In the paper, the author presents phenomenological ideas of corporeality by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre showing, how living body is experienced and involved in human world. The bounding between body and its environment, as well as its role in creation of intentions and formation of our understanding of the world are of exceptional significance. He shows, what implication such an understanding of the body has for popular in contemporary cognitive science concept of 'representation' as well as for propositional of knowledge . Finally, he tries to show, to what extend phenomenological concept of corporeality of mind is parallel to pragmatists concept of action.
In this paper, the author analyses a case of philosophical imagination as a variant of 'anthropological imagination'. This example is the growing radicalization of the conceptualization of the phenomenon of human body in the work of three phenomenologists - Husserl, Merlau-Ponty, and Levinas. This radicalization consisted in passing from the conceptualization of human body as an empirical phenomenon, through treating it as a phenomenon reduced to a certain structure, to treating human corporeality as a phantasm of the sharpest ethical duty.
The author focuses on uses (and meanings) of the term 'metaphysics' that are inherent in the philosophical tradition but are different from or opposed to the most common (classical) treatment of metaphysics as a domain of objective knowledge, as 'science of being qua being'. Such uses are found in 'late' dialogs of Plato, in Descartes' 'first philosophy', in Kant's critical metaphysics and its phenomenological continuation in Husserl and in Heidegger's introduction of timeliness and historicity into fundamental structures of Being.
The objective of the article is a comparison of three texts by Edmund Husserl:'Ideen I', its revision in 'Hua XXXIV' and 'Epilogue' of 'Ideen III'. There are internal (thematic) and external (resulting from author's motivation) connections between these three texts which - also as a justification of this comparison - will be examined in this article. The comparison should give answers to several questions: Why did Husserl decide to do this revision? What changes did he make? Should we regard these changes as important interventions into certain phenomenological topics? What are the results of this comparison for the phenomenological method? By means of these texts several chosen phenomenological themes - such as the problematic of consciousness, intentionality, natural and phenomenological attitudes, method etc. - can be presented, as well as a new view of them 16 or 17 years later. The last text introduces also Husserl's résumé of the idea of philosophy.
The contribution tackles certain themes in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, which exert more or less direct influence on Heideggers’s phenomenology. The analysis is followed by a more general reflection on the tense relationship between religious thought and philosophy.
The author of these considerations puts a question, non-trivial from the point of view of science of science, about relationship of theoretic-methodological consistency between research sub-disciplines regarded by their own creators as discourses of paradigms corresponding to one another in a general philosophical perspective. As a historical example used for this analysis serves the concept of the sociology of knowledge and of the philosophical anthropology, developed - as elements of an overall philosophical perspective - by Max Scheler (1874-1928), beside E. Husserl the most widely known representative of the phenomenological movement in the 20th century. M. Scheler had often articulated his intention in his writings that philosophical anthropology should form a basis of categories of the sociology of knowledge, a reservoir of philosophical assumptions for socio-cognitive ideas. The hypothesis of the present paper is as follows: (a) some fragments of Schelerian sociology of knowledge (the so-called concepts of 'class idols') would be very hard to thought ot as 'grounded' in that meaning into the model of philosophical anthropology that he had proposed; (b) an anthropology different from Schelerian may be indicated (by Helmuth Plessner) more logically consistent with the idea of 'class idol'.
The article is intended to be a contribution to the history of Polish philosophy in the 20th century. It presents Tadeusz Kroński's review of Roman Ingarden's Controversy Over the Existence of the World. The review was published in 1952 in "Myśl Filozoficzna", a journal dominated by Marxist philosophers. The character of this journal is discussed, as well as the ideological context of Kroński's offensive review entitled The World in the Brackets of Ontology. The author discusses this review as a part of the Stalinization of Polish philosophy. Kroński's motives and the significance of his review are analysed in the context of Józef Tischner’s account presented in "The Polish Form of Dialogue".
