea of negative liberty as the core of the liberal conception of justice is critically examined against the background of a summary of Honneth’s ideas on reflexive, negative, and social freedom and its historical protagonists. The author emphasizes the weaknesses and the inability of the liberal concept of freedom and justice to solve mainly the problem of people with disabilities, global justice and issues related to species specificity.

20

Freedom of the Will and Determinism of Nature in Kant's Transcendentalizm

100%

Philipp R.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2008

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vol. 17

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issue 3(67)

89-106

EN

This article is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's position with respect to the possibility of freedom conceived as undetermined causality that operates in the empirical world. This proposal meets with an obvious obstacle. It is unclear how the universal causality of the empirical world (or the phenomenal world) is to be reconciled with an initiation of new causal chains by free will. In the first part of the article the author presents Kant's views and highlights Kant's belief that the practical reason requires an establishment of transcendental freedom. In the second part of the article several theoretical difficulties arising from these assumptions are discussed.

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