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1

NEURONAL CORRELATES OF VISUAL AWARENESS: GLOBALISTS CONTRA ANTIGLOBALISTS

100%

Jaskowski P.

Psychological Studies

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2004

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vol. 42

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issue 4

29-40

EN

What makes cerebral activity conscious? What differentiates conscious from non-conscious cerebral activity? This problem is known as the search for neuronal correlates of consciousness. The article reviews critically current topics concerning the more restricted issue, namely, the neural correlates of visual awareness. Two main views are described. Advocates of one view claim that a specific brain region or set of regions must be active. The others tend to assume that the crucial is the type of activity taking place. In spite of a remarkable progress of neuroscientific research of visual awareness the problem remains still unsolved.

2

„NEŠŤASTNÉ VEDOMIE“ V KIERKEGAARDOVOM ZVODCOVOM DENNÍKU

63%

Uršič M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2014

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vol. 69

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issue 5

409 – 415

EN

The article tries to show the role and importance of Kierkegaard’s writing The Seducer’s Diary in the frame of his fundamental work Either / Or. What is under scrutiny is not only the dilemma between aesthetical and ethical consciousness, but also the “unhappy consciousness”. The latter has in Kierkegaard – contrary to Hegel’s definition of this concept – strong existential connotations.

3

SUBLIMINAL PRIMING AS A METHOD OF CONSCIOUSNESS INVESTIGATIONS

63%

Skalska B., Jaskowski P.

Psychological Studies

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2005

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vol. 43

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issue 2

91-100

EN

The authors reviewed research concerning detection and recognition of stimuli without conscious awareness. Such approach is considered to be a convenient paradigm enabling to investigate features and functions of consciousness. One particular form of such dissociation between recognition and consciousness is subliminal priming. The results of experiments on subliminal priming were compared with analogical experiments where recognitions of stimuli were associated with conscious awareness. Such comparison enabled to indicate several functions of consciousness which occur only if consciousness mediates the task performance. Subliminal stimuli cannot perform strategic control over behavior, cannot trigger behavior which is not consistent with subject's intention and their effect may be rather imprecise.

4

MOHOL BY BYŤ VEĽKÝ JAZYKOVÝ MODEL (LLM) VEDOMÝ?

63%

Chalmers D. J.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2025

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vol. 80

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issue 4

459 – 481

EN

There has recently been widespread discussion of whether large language models such as the GPT systems might be sentient or conscious. Should we take this idea seriously? I will discuss the underlying issue and will break down the strongest reasons for and against.

5

INGARDEN'S REALISM

51%

Poltawski A.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2008

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vol. 36

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issue 2

5-14

EN

In his attempt to analyze the problem of realism, Ingarden started from the Husserlian distinction between the world and 'pure consciousness'. Nevertheless, he rejected all the ontological - or rather metaphysical - features attributed to consciousness by Husserl, while at the same time he was convinced of the indubitability of our knowledge of the basic characteristics of it as a sort of being existent inside the human person. If he had resigned from this epistemological feature of a privileged access, he would have had to grant that we do not need to seek a proof of the existence of the world at all. Other ways in which Ingarden tried to elucidate the problem of being - in the first place the problem of human nature - led him to the sphere of free persons. Understanding our knowledge of this sphere demands an understanding of the human senses in a dynamic and holistic way and the acceptance of a personal model of the world as the basis of our knowledge. The 'primary data' of our experience are, in fact, human persons; they are the paradigm of independent being and full realism means accepting them as similar to us, as free creatures.

6

Kant and the Problem of Self-Consciousness

51%

Frank M.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2004

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vol. 13

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issue 4(52)

263-274

EN

The point of departure in the paper is the problem of identification of the foundations of knowledge, its beginning and status in modern philosophy (Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Hume, Fichte, Chisholm, Shoemaker). The author undertakes an analysis of the position taken by Kant in the context of the problem of transcendental deduction of categories and its fundamental principle - the transcendental unity of apperception. He focuses on the connection between transcendental apperception with pre-predicative existence of pure consciousness and intellectual insight. Kant held that consciousness is a result of the self-referring operation of auto-reflection. This means that self-consciousness is not some kind of knowledge, nor is it any sort of mental content through which it would be possible to identify the subject.