The article tries to show, from the phenomenological position, that it must be possible to reflect on so called pre-linguistic experience. The argumentation is based on a disputation with a symptomatic example used by Wittgenstein to substantiate his language games theory. The analysis of the example attempts to indicate that the language games theory, which has to justify the rejection of the existence of pre-linguistic experience, meets with discrepancies and difficulties which limit the range of this theory to a certain extent. Because it presupposes the existence of 'private', experiential sphere in which - even before language and verbalization enter the game - the structuring of the world, identification of things and an elementary understanding of these processes must be realized. It seems that the discussion on this topic is not only a specific polemic over one problem that can be found in Wittgenstein, but has wider implications because the language games concept in the form of various 'discourses', 'vocabularies' or 'cultures' has found great favour in contemporary postmodern philosophy. On its basis postmodern philosophy very radically (and perhaps against the will of Wittgenstein himself) crosses out the world, profanes its rational, objective description and calls for free variation of different interpretations - their legitimacy is authenticated only by a consensus of their users. In this dispute, phenomenology does not declare that there is a single true description of the world and that it is possible to find a reliable criterion for its definite legitimization. It does, however, draw on the fact that so called pre-linguistic experience does not succumb to the variability of language games and the interests of its users, but that it more and more clearly reflects the unitary and scrutable style of showing the real, objectively given world even though this always happens in seemingly impalpable subjective acts.
Jan Patocka, a disciple of Husserl and Heidegger, was the most eminent Czech philosopher of the 20th century. The article focuses on his concept of practical philosophy, which is seen as a constitutive force in European modernity. As such it has critical, dynamic, and stabilising effects. In this sense it is always closely related to politics and can both motivate social change and legitimise stable political orders. The consequences of this are demonstrated in liberalism and socialism as the two major projects of modern thought.
This article seeks to assess the interplay of society, nature and the world from the perspective of spatial characteristics. First, that is viewed from a purely phenomenological perspective, and then phenomenology is assessed in a broader context, with discussion of its limitations and the possibility of overcoming of them. The focus is on whether and how it is possible to observe society and thus to capture its 'essence' on the level of special phenomenological experience. Thus, first of all, it should be determined how social experience occurs, and it should be ascertained whether society can be captured as a 'meaningful structure' or as a specific 'objectity' (Gegenständlichkeit), as something that can be 'experienced' in a particular way. Or, as is more likely, it is a category of understanding that unites the totality of certain events, namely, something that happens with directly experienced human activities and their final results - 'facts'. The author concludes that the 'secret' of everything lies in the coexistential space and in the way being/nature is transformed into the world.
This paper is based on phenomenological interviews with teachers who worked with underachieving students in South Africa, Russia, and the United States. It focuses on the analysis of meanings that teachers constructed while describing their relationship with underachieving students and how metaphors worked to construct such meanings. The researchers also used Buber's "I-Thou" concept as an interpretive lens to further understand the meanings of teacher-student relationships. The study concludes that the teacher-student relationship is one of the fundamental themes of the teaching experience and is common for teachers from different countries.
The article argues that the static and genetic phenomenological methods are complementary rather than opposed. In claiming this, it challenges Jacques Derrida’s interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. It is claimed that a proper understanding of the two methods must take into consideration Husserl’s B III 10 manuscript. Using the manuscript the author reconstructs the object, limits, and character of both methods of inquiry. Then it is argued that one is able to use the genetic method to investigate human existence. Indeed, Husserl studies the topic of existence in the E III 6 manuscript and in the Crisis.
The transcendental method shows certain analogies with the philosophical analysis of language, in so far as this inquires the objects in the mode of speach about them, that in the mode of thinking them. It is also similar to phenomenlogy, in so far as this presupposes the exact correspondence of noesis and noema, that presupposes the exact correspondence of operatio and intentio as two moments of the one act of mind. These three methods are therefore not to apply exclusively, but jointly. The transcendental method is nowadays nearly forsaken for the reproach of its impossibility to reflect the interpersonality and the story. This deficiency is conditioned by the presupposition of the invariability of the transcendental subject as ground of the absolute truth. But this presupposition is overhauled, if the transcendental reflection goes out from the concrete act of mind, that contains two inseparable moments of knowing and wishing, as founding each other mutually. In this mode theology obtains again the renewed method of reflecting the truths of belief in a horizon of apodictic validity.
