The study addresses the problem of to what extent and in what scope do the regulations concerning political parties, resulting from the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, determine the ordinary legislator? The analysis is made from the perspective of the triad of notions: freedom – duty – responsibility.
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland does not define in a comprehensive manner the matter to be standardized in laws and grants the legislator considerable freedom in determining their content. In view of the subject matter of this opinion, based on views founded on the doctrine of Polish constitutional law and on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court, it can be concluded that the legislator should regulate by law, among other matters, the following matters reserved for statutory regulation (the principle of exclusivity of the act): regulations concerning citizenship and the rights, freedoms and duties of the individual, as well as the basic competences, principles of how public authorities are organised and function. On the basis of this assumption, it was examined whether there is any indication to the legislator from the constitutional norms relevant to the judicial authority. The following were taken into account: the right to a fair trial (Article 45), the principle of the separateness and independence of the judiciary (Article 173), the principle of bi-instantiality of court proceedings and the principle of statutory determination of the system and jurisdiction of courts (Article 176), the principle of the presumption of competence being assigned to common courts (Article 177), and the principle of the non-removability and non-transferability of judges (Article 180). On the basis of an analysis of these constitutional norms, it was concluded that the Constitution of the Republic of Poland enforces statutory regulation of the organisational structure and the material, local and appeal jurisdiction of common courts, and only allows for entrusting specific matters to be regulated by executive bodies by means of a regulation. In the event of any doubts as to whether a given case should be classified into the category of specific matters, the principle of exclusivity of the Act applies.
In the case pending before the Constitutional Tribunal, a review is to be carried out in relation to the statute granting consent for ratification by the President of the Republic of Poland of the European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro. Article 90 in conjunction with Article 120 the first sentence in fine of Polish Constitution and Article 48 (6) of the Treaty on European Union are invoked as a standard for the review. In the opinion of the Sejm, those standards for the review are inadequate. In relation to other matters, the Sejm applies for discontinuance of the proceedings due to inadmissibility of making a decision.
The subject of the article is the issue of security and public order, analyzed on the basis of the implementation of the constitutional right of assembly. The existing Law on Assembly contains numerous provisions on the need for security measures, both in the preparation of the assembly as well as in its course. Obligations are related both to the municipality as well as the organizer. The author makes an interpretation of selected statutory provisions with respect to the position of law and jurisprudence of the courts.
The paper is an English translation of Pozycja samorządu terytorialnego w konstytucji by Teresa Rabska published originally in Polish in the Journal of Law Economy and Sociology from 1995. The text is published as a part of a newly established section of the Adam Mickiewicz University devoted to the achievements of the late Professors of the Facultyof Law and Administration of the Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań.
Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is a universally recognized right, enshrined in human rights catalogues and the constitutions of democratic states governed by the rule of law. This freedom is also protected in the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, specifically in its second chapter. This paper aims to examine Article 53 of the Polish Constitution and analyse the level of crimes that violate this provision in Poland.
The paper discusses the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland, given on 22 October 2020 (K 1/20) concerning eugenic abortion. The Constitutional Tribunal adjudicated that legal provisions permitting termination of pregnancy on the basis of “a high probability of the foetus’s severe and irreversible impairment” or of “the foetus’s life-threatening incurable illness” are inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The result of the ruling is a ban on eugenic abortion and, consequently, a wider scope of protection of human life in the prenatal period.
This study aims to identify various meanings of the expression (name) “dignity”, with particular emphasis on the meanings of this expression as it appears in the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The meaning of the name “dignity” is the concept of dignity; in turn, the different concepts of dignity encompass dignity of particular types. Twelve different meanings of the expression “dignity” are indicated – twelve different concepts of dignity, and thus twelve types of dignity. Half of them are meanings (concepts) that recognize dignity as something belonging to a human being as a subject of law. They were considered in the essay Godność jako właściwość osoby. Typy godności – propozycja systematyzacji [Dignity as a Quality of Person – a Proposed Systematisation]. This group of meanings includes three concepts of dignity which recognize dignity as something constitutive of being a person: (1) inherent dignity of the person, (2) dignity established by qualities specific to a thinking being, and (3) dignity as a historically emergent social status of all human beings. The second group of meanings, treating dignity as something with which the human being (the person) is endowed, includes concepts which encompass (4) personal dignity (honour and good reputation), (5) dignity as moral excellence, and (6) dignity as appropriateness of attitude or behaviour. Dignity as an attribute of collective entities and dignity as an institutionally grounded attribute are a subject of this paper. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland speaks of (1) the dignity of the Nation, (2) the dignity of office or function, and (3) public dignity. The expression “the dignity of the Nation” can be understood in four different ways: (i) analogously to the understanding of dignity of the person, (ii) of personal dignity, (iii) of dignity as moral excellence, and (iv) of dignity as appropriateness of attitude or behaviour. The expression “dignity” when designating something institutionally grounded can designate (4) the dignity of social roles, (5) the dignity of a profession, and – specifically to the Polish language – (6) dignity meaning a surname. The author argues that it is unacceptable to ascribe different concepts of dignity to the expression “dignity” appearing in a specific legal provision.
