Among the numerous problems that arose along with the regaining of independence, the question of Poles’ national identity played an important role. Naturally, the Polish victory in the battle of Grunwald in 1410 appeared to be an almost perfect binder for the citizens of independent Poland. “Nationalists,” for whom the German threat was the major concern, were basing their ideology on building the national identity around that event. The official governmental factors, however, saw the main enemy of the new Polish nationality in the East, in the Soviet Russia. The lack of official support caused that the Grunwald tradition did not become the leading idea of the national reunion during the interwar period. The memory of “the glory of the Grunwald battlefield” was incorporated into the official governmentpropaganda during the months preceding the German assault on Poland in 1939. Only then it turned out how deeply this tradition is entrenched in the awareness of the Polish society.The September defeat caused that “the second Grunwald” became a slogan of all political powers in occupied Poland and on emigration. The thought of making amends for the crueltiesof the German occupation in the form of “the second Grunwald” was also popular in wide circles of the Polish society. That is why both the powers politically representing pre-war Poland and the new player on the political stage – the Communists supported by the Soviet Union – tried to make use of this idea.The post-war distribution of power in Europe and in the world caused that Poland got into the Soviet zone of influence. The idea of Grunwald constituted a perfect element of theCommunists’ ideology of “the Slavic unity in the fight with the German imperialism.” It led to the renaissance of the Grunwald tradition. Simultaneously, the Grunwald victory becamea subject of numerous abuses of the official propaganda. It resulted in the strengthening of the falsified image of the battle and its significance. After the fall of Communism, the Grunwald tradition which used to be extremely popular among Poles, yielded to commercialisation deepening the plastic, almost “fabulous” image of the battle which was getting further and further from the historical truth.
omówienie publikacji: Elżbieta Kowalczyk-Heyman, Dzieje granicy mazowiecko-krzyżackiej (między Pisą a Biebrzą), Wydawnictwo DiG, Warszawa 2013, ss. 395.
Grunwald has occupied an important place in every Lithuanian history textbook, in most of them the event is devoted a separate chapter. The author of the article states that the oldertextbooks provided no information on the significance of the battle of Grunwald for Poland. In the interwar period the battle was only a component of Vytautas’ portrayal, a symbol ofthe ruler’s military victories. Grunwald was also used to show historic differences between Poland and Lithuania. We do not come across an interpretation where the Grunwald victorywould not be considered the greatest triumph of the Lithuanian army achieved by the Prince of Lithuania Vytautas the Great – a military genius. In the Soviet period, attempts were made to use the Grunwald victory in politics, as an instrument for the creation of an everlasting friendship between Lithuania and Russia as well as for strengthening the enmity towards the Western countries, especially West Germany. Contemporary textbooks show some remains of the former stereotypes concerning the behaviour of the Polish chivalry on the battlefield. The author looks for the reason for such a state of affairs in inadequate competence of the authors, lack of critical attitude towards the material presented in the former textbooks and their negligent revision. He also shows that the advantage of the contemporary textbooks is that they are based on systematized achievements of historiography. On the cusp of the 20th and 21st centuries, the textbooks started to display the features of the scientific objectivism. Thanks to that, the students can fully realize how meaningful the battle of Grunwald was for Lithuania. The importance consisted in the increase of the authority of Vytautas the Great, reclaiming Samogitia and undermining the military power of the Teutonic Order. As a permanent aftermath of the battle the author also mentions the prevention of a perennialunion of the Prussian and Livonian branches of the Teutonic Order and the creation of firm premises for an immediate baptism of Samogitia. The students also find out that thebattle of Grunwald became an effective prevention of the Teutonic Order’s further conquest of Lithuania, destruction of the Lithuanian nation, ruining its culture and wealth. It is alsoemphasized that Lithuania and Poland became the greatest political power in Eastern Europe. A predominant problem connected with the battle of Grunwald appearing in the textbooks is the person of the Prince Vytautas the Great. The question of the diversionary flight manoeuvre became an undisputable didactic truth. The problem arousing the greatest controversy is the role of King Wladyslaw Jagiello and the Polish army. The author of the article also explores the issue of how the Lithuanian textbooks serve the development of the discourse about the historical memory.
