The main task in this paper is to tackle a problem in the Protagoras whose solution is long overdue - the one posed by the fact that in stating and defending his doctrine of ''the unity of the virtues'' Socrates employs formulae which seem hopelessly at odds both with common sense and with the procedural assumptions of his own dialectic. The proportions of this problem are obscured in standard discussions of this passage.
In this paper the dialogue Protagoras is analyzed in light of Aristotle's conception of dialectic as described in the Topics. The aim is to follow those argumentative strategies and other features of discussion between Socrates and Protagoras which represent rules or characteristic steps of dialectical discussions in Plato's and Aristotle's times. This approach to Plato's dialogues (including Protagoras) could extend our understanding of these writings. In the Protagoras the paper detected these dialectical motives described in the Topics: dialectical problems and questions, strategies recommended for questioner as well as for answerer, allusion to all three goals of dialectical discussions, allusion to ''rules and rights'' for both participants of discussion, the opposition of the views of the many and the wise.
The essay investigates the interpretative possibilities inherent in the Homeric undertone of the descriptive introduction to the great debate in the Protagoras, its exploitation of the katabastic motives known from the earlier literary tradition and possible allusions to the contemporary dramatic art. Should we take those allusions as indication of the authorial intent, it seems arguable that the references to the underworld voyages of Odysseus (explicit) and Dionysus (possible) may reveal Plato's highly negative opinion concerning the sophistic training and prepare the ground for the imminent clash between the Socratic elenchus and Protagorean sophistry, thus being of particular value in any attempt to reconstruct Platonic psychagogic techniques.
The practical and pre-philosophical understanding of reality contains two fundamental certainties, transience and death. We perceive transience through our experience of the constantly changing world. Death, although intrinsically connected with transience, is something quite different. The Platonic way of practicing philosophy can be said to reveal a real concern about dying. It is an attempt to learn to accept the mystery of death, to commit oneself to the lifelong task of preparing for this special moment, to grow aware of the transcendental reality that we perceive and experience. Plato’s pursuit of wisdom as care for the soul is a kind of continuous preparation for the moment of death. The philosopher whose attention is directed towards the ultimate things turns away from the body and is more concerned about the soul. In the Platonic view philosophy is not sterile intellectual speculation but a special method of developing the proper attitude toward the inevitable.
Animal metaphors have been often used in European culture. Philosophers have used them since antiquity. Animals illustrate thoughts and arguments in their writings. Plato includes an almost complete zoological garden in his dialogues. There are both domestic and wild animals, employed for literary, psychological, didactic or educational reasons. The most famous animal, however, is the tortoise, well known from Zeno of Elea’s defense of the Parmenidean doctrines. The tortoise has been used in the writings of prominent philosophers such as Aristotle, Shaftesbury, Locke, Leibniz, Bergson and Russell.
A passionate discussion between Roger D. Masters and Anton Hermann Chroust concerning the case of Aristotle’s missing dialogues, namely The Stateman and The Sophist (commonly attributed to Plato), started in the second half of the 20th century on the pages of the scientific journal Political Theory. Masters offered two assumptions on the authorship of the dialogues which gave rise to the whole polemic: A) the author of the fourth to sixth books of Aristotle’s Politics is Theofrastos; B) Plato’s Stateman and Sophist are works of the young Aristotle. The aim of this paper is to confront Masters’ and Chroust’s arguments with the arguments from Aristotle’s Politics and Plato’s dialogues. On the basis of the textual evidence we will try to determine which of the two authors offers stronger arguments.
The paper demonstrates Plato's efforts to emancipate reason from the influence of mythological tradition developed among others by 'myth-creative' mimetic art that plays at mass audience's heart strings (Plato's 'Ion' is watched by twenty-thousand strong audience). As a result, the sphere of affects were marginalized later on by Christianity. Shakespeare appears here as one of the first liberators of that affective sphere, and as a fighter for artists' dignity, especially theatre artists. Brecht appears as a representative of the next wave of emancipation, who, like Plato before him, tries to empower the public and make him a subject. The theme of an actor and the fight for his dignity is an example of development of the significance of individuality in Europe's history.
The idea of homo interior (inner man) was widespread in the ancient world. The term „o` e;sw a;nqrwpoj“ was first used in an invariant form by Plato to describe the inner nature of man, his highest rational capabilities. This was afterwards accepted and transformed by various authors, especially by Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, and Greek Church Fathers Origenes and Gregory of Nyssa. St. Augustine was the first one among them, however, who transformed established hermeneutical approach to “homo interior” by shifting the ontological perspective towards interiority. The aim of the present article is a more detailed analysis of some of Augustine’s texts concerned with “homo interior”, which could be brought to some relevant conclusions.