This study aims to identify various meanings of the expression (name) “dignity”, with particular emphasis on the meanings of the expression as it appears in the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The meaning of the name “dignity” is the concept of dignity; in turn, the concept of dignity encompasses dignity of particular types. Twelve different meanings of the expression “dignity” are indicated – twelve different concepts of dignity, and thus twelve types of dignity. Half of them are meanings (concepts) that recognize dignity as something belonging to a human being as a subject of law, and this essay is devoted to this group of meanings. This group of meanings includes three concepts of dignity which encompass dignity as something constitutive of being a person: (1) inherent dignity of the person, (2) dignity established by qualities specific to a thinking being, and (3) dignity as a historically emergent social status of all human beings. Only the first of these three concepts of dignity is adequate to the interpretation of the preamble and Article 30 of the Polish Constitution. The second group of meanings, treating dignity as something with which the human being is endowed, includes concepts which encompass (4) personal dignity (honour and good reputation), (5) dignity as moral excellence, and (6) dignity as appropriateness of attitude or behaviour. The other half of the meanings take dignity as something that belongs to something. These meanings will be considered in the forthcoming essay Godność jako cecha podmiotów zbiorowych lub cecha ugruntowana instytucjonalnie. Typy godności – Propozycja systematyzacji – Część 2 [Dignity as an attribute of collective entities or an institutionally grounded attribute: Types of dignity – A proposed systematisation – Part 2]. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland speaks of (1) the dignity of the Nation, (2) the dignity of office or function, and (3) public dignity. The expression “dignity” when designating something belonging to something can also designate (4) the dignity of social status based on belonging to a social group, (5) the dignity of a profession, and – specifically to the Polish language – (6) dignity meaning a surname. The author argues that it is unacceptable to ascribe different concepts of dignity to the expression “dignity” appearing in a specific legal provision.
This study is devoted to the analysis of the role that freedom of expression plays in a democratic state. At the beginning, the author puts forward the theses that: 1) freedom of expression can emerge and function only in democratic countries; 2) without freedom of expression, there can be no democracy; 3) freedom of expression is a value that forms other freedoms and rights; 4) freedom of expression is a guarantee of protection of other freedoms and rights; 5) freedom of expression is a condition for the realisation of political pluralism; 6) freedom of expression is a condition for the realisation of the principle of national sovereignty. The following part of this study is devoted to the verification of the above-mentioned theses.
Collegial bodies as well as the sovereign make decisions by voting. The adoption of a legal act or the selection of a candidate depends on obtaining a certain majority of votes. The subject of this study is the majority of votes regulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The basic types of majority in force in the Polish Constitution are: simple, absolute and qualified majority. The authors present particular types of majority of votes used in votes of the Sejm, the Senate, the National Assembly and the Constitutional Tribunal, but also in elections and referendums. There are as many as eight types of majority required depending on the kind of decision to be made, which results from calculating the majority based on the statutory number of members, and not the actual number of voters. This is a sure sign that the legislator deliberately determined and differentiated the required majorities.
The aim of this legal opinion is to answer the question whether the Supreme Court’s determination as to the validity of the presidential election constitutes a prerequisite for the elected person to assume office. An analysis of the provisions of the Constitution and of the Electoral Code leads to the conclusion that – when the presidential election was called due to a vacancy in the office of President of the Republic of Poland or due to the invalidity of the previous presidential election – the Supreme Court’s confirmation of the validity of the presidential election in question is a necessary requirement to be fulfilled before the president-elect announced by the National Electoral Commission may actually take office. In any other cases, the person whose election as President of the Republic of Poland has been announced by the National Electoral Commission may take office even if the Supreme Court fails to determine the validity of the election.
The article is devoted to the constitutional right of a child to care and help of public authorities (Article 72 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997). The author analyses the following elements that make up this right: the right of a child to protection against violence, cruelty, exploitation and demoralisation, the right to care and help of public authorities in the event of deprivation of parental care and the right of a child to be heard and have his/her opinion taken into account, where possible, by public authorities and persons responsible for the child in the course of determining a child’s rights. The article also discusses the problem of determining the term “child” against the background of constitutional provisions and the divergent conception of a “child” in the Civil Code and the Family and Guardianship Code.