For years, the route followed by the Polish-Lithuanian army on its way to Grunwald in 1410 has been arousing controversy as the sources do not allow for its clear-cut determination.From the moment when Jagiello’s army crossed the Vistula river at Czerwińsk (3rd July) until it reached the fields of Grunwald only some of its halting-places are known. The passagefrom Dąbrówno to the battlefield covered on the 15th of July is given special attention in the historians’ discussion. S. Ekdahl claims that the Polish-Lithuanian army pitched a camp tothe north of Dąbrówno and stormed the town from that direction. Other historians incline towards the opinion that the army’s camp was situated to the south of Dabrówno, near the village Kalbornia. As a consequence they assume that the town was also attacked from the south. A few routes of the march from Dąbrówno to the site where the battle was supposed to take place were suggested in the present literature. According to S. Ekdahl, Jagiello’s army moved from the camp situated to the north of Dąbrówno to the east through Samin to stop near Grunwald. In the newest monograph of the 1409-1411 war it was stated that Jagiello’s army got to Grunwald by a route running through previously captured Dąbrówno and later on through Samin to Grunwald Jagiello’s army, after breaking up its camp at Kolbornia, moved east to turn north after a few kilometres and continue its march through Osiekowo, Łodgowo. A. Nadolski did not agree with those assumptions as he believed that from the camp in Dąbrówno the army headed for Turowo and then marched north towards Mielno circumventing the Ulnowo Lake from the east. The author of the article propounds a hypothesis that Jagiello’s army could act both to the north and south of Dąbrówno where the main camp of the Polish-Lithuanian forces was situated. He also considers that the conception of S. Kuczyński criticised by A. Nadolski and S. Ekdahl concerning the final phase of the march should still be taken into consideration as very probable. The author believes that there was no serious discussion on the Grunwald campaign during the last twenty years in Poland. Both the last monograph of the 1409–1411war and this article show that a new view on that topic is still possible.
On the cusp of the 19th and 20th centuries the Grunwald tradition was becoming one of the basic instruments of forming the historical awareness, especially among the plebeians, andthe feeling of unity in the period between the annexations. A number of factors that led to the revival of the Grunwald tradition which had been disrupted by the partitions appearedin the 19th century. These factors also influenced the change of the character of the Grunwald tradition, its social perception and mythologization. The process should be associated withthe current state of the “Polish affair” and “Lithuanina affair”, the course of the nationbuilding processes and the international events. The development of historical writing, political thought and literary works of Romanticism, the programmes of the Spring of Nations, cultural and national emancipation as well as the autonomic freedoms of Galicia also had an impact on the revival. The germinasational policy of the Prussian and German authorities was a significant impulse to develop a stereotype of a German resembling a Teutonic Order Knight. The Grunwald celebrations organised in 1902 and 1910 in Galicia, by their course, mass participation and ideological content revealed the extent of the changes that had taken place in the historical awareness of the Polish society in the 19th century. They also showed the role of the Grunwald tradition in the process of nationalisation of the plebeians, especially the peasants. It were the last celebrations, combined with the unveiling of the Grunwald Monument in Cracow, lasting three days and having a central character, with the participation of delegations from other partitions that reverberated not only in the Polish society.