7

Sartre: 'We are what we dare to be'

51%

Tuzova T.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2005

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vol. 14

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issue 4(56)

165-177

EN

Sartre's philosophy is analyzed against the background of the philosophical tradition of the cogito. His contributions seem most impressive in the area covered by such concepts as the subject, consciousness, self-awareness, liberty, otherness and human responsibility. Although these topics seem to have attracted his undiminished attention all the time, one should be aware that his views on these matters gradually changed in his lifetime. In social questions his main interests shifted from the role of consciousness to the ontology of practical activity. In the philosophy of the individual they shifted from individual conscience to the appreciation of individual past experience. But despite these changes he consistently retained the structure of 'présence-a-soi', first, as a specific indication of human experience, and secondly, as an idea underlying being, history and philosophy. 'Présence-a-soi', and the manner in which its pragmatic aspect is introduced into phenomenology to explain the constitutive activity of the empirical consciousness are essential factors used in the explanation of socially widespread images, thoughts and practices that flourish without having a discernible author.

8

Intersubiektywność świadomości a Edmunda Husserla czas intermonadyczny: ujęcie w ramach kategorii «teraz»

51%

Olbromski C. J.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2011

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vol. 47

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issue 1(187)

59-74

EN

The constitution of internal consciousness of time plays crucial role in the Husserlian phenomenology of time. Flow/stream of consciousness constituting internal time refers to the surrounding world and the Other as a regular element of this world. There are not only the analyses of flow of the consciousness but also the most crucial text included in late considerations of Husserl on the issue of intersubjectivity of the consciousness. The author takes consideration into (1) activation of subject by primordial source playing most important role in constitution of the consciousness of time (the original 'I' and manners of temporalizations of 'I'); (2) proposition of model of the consciousness of inter-monadic time of social world; (3) complementary coexistence of what is constituted within inter-monadic time; (4) description of internal conditions of temporalization of the Other's consciousness [Ich-Spaltung, einfuehlende Vergegenwaertigung]; (5) reference to the actual moment of change creating the consciousness of the 'now'. Also inter-monadic time as coexistence and overlapping of temporal horizons of identity plays important role in the context of temporal socialization (Husserl, Waldenfels).

9

Reprezentacja, milczenie, inny. Od samowiedzy przedmiotowej do samoświadomości transcendentalnej w psychologii opisowej Franza Brentany

51%

Moroz K.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2013

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vol. 41

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issue 2

5 - 23

EN

In this paper I use the distinction between self-consciousness as an object of expe-rience and self-consciousness as the subject of experience proposed in Peter-Rudolf Horstmann's article „The Limited Significance of Self-Consciousness" in order to analyse Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology. The result of this analysis can be expressed in three theses: 1) Every self-consciousness is the consciousness of another self-consciousness. If there is self-consciousness, we have the essential conditions for it to know another self-consciousness. 2) Every self-knowledge is knowledge about another self-knowledge. I cannot know anything about myself which could not lead to knowledge about another. Even if the self-knowledge is not propositional, it is not an exclusive and unique fact. 3) Every objective self-knowledge is also non-objective self-knowledge. Selfconsciousness cannot be reduced to empirically tested features because it is always something more.

10

TYPES OF INTENTIONAL ACTS IN ROMAN INGARDEN'S PHENOMENOLOGY

51%

Wysocki M.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2007

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vol. 35

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issue 2

87-108

EN

Roman Ingarden nowhere either compared or summarized his ideas about intentional acts - one of the most important issues in his philosophy. This was the main subject of author's research. He attempted not only to collect and present information about the types of consciousness described by Ingarden, but also to create an ordered characterization of them. In this article, the author presents the results of his work. It consists of two parts. The first describes what, in his opinion, are the most important types of intentional acts. The second presents some comparisons among them.

