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F. Suárez o povaze počtu

100%
Svoboda D.
Studia theologica
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2009
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vol. 11
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issue 2
11-25
EN
The paper deals with Suarez's concept of a number as it is put forth in his famous Disputatines Metaphysicae. Suarez's explanation is led by the standard scholastic question with regard to the nature of a number, namely whether a number is the real species of a quantity. Suarez answers the question in a negative way and his main opponents are in this respect Thomists. Suarez rejects the Thomistic concept of a number according to which a number is the real species of a quantity. Suarez's argument is based on the claim that a number is not a being (ens) per se and that is why the Thomistic thesis is not valid. According to Suarez, a number is (broadly speaking) an aggregation of units, which of itself does not have a sufficient type of unity in order that it could constitute a being per se. However, a number has some kind of unity but the unity of a number comes from the cognitive act of our reason which subordinates an aggregation of units under some concept. Only if we consider an aggregation of units with this kind of unity can there be strictly speaking (or formally speaking) a number, e.g. the number of the apostles. A number taken in a formal way then somehow belongs (but not in the strict sense of a word) to the species of a quantity.
2

JE ČÍSLO VLASTNOST VNĚJŠÍCH VĚCÍ? MILL – FREGE - KESSLER

88%
Sousedík P., Svoboda D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2014
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vol. 21
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issue 1
45 – 62
EN
In this paper we deal with the problem, whether number is a property of external things. It is divided into three parts. Firstly Mill’s empirical concept of natural numbers is summarized, then Frege’s arguments against this conception are put forth and finally viewpoints of some contemporary analytical philosophers (first of all G. Kessler), who reject Frege’s critique, are set out. Kessler and his followers in fact revive the abandoned theory of Mill.
3

MILLOVO POJETÍ ČÍSLA

88%
Sousedík P., Svoboda D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 2
201 – 221
EN
According to the positivists, all our knowledge is based on experience which is the foundation not only of every empirical science, but also of those disciplines that are usually considered to be a priori. The paper consists of two main parts. Firstly, a positivist concept of number defended by J. S. Mill is presented; secondly, it is shown how this conception can settle some objections coming from apriori-oriented philosophers. Mill’s theory of number is interesting for at least two historical reasons. It is developed in connection with a relatively rich scholastic logic which is why its methodology is similar to the contemporary philosophy of language; it is indispensable for an appropriate comprehension of the concept of number that was proposed by Mill’s most famous opponent G. Frege.
4

A REFLECTION ON FREGE'S DEFINITION OF THE NUMBER (Zamysleni nad Fregovou definici cisla)

88%
Vlasakova M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2010
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vol. 17
|
issue 3
339-353
EN
In his treatise Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Gottlob Frege tries to find a definition of a number. First, he rejects the idea that the number could be a property of external (empirical) objects. Then he comes with a suggestion that a numerical statement expresses a property of a concept, namely it indicates how many objects fall under the concept. Subsequently Frege rejects, or at least essentially modifies, also this definition, because in his view a number cannot be a property - it should be an object. The article tries to show that Frege's first definition of number seems to be, despite his own opinion, much more promising than he supposed. It also argues that Frege's argumentation against the (possibly) empirical character of number is by no means convincing.
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