In the article I tried to present those of Polish knights whom the “Great War” brought measurable benefits, whose political and clerical careers were boosted and fortunes increased. They achieved that thanks to King Wladyslaw Jagiello who knew how to appreciate people serving him faithfully as well as those who proved courageous in that great campaign. In the per iod from the middle of July 1410 to the middle of March 1411, the king rewarded 23 knights bestowing them with 10 villages and charging the crown land with the sum of 2310 grzywnas which meant that the goods were actually transferred into a private property. Adding the bestowals from the autumn of 1411, which can be associated with the Great War, we will have 26 rewarded and the amount of grzywnas will increase to 3310. Among thebestowed included were indigent knights as well as magnates who came from all over the Kingdom of Poland, although the majority was from Małopolska. A dozen of people who weregranted offices or were promoted should be also included into the circle of the beneficiaries. In both cases this certainly was not everyone. Analysing the later careers of the knights, theheroes of the war enumerated in Jan Długosz’s chronicle, one thing can be noticed i.e. the king felt a sentimental attachment to those knights who fought in the battle of Grunwald, especially those who were exceptionally courageous and did not spare their own blood in the battle. Those of whose reward we do not know could later on count on the king’s clemency. The majority of the knights who courageously fought in the first ranks during the battle of Grunwald and Koronowo took land offices, starosties or were taken in the court by clemency of the king in the later years. The battlefields of “the Great War” turned out to be a kind of “purgatory” for those knights who had formerly fallen into disgrace (e.g. Jakub from Kobylany, Mikołaj Chrząstowski). Finally, it is necessary to mention the largest group of “the Great War” beneficiaries, unfortunately almost entirely anonymous, namely hundreds of knights who enriched themselves with trophies obtained during the campaign.
The author of the article explores the onomastic conceptions of the battle of Grunwald appearing in the Lithuanian literature. The name „Žalgirio mūšis,” which is a translation ofthe German “Grünwald” into Lithuanian, was adopted. The author discuses the works of the Lithuanian historians which were developed in a strong opposition to the Polish apprehensionwritten by Karol Szajnocha. The main reason for the criticism of Szajnocha’s work, as well as of numerous other Polish studies, was that they uncritically adopted Długosz’s version about theLithuanians’ abandonment of the battlefield. The Lithuanian historiography has always been sensitively reacting to any attempts of belittling the importance of the Lithuanian army andVytautas’ role in the battle of Grunwald. Instead, the Lithuanian historians were developing a conception of a diversionary flight manoeuvre which was generally accepted before SvenEkdahl published the famous letter of a Teutonic commander. For a long time, a thesis that the Polish army was unwilling to fight and the whole burden of combat in the battle of Grunwaldwas borne by the Lithuanians was prevailing in many works of the Lithuanian historians. The author shows that the tense Polish-Lithuanian relationships during the interwar period had influence on the historiography. The Lithuanian literature attaches much importance to the account of Bychowiec’s Chronicle which is usually disregarded by the Polish historians and considered rather unreliable. With the course of time, analyses of various aspects of the battle conducted mainly from the military point of view, started to appear (the place of the battle, the route of the march, the strength of the army, the ar t of the war fare and thecourse of the battle). Many aspects, i.e. the strength of the army, are still discussed in the works of the Lithuanian authors. In the most recent literature the issue of the diversionaryflight manoeuvre still arouses controversy. The manoeuvre is almost commonly accepted as a historic fact, however, the historians dispute whether the Lithuanians culled it from theTatars or was it an immanent feature of their art of war fare. The author concludes his article with a discussion of the latest treaties by M. Jučas, R. Batūra, E. Gudavičius, K. Gudmantas, R.Petrauskas. The significant role of the Lithuanians in the initial and final stages of the battle is contemporarily commonly accepted. The author concludes that for a long time theLithuanian historiography has been presenting the battle of Grunwald as an epoch-making event that led to the destruction of the power of the Teutonic Order.