The article deals with the relation between body and its environment. According to the author the body is not only a centre of orientation, but also a factor of creative interaction. The role of the senses is analysed, drawing from the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. On the background of Levinas ideas the body is conceived as the source of the ethical relationships between the inhabitants of the environment, which is parallely created by them. The body is interpreted in the context of phenomenological and hermeneutical cultural studies. The author raises the thesis that the body is implicit in the existential creation conceived as an interaction between us and our environment. The phenomenology of culture is conceived as an interaction between different existential layers (ethical, aesthetical, technical), where the body lays an important role. The theses, raised in the article, are illustrated by the examples from multi-layer art (e. g. films).
The subject of this article is the ontological theory of causality presented in Roman Ingarden's 'Controversy over the Existence of the World'. The peculiarity of this theory is discussed, and some differences between it and Hume's and Kant's theories are shown. The article presents Ingarden's definition of cause, the principles of causality, and rarely discussed problems connected with the analysis and division of events. The changes in the method of inquiry which occur in the third part of the 'Controversy over the Existence of the World' and which are related to the problem of causality are also examined.
Currently, one can encounter numerous contributions that apply phenomenology and its approach to experience in the fields of anthropological and ethnographic research. The convergence of phenomenology and anthropology has its own reasons. I will first trace the thematic areas of this collaboration and present specific projects, and secondly specify the questions and applied methods that phenomenology brings to the discourse of the specialized sciences. In a third step, I will build on the original relationship between phenomenology and anthropology that leads us to the work of H. Plessner; that is not only meant to be a historical look back, but also an updating of such themes that can be productively re-developed in the present. In particular, I will ask what might be the position of H. Plessner in the current context, since his works are absent in contemporary authors.
There is a similiarity beetwen the approach of a Phenomenologist on the one hand and the general cognitive principles of the modernist poetry on the other. This sort of poetry follows the rule of removing the previous assumptions in order to return to the epistemologically primal situation in which the object and the subject are brought together. The works of Julian Przybos constitute the most eminent example of this approach in Polish poetry.
Similarly to Husserl's gradually developing view of the fundamental phenomenological questions also his relationship to the philosophy of R. Descartes and to the history of philosophy as a whole underwent several changes. There is for example his shift from stressing (Descartes') 'universal attempt at doubt' to 'misunderstanding of Descartes' own discovery of ego'. Husserl sees Descartes' methodical skepticism as a crucial historical impulse for articulating his own conception of 'epoché'. Descartes' methodical skepticism and Husserl's putting in brackets the general thesis about the existence of the world show the closest parallel between their philosophical doctrines. Further, similarly to Descartes Husserl also aims at reforming the philosophy of his time; in Descartes' 'Meditations on first philosophy' he finds the way leading to transcendental phenomenology. However, there are also differences in their projects of universal philosophy. While for Descartes the model of his 'mathesis universalis' is mathematical science, Husserl aims - with far reaching consequences - at creating transcendental phenomenology as a strictly scientific philosophy which must offer a fundamental organon to all other sciences and thus enable them to undergo fundamental reforms.
The presented text, prepared for a scientific conference on the philosophical work of W. Stróżewski and W. Tatarkiewicz, presents an analysis of selected issues regarding the concept of phenomenology implemented in the work of W. Stróżewski. It is an original concept, the essence of which boils down to an attempt to combine broadly understood classical philosophy with many threads of the various proposals by representatives of the phenomenological position. The understanding of phenomenology proposed by W. Stróżewski is an important voice in the discussion about the scope of possible applications of the phenomenological method in contemporary philosophical research. It can also become an important source for in-depth studies on the essence of phenomenology itself.
The author undertakes as interpretation of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' in which transcendental idealism and empirical realism are equated with one another. He proceeds by first asking if such an equation is possible, and then inquires how its acceptance would change the standard interpretation of Kant's thought and whether it will be helpful in presenting his ideas in their true colors. The author claims that such reading of Kant may be more interesting if it is seen in the light of phenomenology. He is not only concerned to emphasize similarity between some conceptions of transcendental idalism (empirical realism) of Kant and Husserl, but shows how the proposed reading of Kant helps to detect Kantian inspiration in much of contemporary philosophy.
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