11

DENNETTOVA NATURALISTICKÁ KONCEPCIA VEDOMEJ SKÚSENOSTI

51%

Sklutová K.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2021

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vol. 76

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issue 9

674 – 687

EN

The main aim of the study is to analyse key features of Dennett’s naturalistic conception of conscious experience. The paper proceeds from the assumption that Dennett’s primary intention is the naturalization of consciousness through the so-called “Hard Question”: And then what happens? The structure of the text consists of two main levels of Dennett's naturalistic program: a) negative level – rejection of the Cartesian model of consciousness, b) positive level – formulation of the multiple drafts model. I assume that examining these levels will justify the importance of the Hard Question, thus contributing to a better understanding of Dennett's naturalization of conscious experience.

12

CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERIPHERAL SELF-AWARENESS

51%

Hatipoğlu S. E.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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vol. 20

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issue 3

323 – 340

EN

It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., without an implicit awareness of oneself as the subject of one’s mental state. The author ś purpose is to undermine this view. He contend that a subject’s first-personal access to her conscious mental states and an awareness of them as hers, along with a particular approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things motivate the view that consciousness is not possible without self-consciousness. In order to undermine this view he argues that not all conscious states are accompanied by a sense of mineness. He rejects also the reasons for endorsing an approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things. Then he examines critically Kriegel’s arguments for the dependence of consciousness on self-consciousness based on the first-personal access a subject has to her conscious mental states and discuss the difficulties involved.

13

INTENTIONALITY AND AWARENESS OF SUBJECT (Intencjonalnosc i swiadomosc podmiotu)

51%

Drabarek A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2010

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vol. 46

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issue 2

253-269

EN

Authors and supporters of the category of intentionality claim that the foundations of all knowledge on the really existing world is perception approached as a subjective act of awareness thanks to which we recognize things directly. Perception of things is based on an individual seeing, hearing or touching; it is an experience of awareness which concerns a specific object. Many philosophers and psychologists connects awareness with emotional states. However, we cannot evoke emotions as we like and get rid of them even though we want it very much. Conscious emotions though - or the logic of emotions as F. Brentano used to terms them has a very intense and essential influence on the direction of actions and choices made by man.

14

DILEMMA ABOUT THE MENTAL

51%

Elpidorou A., Dove G.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2021

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vol. 28

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issue 4

867 - 895

EN

Physicalism demands an explication of what it means for something to be physical. But the most popular way of providing one—viz., characterizing the physical in terms of the postulates of a scientifically derived physical theory—is met with serious trouble. Proponents of physicalism can either appeal to current physical theory or to some future physical theory (preferably an ideal and complete one). Neither option is promising: currentism almost assuredly renders physicalism false and futurism appears to render it indeterminate or trivial. The purpose of this essay is to argue that attempts to characterize the mental encounter a similar dilemma: currentism with respect to the mental is likely to be inadequate or contain falsehoods and futurism leaves too many significant questions about the nature of mentality unanswered. This new dilemma, we show, threatens both sides of the current debate surrounding the metaphysical status of the mind.

15

Embodied Mind, or the Problem of the Existence of the Soul in the Philosophy of Antonio Damasio

51%

Bankiewicz P.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2008

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vol. 17

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issue 3(67)

5-19

EN

According to Antonio Damasio, consciousness and the sense of self consist of several hierarchically structured maps and representations. At the basic level there is a collection of neural patterns (first-order maps) that reflects the state of the organism's internal milieu. Higher mental levels re-represent this differentiation in the higher-order maps. Thus, we can speak of an embodied nature of the mind without denying its reality. To provide a background to Damasio's theory, the author raises the question about methodological frameworks. A comparison between Damasio's empirical theory and the traditional notion of the soul highlights the explanatory weakness of the latter. It pertains especially to the relationships between brain damage and changes of consciousness or the sense of self.