The author of the article presents an in-depth analysis of nar rative sources about the battle, namely: “The chronicle of the conflict between Wladyslaw, King of Poland and the TeutonicKnights” (“Kronika konfliktu Władysława króla polskiego z krzyżakami”), “Continuation” of the Teutonic chronicle of Johann von Posilge, a comprehensive description by Długosz in the9th book of his Yearbooks (Roczniki) as well as the account of so-called Toruń Annalist. The author confronts this analysis with the findings published in the most impor tant works ofPolish historians, archaeologists and historical geographers. Particularly controversial is the issue of the armies’ strength. The author believes that the calculations presented in the morerecent literature, especially those per taining to the Teutonic army, are not reliable. He also indicates that the issue of the number of casualties in both armies should be re-discussed. Theauthor depicts the battle on the basis of narrative sources from which he tr ies to pick up the elements that could have come from the witnesses and participants of the battle and separatethem from the authors’ own combinations. “The chronicle of the conflict” does not provide any details concerning the strength of the Jagiellonian and Teutonic armies, shows some omissionsin recounting the episodes of the battle known from Długosz’s account and generally perceived as authentic. It does not provide any information on the fall of the gonfalone with the eagleduring the encounter of the Great Chorągiew of Cracow. No mention of the heroic behaviour of the Smolensk Chorągiew and of the abandonment of the battlefield by the mercenary CzechChorągiew (events accepted by the Polish historians) need to be enumerated among the most important omissions of “The chronicle.” The Teutonic “Continuation” and the account of theToruń Annalist are characterised by brevity consisting in using just a couple of sentences to describe a day-long battle. Długosz created his depiction of the battle of Grunwald when notonly the outcome of the Great War had already been known but also the effect of all other wars with the Teutonic Order, including the Thirteen Years’ War (1454–66). While the author of“The chronicle” wanted to create the account mainly of the facts, Długosz wanted to describe the reasons as well. He blamed Vytautus and the Lithuanians as well as a couple of Cracovianmagnates for the withdrawal form the siege of Malbork. He could not, however, decide whom to blame for the course of the battle of Grunwald. The author of the article believes that Długosz gives the same account of the battle as “The chronicle of the conflict,” but he falsely described the stance of the Lithuanian army failing to mention an extremely important fact i.e. the return of the Lithuanian army to the battlefield. Initially, the Cracovian historian also falsely described the alleged passivity of the king towards the approaching Teutonic army, on the morning of the 15th of July. From the whole Długosz’s descr iption emerges an image of a king skilfully commanding his army.
The picture of the battle of Grunwald presented in the Polish history textbooks, from those published during the partitions through the interwar textbooks to the post-war ones andthose used after the educational reform in 1999 was changing. Each of those periods was characterised by a particular approach to the battle as it was attempted to make use of thehistory for the needs of the current politics. That is why the events of 1409–1411, although unambiguously interpreted as a great victory, had an undercurrent depending on the plannedand expected effects of the message. Teaching as well as learning is based mainly on words, that is why textbooks play such an important role in those processes. Textbooks as information carriers reaching wide audiences are perfectly suitable for the purpose of creating the pastaccording to the needs of the current political situation. Textbooks published during the partitions focused mainly on the victories of the Polish army and on those decisions of thePolish rulers and commanders which contributed to the increase of the country’s power. The Teutonic Order was identified with Prussia – one of the powers involved in the partitions.The germanisation period contributed to associating it with the Third Reich. That is why Poles willingly cast their minds back to the glorious pictures of the past victories over the contemporary oppressor. When the longed-for freedom came the history textbooks were not altered in any major way. The positive moments in the history of our country were emphasised, this time in order to remind those who were born under the foreign ruling that they should double they effort to unite the brutally torn country. This idea was interrupted by the outburst of another world conflict. Its aftermath, namely the annexation of Polandinto the Eastern Bloc, had long-lasting consequences. The authority imposed by the Soviet Union attempted to create an anti-western and anti-imperial myth of Grunwald. The battlewas depicted as an example of a Slavic brotherhood of blood and the victory of the nations of the Soviet Union over Germany – an enemy of time immemorial identified with the TeutonicOrder. In the textbooks published after 1989 we will not find the identification of the Teutonic Order with Germany. The authors usually show the holistic European background of the battleof Grunwald pointing out that the victory had wide repercussions on the international arena and its consequences had an immense influence on the 14th-century Europe. The power ofthe Jagiellonian country increased as it took the helm of the old continent’s politics for a long time while the influence of the Teutonic Order decreased. The analysis of the Polish historytextbooks suggests that the battle of Grunwald was, and still is, an event of which Poles are proud and as such occupies special space on the textbooks’ pages.