The article suggests that the Protagoras could be read as an exposition of a particular model of philosophy. On this account, the dialogue appears to equate philosophy with rational discussion. Obviously, the Protagoras does treat of the teachability of virtue, but the major problem that seems to occupy Plato in the dialogue is the idea that philosophy is a rational exchange of opinions. That is why the confrontation between Socrates and Protagoras ends neither in the philosopher's prevalence over the sophist nor the other way round. For similar reason, Socrates seems at times to transform into Protagoras, while the sophist may occasionally sound more like his opponent. The rationale behind these strange developments is that the genuine protagonist of the dialogue is logos as the epitome of philosophical method proper. Thus, the philosophical method of a dialectical conversation triumphs over the sophistic monologue. The philosophical dialogue between Socrates and Protagoras yields no definitive result, for it is supposed to show that the only legitimate guide in life is reason which transpires to be the measure of all opinions.
The aim of this paper is to present the main theses and the importance of Tatarkiewicz’s article The dispute about Plato (Spór o Platona) in polish reception of Plato’s philosophy. This article – which was published by Tatarkiewicz a hundred yeas ago (1911) – was the first presentation of the new and interesting interpretation of Plato’s theory of ideas which was inspired by Marburg neo-Kantian school. In Tatarkiewicz’s view the Plato’s philosophy is not some kind of metaphysics but it is generally the theory of knowledge. We can agree this is still unusual approach to Plato and we have a good reason to remind this early Tatarkiewicz’s essay.
This study investigates Plato's so-called theory of ideas. The starting point of the investigation is an analysis of the first part of the 'Parmenides', where Parmenides presents a broad and thorough criticism of ideas. This analysis shows, firstly, that the usual rendering of the Greek terms 'eidos' and 'idea' as 'Idea' (in a metaphysical or Platonic way) is misleading and that it is more appropriate to render these Greek terms using the phrases 'characteristic kind' or 'generic nature'. In the course of a short excursion into the middle dialogues it is shown that Plato's 'theory of ideas' - that is, Socrates' conception of independent 'Eide' which Parmenides criticises in the dialogue of the same name - has two sources. (1) In the early dialogues the terms 'eidos' and 'idea' denoted the characteristic features common to a group of things - in particular, virtues. (2) In the middle dialogues 'ideas' were conceived above all as objects of knowledge (cf. the doctrine of reminiscence), which accounts for the use of substantialising adjectives and for the qualifier 'in itself' (cf. auto to kalon).
The paper re-examines the traditional view of the relationship between Diogenes of Sinope and Plato. The first part analyses one particular anecdote about Plato’s labelling Diogenes „Socrates who has gone mad“. This narration serves as a starting point of a closer examination of the whole anecdotal tradition of Plato’s encounters with Diogenes. The next part focuses on the Platonic themes of guardians in his Republic and madness in Phaedrus. In the last part of the study it is argued that due to the similarities between Diogenes’ religious beliefs and the opinions of Socrates’ devotees as well as of Socrates himself, Plato’s designating Diogenes with the label of Socratic madness is rather positive than negative.
The article investigates the relation between dialectic and rhetoric in Plato's Protagoras exemplified in the dialogue by the eristic agon between Socrates and the sophist. The one of the very theme of this agon is the agon alone i.e. reflection about its conditions, methods and purposes. Consequently the dialogue can actually be seen as Plato's attempt to transform egocentric type of struggle base on archaic, traditional ethos and establish a new kind of agon - the philosophical one - which is concentrated on dialectical search for truth and can be associated with Plato's ideal of symposium. Moreover in the end of dialogue Plato through his concept of metretikē technē try to polemically indicate essential error in the Sophistic thought and especially in the Protagoras's famous dictum about anthrōpos metron. Simultaneously this concept is directly related to the truth and in this way seems to by closely connected with Plato's dialectical method.
AAccording to Plato, the poetry and the painting belong to 'mimetic arts'. A painter does not represent the Idea, the essence of objects. A bed that was painted is only imitation of imitation and that is why this bed pictured by a painter 'is as many as three steps away from nature'. Today, it is believed that an artist - like God - creates a new world deriving it from his own imagination. In contrary, in Plato's conception only God is a real creator. On the other hand, Plotinus claims that the arts cannot be disregarded or condemned only because they imitate nature, which itself is imperfect. He completely inverts Plato's schema. In his opinion, art is superior to nature. Plotinus, criticizing Plato's criticism of mimetic arts, admits that the artist is able to reach to divine and intelligible causes and to make visible the very patterns of things. The figurative art of Fayum Portraits no less than the Byzantine art would be mirrored in the metaphysics of Plotinus whereas the abstract art would reflect his metanoetics that sets forth the theory of One without any form and would give value to unconscious acts of artistic creation.
In his theory of society Protagoras, one of the most influential sophist thinkers, applies a contractarian approach, similar in many respects to those of Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau. Protagoras, unlike Aristotle or Plato, was convinced that individual perceptions and beliefs as well as those of the body political are relative, because there is no uniform ground on which things could be perceived or experienced. He offers an evolutionary account of the development of human species, arguing that society is a result of a contract among its members, based on commonly shared and taught social virtues. On the other hand, Protagoras is not a nihilist: In his account there is still a possibility of an expertise within the polis, related to the good of the particular community.