16

HUSSERL'S AND INGARDEN'S CONCEPTION OF THE COGNITIVE IMPASSE

51%

Chadzynski A.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2008

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vol. 36

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issue 2

93-99

EN

The main thesis of this paper is that, in their epistemological views, both Husserl and Ingarden accept two non-controversial theses that lead to logico-ontological problems. One of them is the conception of the intentionality of consciousness. The second is the conception of cognition as a synthesis of identification. The acceptance of both at the same time does not seem to be controversial at first glance. However, deeper investigation shows that one who accepts them both stands in the face of the logico-ontological problem of the identification of a kind of being with nothing in cognitional syntheses, or of the infinite identification of two intentional objects in every act of consciousness. Both consequences lead to the actual impossibility of active acts of cognition, even if we accept that most cognitional syntheses occur in the domain of passivity. The problem is shared by Husserl's conception of knowledge from his 'Logical Investigations' through the later writings, where he uses the concept of noema. There is a contemporary interpretation of the latter concept as identical to Ingarden's concept of intentional object. Therefore, the problem remains in Ingarden's theory of knowledge, which is based on Husserl's original theory of cognition as a synthesis of identification.

17

SARTROV POJEM INTENCIONALITY OPTIKOU AKTUÁLNYCH SKÚMANÍ

51%

Smreková D.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2007

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vol. 62

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issue 5

457-467

EN

The paper deals with those current Sartrean researches, which are concerned with Sartre's early phenomenological writings. The researchers involved see the latter as important as Sartre's later fundamental works. Their interpretations go beyond the view traditional of those works. Beside Sartre as a philosopher of subjectivity they try to emphasize the 'other' Sartre, who is concerned with the power 'of things' and the potential abilities of the consciousness deprived of ego as the uniting centre of experience. Adopting this perspective requires to resort to his conception of intentionality. It is necessary to comprehend, how the world oriented consciousness with its typical compulsory self-transcendence becomes also self-consciousness due to the experience of the sense of the given. The issue under question is not only the profit brought by this process, but also the loss involved in such approach to consciousness.

18

COMPUTATIONAL THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS (Obliczeniowe teorie swiadomosci)

51%

Milkowski M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2010

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issue 11

133-154

EN

In this paper, I review the motivations for having a computational theory of consciousness to see if they turn out to be no longer plausible in the light of recent criticisms. These criticisms focus on the alleged inability of computational theories to deal with qualia, or qualities of experience (or objects of experience in some accounts), and with so-called symbol grounding. Yet it seems that computationalism remains the best game in town when one wants to explain and predict the dynamics of information processing of cognitive systems. Conscious information processing does not seem to be explainable better within any other framework; computationalism regarding consciousness can only be discarded by supposing that consciousness is epiphenomenal in information processing. I will argue that recent theories of consciousness that are to deal with the so called hard problem of consciousness remain in their core computational if they do not subscribe to epiphenomenalism. For example, the quantum theory as proposed by Stuart Hameroff remains openly computational; the same goes for pan(proto) psychist speculation of David Chalmers. The qualitative character of information processing that Chalmers takes to explain the existence of subjective experience piggy-backs, so to say, on the very fact that there is information processing that is best explained in a computationalist framework. I also briefly show that other alternative accounts of consciousness (such as direct theories of consciousness) that were supposed to oppose computational and functionalist conceptions are not only compatible with them but require them to begin with. In short, to discard credentials of computationalism in consciousness research one would have to show that it's possible to explain conscious information-processing mechanisms sufficiently in a non-computational way. And this has not been done by any of the critics of computational accounts. This all doesn't suggest, though, that computational explanation is sufficient for building a complete theory of consciousness; it seems however to be necessary.