Bemühungen König Johann Albrechts von Polen um Hilfe des Deutschen Ordens gegen Herzog Konrad III. den Roten von Masowien im Jahre 1495ZusammenfassungNach dem Abschluß des Zweiten Thorner Friedens 1466 ist der Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens „Fürst und Rat der Krone” geworden, der dazu verpflichtet war, dem polnischen König militärischen Beistand zu leisten. An diese Pflicht erinnerte König Johann Albrecht den Hochmeister Johann von Tiefen, als 1495 nach dem Tod des Herzogs Janusz II. von Masowien sein Brunder Konrad der Rote das Fürstentum Płock eingenommen hatte, auf das auch die Krone Ansprüche geltend machte. Johann Albrecht entsandte seinen Sekretär Johann Konopacki mit der Forderung nach Preußen, bewaffnete Hilfe gegen Konrad zu leisten. Die Ordensleitung unterstützte diese Aktion nicht, weil sie befürchtete, daß die Krone sich ganz Masowien einverleiben und die Stellung des Ordens somit noch mehr geschwächt würde. Der Hochmeister sah aber zusammen mit Vertretern der preußischen Stände keinen Ausweg, den Forderungen des Königs zu widerstehen (rechtlich gesehen hatte er keine Gründe, diese abzulehnen, er verfügte auch über keine reale Macht), weshalb er auf Zeit spielte. Er verschob seine Entscheidung bis zur Versammlung der Stände, dann bot er sich als Vermittler zwischen dem König und Herzog Konrad an. Auch versuchte er, die Angelegenheit mit seinem Streit mit dem Bischof von Ermland Lukas Watzenrode in Verbindung zu bringen Der König entschied den Streit mit Konrad dem Roten schließen ohne die Hilfe des Ordens zu seinen Gunsten. Zwei Jahre später nahm Johann von Tiefen am Kriegszug Johann Albrechts in die Moldau teil, wo er auch gefallen ist. King Jan Olbracht’s solicitation for help from the Teutonic Order against Konrad III the Red, duke of Masovia, in 1495AbstractThe paper presents the activities of Jan Olbracht, who in 1495 requested help from the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, Johann von Tiefen, against against Konrad III the Red, duke of Masovia, who illegally took over the Duchy of Płock after the death of his brother Janusz II. Faced with the demands presented by the royal envoy Jan Koniecpolski, the Order’s authorities temporised with the king. A special state meeting was convened and the Order’s mediation was suggested to the king, only after the fiasco of which, military aid was promised. The validity of king’s request was not questioned, however. Eventually, the help of the Grand Master was not needed, because Jan Olbracht soon solved his argument with the Masovian duke.
The author of the article shows that both the Polish and Lithuanian historiography pays great attention to the opinion of Jan Długosz on Prince Vytautas the Great. The reason for this interest is the fact that Jan Długosz devoted a lot of space to Prince Vytautas, presenting his activity during an extended period of time (1376–1430) and, in his description of the 1410 campaign, depicted a highly ambiguous picture of the Prince of Lithuania. The Polish and Lithuanian literature assumes that Prince Vytautas played an extremely significant role in the preparation and the course of the Great War of Poland and Lithuania with the Teutonic Order whose climaxwas the battle of Grunwald. It is generally known that the Prince participated in that battle in person. The author of the article discusses the development of the Lithuanian research onthe activity of Prince Vytautas. Three aspects of forming evaluation of Vytautas the Great in the time of the 1410 military campaign are visible in Długosz’s opinion: military, moral andpolitico-diplomatic. Długosz also evaluates the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania which participated in the battle of Grunwald. The literature on the topic underlines that Długosz’sdescription of the battle of Grunwald is one of the most exhaustive portrayals of Vytautas as a warrior and leader preserved in the medieval sources. The author concludes that Długosz presents an extraordinarily positive opinion about Prince Vytautas with reference to the battle of Grunwald while his evaluation of the Lithuanian army and its alleged abandonmentof the battlefield are definitely negative. In the description of the next stages of the 1410 campaign, Długosz’s opinion about Prince Vytautas undergoes a radical change which was supposed to stem from the change of the Prince’s politics towards Poland and the Teutonic Order. From a staunch ally and the commander of the battle of Grunwald he transforms into a politician interested solely in the welfare of Lithuania, insincere towards Poland or even plotting with the Teutonic Knights against Poland. Długosz, who in 1410 wished to make the most of the Grunwald victory, wrongly blames Prince Vytautas for ruining the opportunity of capturing Malbork.