This article analyses the scope and limits of the mutatis mutandis application of the Standing Orders of the Sejm to the proceedings of the National Assembly that is convened for the purpose of administering the oath of office to the newly elected President of the Republic of Poland. The point of departure is § 9 of the said National Assembly’s Standing Orders, which – in matters not regulated in those Standing Orders – provides for reference to the Standing Orders of the Sejm. Such reference is subject to significant limitations arising from: the Constitution of the Republic of Poland; the constitutional purpose of the said National Assembly’s sitting; and, in fact, the said National Assembly’s Standing Orders themselves. This study demonstrates that the mutatis mutandis application of the Sejm’s Standing Orders may neither lead to an extension of the agenda, nor result in the said National Assembly’s adoption of normative or declaratory acts, nor permit the conduct of a debate going beyond the scope of the act of administering the aforementioned oath. A detailed analysis has been carried out as regards the admissibility of submitting procedural motions, identifying those that are excluded due to the lack of the possibility of holding debates and considering draft resolutions, as well as those that may be deemed admissible insofar as they relate solely to the procedural aspects of the sitting. The possibility of ordering a recess or an adjournment of the sitting is assessed negatively, admitting it only in extraordinary circumstances, with due regard to the principle of continuity in the exercise of the office of the President of the Republic of Poland. The author also justifies the competence of the Marshal [i.e. Speaker] of the Sejm to refuse to put inadmissible procedural motions to a vote, emphasising that the criteria for their assessment must take into account both the Standing Orders of the Sejm and the Standing Orders of the said National Assembly, as well as the constitutionally defined subject matter of the sitting.
The article presents the main theses of the papers presented by Leszek Garlicki, Marcin Kudej, Jerzy Góral and Marek Zubik. The first two speakers referred primarily to the features of the Standing Orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and their place in the Polish legal system. The Standing Orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, adopted as a resolution, express the organisational autonomy of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and, in accordance with the Polish constitutional tradition, remain a uniform, permanent and normative act. The Standing Orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland are neither an act of universally binding law nor an act of internal law: they are a special act of a mixed nature. It follows from the Constitution of the Republic of Poland that the Sejm of the Republic of Poland is obliged to enact and maintain its Standing Orders in force as well as to ensure that their scope of regulation corresponds to that specified in Article 112, Article 61(4) and Article 123(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. In all matters that are excluded from the scope of regulation of the Standing Orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland by virtue of the specific provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland – despite falling, as far as their subject matter is concerned, within the scope of regulation of the Standing Orders – a reference to an Act of Parliament covers only the regulation of specific issues related to the particularities of a given reference, while all other issues may be regulated by the Standing Orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland. Jerzy Góral and Marek Zubik, on the other hand, focused on the problems related to the structure of the Standing Orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and their specific content, and proposed appropriate amendments.
This review focuses on two volumes of commentary on the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland which relate to the Constitutional Tribunal. The authors of the reviewed volumes, contributing to the multi-author commentary series on the Polish Constitution published by Difin, are two Polish law professors: Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski and Hubert Izdebski. Their volumes of commentary – which make an excellent read, having been well-edited – present an analysis of the aforementioned constitutional norms in the context of the practical application thereof, with a view to the impact of the constitutional crisis on the functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal. Those volumes contribute to the ongoing debate on the constitutional judiciary in Poland and the significance of the constitutional provisions that regulate the status and powers of the Polish constitutional court.
Historical, systemic and purposeful interpretations make it impossible to assume, as the Supreme Court did in the decision discussed herein, that the mere physical presence for military service, even when one is in a physical state that makes it impossible to serve, abolishes the punishability of the act under Article 144 § 1 of the Polish Criminal Code. The duty to defend the Republic of Poland, as one of the constitutional civic duties, covers in its scope such performance of military service, that increases the state’s defense potential. Reporting for service under the influence of alcohol reduces this potential. Only behavior aimed at protecting the legal good in the form of state defense abolishes the punishability of the act in question. Failure to appear for service is punishable when it covers the physical failure to report for service, but also reporting for duty in such a physical or mental state that excludes the ability to perform this service. Also, the lack of, for example, documents necessary for admission to service implies the commission of the said crime.
Janusz Trzciński’s book is a collection of his scholarly papers which have mostly already been published, although some of those publications may prove to be hard to access for a non-expert reader. After a time when there were attempts to push the Constitution into the shadow and to forget about the direct application thereof, especially by courts, the author reminds readers what a considerable body of work in that regard has been provided by Polish legal scholars and in Polish courts’ jurisprudence. The author’s papers selected for the book are particularly interesting, as well as they are theoretical, which implies their enduring relevance.
The article focuses on the role and importance of self-regulatory bodies of public trust professions, in the light of Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, in the context of applications submitted to the Constitutional Tribunal to examine the compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of the provisions guaranteeing the pluralism of the functioning of these self-regulatory bodies. Based on the analysis of the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the views of the doctrine and the positions expressed in the judgements of the Constitutional Tribunal issued between 1997 and 2015, the authors prove that the initiative to question the existing regulations adopted in relation to the professions of a lawyer, legal adviser, doctor and dentist is intended to serve solely by questioning their independence from the political authorities. At the same time, the authors indicate threats related to questioning the status of other professional self-regulatory bodies, including those of architects and construction engineers.
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