19

THE CONCEPTS OF MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN ABHIDHARMA BUDDHISM (Podstawy abhidharmicznej koncepcji umyslu. Pojecie swiadomosci)

51%

Szymanski M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2009

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issue 9

143-161

EN

According to Abhidharma thinkers mind is a set of many mental elements (dharmas). All these elements were regarded as impermanent. The basic dimension of the diachronically considered mind was believed to be a continuous succession of consciousness (citta) elements. They were believed to lie at the foundation of any psychical activity. They were to be accompanied by other mental elements (called caitasika) to determine the nature of cognitive, emotional and volitional activity of the mind at any given moment. Among them they recognised dharmas unavoidably accompanying citta elements (feelings, elements of attention, conceptual identifications, volitions etc.). The mind was apparently treated as an integral whole which is signified by the conviction that every mental dharma is adjusted to the character of the other simultaneous mental elements. Such a combination of mental dharmas was believed to determine the content of the mind in the succeeding moment (i.e. to bring about the new set of mental elements before it ceases), which is effected with such participating factors as karmic compensation and the influence of the environment.

20

PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS AN EVOLUTIONARY INVENTION: EXPLAINING THE POSITIVE FUNCTION OF ILLUSIONISM

51%

Marcinčinová K.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2024

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vol. 79

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issue 2

195 – 211

EN

The article’s main objective is to analyse the positive aspect of illusionism and the so-called “illusion problem” that lies at its heart – the problem of explaining the origin and causes of the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that a key aspect of the illusion problem is explaining the function of the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. Some authors suggest that the illusion probably has no particular function but is a by-product of introspection. Whereas others have pointed out that it has played an important role in the evolution of consciousness. I focus on Nicholas Humphrey’s evolutionary theory of consciousness, “phenomenal surrealism,” in emphasizing this crucial part of the illusionist program.

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NEURONAL CORRELATES OF VISUAL AWARENESS: GLOBALISTS CONTRA ANTIGLOBALISTS

„NEŠŤASTNÉ VEDOMIE“ V KIERKEGAARDOVOM ZVODCOVOM DENNÍKU

SUBLIMINAL PRIMING AS A METHOD OF CONSCIOUSNESS INVESTIGATIONS

MOHOL BY BYŤ VEĽKÝ JAZYKOVÝ MODEL (LLM) VEDOMÝ?

INGARDEN'S REALISM

Kant and the Problem of Self-Consciousness

Sartre: 'We are what we dare to be'

Intersubiektywność świadomości a Edmunda Husserla czas intermonadyczny: ujęcie w ramach kategorii «teraz»

Reprezentacja, milczenie, inny. Od samowiedzy przedmiotowej do samoświadomości transcendentalnej w psychologii opisowej Franza Brentany

TYPES OF INTENTIONAL ACTS IN ROMAN INGARDEN'S PHENOMENOLOGY

DENNETTOVA NATURALISTICKÁ KONCEPCIA VEDOMEJ SKÚSENOSTI

CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERIPHERAL SELF-AWARENESS

INTENTIONALITY AND AWARENESS OF SUBJECT (Intencjonalnosc i swiadomosc podmiotu)

DILEMMA ABOUT THE MENTAL

Embodied Mind, or the Problem of the Existence of the Soul in the Philosophy of Antonio Damasio

HUSSERL'S AND INGARDEN'S CONCEPTION OF THE COGNITIVE IMPASSE

SARTROV POJEM INTENCIONALITY OPTIKOU AKTUÁLNYCH SKÚMANÍ

COMPUTATIONAL THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS (Obliczeniowe teorie swiadomosci)

THE CONCEPTS OF MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN ABHIDHARMA BUDDHISM (Podstawy abhidharmicznej koncepcji umyslu. Pojecie swiadomosci)

PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS AN EVOLUTIONARY INVENTION: EXPLAINING THE POSITIVE FUNCTION OF ILLUSIONISM