The article discusses various ideological conditionings in whose clutch Ford’s film “Knights of the Teutonic Order” is located. They cause that it is impossible to perceive the film onesidedly.“Ideological conditionings,” close to the notion of “discourse,” are defined in this article in accordance with the research in cultural studies as all social sets of convictionsand imaginations of reality which create a socially defined identity, determine the way of conceptualization of the surrounding world – also the forms of the cinematic expression of this world. Ideological discourses which determined the artistic, formal and philosophical shape of “Knights of the Teutonic Order” were mainly: the original text of Henryk Sienkiewicz’s novel, his model of literature and the model of a specific philosophy of history that results from it; recipients’ expectations characteristic for common rationality with their typical receptionmodels, the accepted understanding of the film adaptation of literature, the acknowledged model of intersemiotic translation, genre features of a historical film and the set of formalways of film expression used, current policy of the Communist government in 1960 and the original strategy of Alexander Ford, the film director.
The medieval manuscripts of St. Mary’s Church Library ( Biblioteka Mariacka) are the oldest part of the collections of the Gdansk Library, with some items dating back to the 12th century. In view of their topics and history, they provide a priceless testimony to the history of Pomerania. The value of the manuscripts lies not only in their contents and ornamentation, but also in the fact that they include parchment documents bound by Gdansk bookbinders, which have survived in an excellent condition. The uniqueness of the collection was confirmed by the missal Missale secundum notulam dominorum Teutonicorum (Ms. Mar. F 332) being entered on UNESCO’s “Memory of the World” Polish National Register in 2016. After 1921, not a single study discussing the provenance of books kept in St. Mary’s Church Library was written. This paper is an attempt to partially fill in the gap – to indicate the scribes and owners of the most valuable manuscripts. Among the latter, special attention should be devoted to clergymen connected with St. Mary’s church: Andreas Slommow, Heinrich Calow, and Johannes Zager, a lawyer Nicolaus Velan, and a scribe Johannes Rasoris from Nidzica. For the purposes of this article, books kept by the Library were divided into sections: theology, philosophy, law and medicine; manuscripts related to the Teutonic Order were also given a separate section. Such a division may help the readers use the library holdings. The text also discusses the most important wartime losses.
Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza 46 skarbów monet odkrytych na terenach konfliktów zbrojnych Królestwa Polskiego oraz Zakonu Krzyżackiego. W jej efekcie stwierdzić można, że napięcia te nie miały znaczącego wpływu na wzajemne relacje gospodarcze obu krajów oraz na obieg pieniężny na tym terenie. Struktura skarbów monet wskazuje, iż odzwierciedlają one potrzeby ekonomiczne obu stron.
EN
An analysis of 46 coin hoards discovered in the border area of the Kingdom of Poland and the Teutonic Order inclines one to the belief that the series of military conflicts between these two states had no significant impact on their economic relations or on monetary circulation. The structure of the hoards reflects the material possessions of the local population, as well as their needs as consumers on both sides of the frontier.
During the reign of king Władysław II Jagiełło (1386-1434), the Mazovian Piasts participated actively in all conflagrations between their sovereign and forces of the Teutonic Order: at the beginning of the 1390s; during the so-called great war against the Teutonic Order 1409-1411; in warfare of 1414; in a short-lived military expedition of 1419 (abandoned due to the intervention of Sigismund of Luxembourg's envoy, Bartholomew de Capra, Archbishop of Milan) and in the war of 1433. In this way, king Władysław II strenghtened his army, provided better supplies for his troops, and prevented the Mazovian Piasts from siding with the Teutonic Order.