The authoress asks two questions. The first, is war really the best action of a polis how the introductory conversation of the 'Timaeus' (19b -c) suggests. The second, has been the Sokrates' desire to see his ideal polis in action fulfilled in the 'Timaeus-Critias' sequence. The approach to the problems seems to be found in the 'Laws', where these two questions are turned to this one: might war be the pattern for a lawgiver.
History and philosophy differ from each other in their subject matter and in the way they communicate what each of them says about it. While history expresses itself most adequately by means of stories, narration; philosophy, by means of conceptual distinctions, definitions and syllogisms. This difference can be described by saying that philosophy deals with ontic existence while history is concerned with gignetic existence and that this difference accounts for their different language.However, in practice, nothing prevents a historian from using general concepts and their definitions just as nothing prevents a philosopher from narrating single, contingent facts. A similar difference and similarity exist in a specific way also in Hellenistic Jewish thought, and later in Christian thought. As a literary message, the Old and the New Testament are mostly a history, but their main contents are of an identical, or very similar character to the nature of philosophy. This is why they were translated into the language of Platonic and Stoic philosophy by Philo of Alexandria.The ancient and, even more clearly, the medieval exegesis of the Bible transformed the allegoric presentation into a rigorous conceptual system. This was favoured by the increasingly strong dominance of philosophy in medieval intellectual culture. The Renaissance humanists of the 14th-16th centuries raised the rank of history. Some of them extended their meta-historical reflections to the Bible. One of the most important among them was Erasmus of Rotterdam, a humanist and also a theologian.Having made the Bible the focus of his theological and humanistic works, Erasmus could not avoid the Biblical thought and conveyance structures which were typical of history. He also realised that the thought structures proper to history were not a sufficiently adequate tool for the Bible. It was in allegory that he tried to find the conceptual and philosophical 'generality' which was lacking in these structures, hoping that with its help he would be able to save the concreteness of the personal character of the Christian message and avoid scholastic conceptualisation and systematisation. The author of the article, which is a fragment of a still unfinished book 'Aristotle's Philosophy and the Scientific Status of Historiography', analyses anew Erasmus' humanistic and theological thoughts on the Bible as history.
The author raises the question about philosophical importance of a well known excerpt of the dialogue 'Teaetetus' which contains 'Socrates' dream' ('Teaitetus' 201d 12 – 206b 12). The prevailing interpretation of this dream is that some forms of immediate and intuitive insight into reality defy objective understanding (Gillespie, Hicken and Burnyeat) or that they resist scinetific analysis (Morow). The author argues that these readings are incorrect and proposes the view that the dream in the 'Teaitetus' is analogous to Plato's treatment of dialectics in the 'Parmenides' and the 'Sophist'. He contends that the theme of dialectics is characteristic for Plato's late dialogues.This interpretation is supported by considering what is knowledge 'per se' - a dialectical question, in the sense of dialectic expounded in the 6th and the 7th book of the Republic. The 'Teaetetus' does not provide an answer to this question, and the dialogue ends in a aporia for which neither Socrates, a philosopher who is accustomed to strict analysis, nor Teaetetus, who is a young matematician, can find a way out. This can be interpreted as an indication that knowledge must be understood dialecticaly, or as an ouitcome of a debate, and as such it cannot be presented clearly and distinctly in any other form but a dream.
The most obvious paradox of Plato's dialogue Protagoras is statement that no one does not consciously make evil. The statement is connected with the rejection of two phenomena: an acrasia and the free will. It seems that Plato has made a considerable correction of the intellectualistic position in the Republic, but he repeats this paradox also in the late dialogue Timaeus. So it should be asked: what is the sense of the ethical intellectualism in the Protagoras? Does the ethical intellectualism deny the self-evident facts concerning human behavior? Did Plato really change his view? Is Aristotle's criticism of the ethical intellectualism accurate? The answers can be found in this paper.
In spite of the apparent opposition to Plato, Aristotle accepted a lot from the thought of his master. The intuition, which plays the key role in the system of Plato, was understood by Aristotle in terms of how we grasp the middle term of syllogism. It is not, therefore, the intuition of being, but the reasoning, departing from the experience (nature’s “intention”), which is the way of the cognition of the ultimate. The teleology of being, which Plato was so keen on finding, was found by Aristotle in the physical world as a counterpart of motion. Alas, Aristotle lost sight of what is most valuable in Plato: the sense of being that transgresses the categories. According to Thomas, being is what is the most perfect in things; so, consequently, what is the proper effect of the Ultimate Cause, and what is Its primary aim. It is better to be, i.e. to exist. Each thing craves for being. Being, however, is, in the Dionysius’ sense, a problem; it might guide us to God, but veil Him before us as well. It is a perfection, but not the Perfection itself, Plato was right at this point.
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