PL
Za panowania Władysława Jagiełły (1386-1434) Piastowie mazowieccy aktywnie uczestniczyli we wszystkich konfliktach zbrojnych toczonych pomiędzy swoim suwerenem a siłami Zakonu Krzyżackiego – na początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych XIV w.; w czasie tzw. wielkiej wojny z Zakonem Krzyżackim 1409-1411; w walkach 1414 r.; w krótkotrwałej wyprawie 1419 r. (zaniechanej na skutek interwencji wysłannika Zygmunta Luksemburskiego, arcybiskupa Mediolanu Bartłomiej de Capra) i w wojnie 1433 r. W ten sposób król Władysław II wzmacniał własne siły wojskowe, zapewniał lepszą aprowizację dla swoich wojsk i uniemożliwiał Piastom mazowieckim (zwłaszcza Siemowitowi IV) opowiedzenie się po stronie zakonu.
Protest Zakonu Krzyżackiego wobec koronacji elektora brandenburskiego Fryderyka III na króla w Prusach w 1701 r. przebił się na forum ogólnoniemieckie i europejskie. O jego niepowodzeniu zadecydowała ówczesna sytuacja międzynarodowa. Narastający konflikt habsbursko-burboński o sukcesję hiszpańską zmusił cesarza Leopolda I do opowiedzenia się po stronie Hohenzollerna. The protest of the Teutonic Order against the coronation of Frederic III, Elector of Brandenburg, as the king in Prussia in 1701, reached the German and European forum. Its failure was caused by the international situation. The growing conflict between Habsburgs and Bourbons regarding the Spanish succession forced Emperor Leopold I to take Hohenzollern’s side.
On 18 June 1388 in Malbork a number of lords from Great Poland signed a treaty with the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order Konrad Zöllner von Rotenstein concerning supplying him with military aid against Władysław Jagiełło, the king of Poland, which would include, among other things, allowing the Order to use the “castles” belonging to them whenever they needed. The paper identifies those lords and puts forward a hypothesis concerning the motifs which led them to the betrayal of the Polish monarch. In the appendix two sources are published: the document of 18 June 1388 and the documents of Wierzbięta of Smogulec dated 29 July 1390 and 25 July 1391.
PL
18 VI 1388 r. w Malborku kilku wielkopolskich panów zawarło układ z wielkim mistrzem zakonu krzyżackiego Konradem Zöllnerem von Rotenstein w sprawie udzielenia mu pomocy zbrojnej przeciwko królowi Polski Władysławowi Jagielle, polegającej m.in. na udostępnieniu Krzyżakom na ich każde życzenie należących do nich „zamków”. W artykule dokonujemy identyfikacji owych wielkopolskich panów, przedstawiamy również hipotezy dotyczące pobudek, które doprowadziły ich do popełnienia zdrady wobec polskiego monarchy. W aneksie zostały również opublikowane dwa źródła: wspomniany dokument z 18 VI 1388 r. oraz dokumenty Wierzbięty ze Smogulca z 29 VII 1390 i 25 VII 1391 r.
W czasie panowania Władysława Jagiełły monarchia polsko-litewska stała się ważnym podmiotem polityki europejskiej. Władca prowadził intensywną politykę zagraniczną, a polskie poselstwa docierały na najważniejsze dwory średniowiecznej Europy. Istotną rolę w tym czasie odgrywały stosunki monarchii jagiellońskiej ze Stolicą Apostolską, z uwagi na to, że panowanie pierwszego Jagiellona zbiegło się w czasie z wydarzeniami kluczowymi dla całego Kościoła Powszechnego. To właśnie w kurii papieskiej, najważniejszym dworze średniowiecznej Europy, znajdowały rozwiązanie wszystkie kwestie, które zdominowały politykę zagraniczną państwa tego okresu, a więc sprawy krzyżackie, husyckie, czy luksemburskie. Częstotliwość kontaktów, a także ranga załatwianych w Rzymie spraw, skłania do zastanowienia się nad osobami królewskich dyplomatów. Wśród nich znalazły się osoby należące do kościelnej i prawniczej elity ówczesnego państwa polskiego, takie jak Mikołaj Trąba, Piotr Wysz, Paweł Włodkowic, czy Mikołaj Lasocki. Ich działalność obejmowała przede wszystkim zabiegi mające na celu zatwierdzenie przez papieża chrystianizacji Litwy, zmagania z dyplomacją Zakonu Krzyżackiego, utrzymującego w Rzymie stałego prokuratora oraz uzyskiwanie prowizji na wyższe godności w Kościele polskim. W artykule zostały omówione działalność posłów, ich pochodzenie, wykształcenie, kariera i sprawowane funkcje publiczne. Artykuł podejmuje także próbę charakterystyki środowiska królewskich dyplomatów oraz dróg ich rekrutacji do służby dyplomatycznej.
EN
During the rule of Ladislaus Jagiello, the Polish-Lithuanian monarchy became an important subject of European politics. The king conducted an intensive foreign policy and Polish legations were present at the most important courts of Medieval Europe. Because the reign of the first Jagiellonian coincided in time with key events for the Catholic Church, the relationships of the Jagiellonian monarchy with the Holy See played an important role at that time. It was in the Roman Curia, the most important court of Medieval Europe, that all problems dominating in foreign policy of that time found their solution: problems with the Teutonic Knights, Hussites or Luxembourg. Frequency of contacts as well as the rank of problems solved in Rome puts a focus on the royal diplomats. Among them one can find members of the contemporary church and judicial elite of Poland, such as Mikołaj Trąba, Piotr Wysz, Paweł Włodkowic, or Mikołaj Lasocki. Their activity comprised mostly endeavours to obtain papal confirmation of the Christianisation of Lithuania, struggles with the diplomacy of the Teutonic Order, which had a special attorney in Rome, as well as obtaining provisions for higher ranks in the Polish Church. The article presents the activity of the legates, their descent, education, career and public functions. It also attemps to characterise the background of the royal legates and the means of their recruitment for the diplomatic service.
The following article examines the rotation on the offices of the Teutonic Order during the hundred years (January 1310-December 1409). According to the previous opinion, such a mechanism for the prevention of potential corruption seemed to have worked until the middle of the XIV century and ailed afterwards. That statement could have been not be entirely true, as the following research shows that the frequency of the rotations dropped already in the 1340s. In this decade it became for younger brethren more difficult to rise to a higher rank. It explains the existence of the secret oaths for the mutual career help which were banned in 1354. In the 1360s the frequency rotations decreased even more. After the death of the long -ruling Winrich von Kniprode it grew for a short period, as more young brethren were able to reach important functions. But those who did not take the chance immediately, had in the next two decades again much lower chances.
PL
Niniejsze badanie analizuje rotacje na urzędach krzyżackich na przestrzeni stu lat (od stycznia 1310 do grudnia 1409 r.). Wedle dotychczasowej opinii tenże mechanizm regularnej wymiany zakonnych funkcji, mający na celu zapobieganie korupcji, zdawał się działać do połowy XIV. w., następnie podupadając. Twierdzenia te są w świetle niniejszej analizy nie do końca prawidłowe, gdyż częstotliwość rotacyjna spadła już w latach czterdziestych XIV w., kiedy to młodym braciom stało się znacznie trudniej dotrzeć do tytułu komtura lub Wielkiego Dostojnika. Wyjaśnia to egzystencje tajnych ślubowań w celu wzajemnego wspierania się, zabronionych w 1354 r. W latach 60. XIV w. rotacje spadły jeszcze bardziej. Po śmierci długo rządzacego Winricha von Kniprode, gdy więcej młodych krzyżaków osiągało ważne funkcje, wezbrały one na krótko na sile. Kto jednak natychmiast nie skorzystał z nadarzającej się opcji, ten miał w następnych dwóch dekadach znów znacznie niższe szanse.
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