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1

ZÁMĚR WITTGENSTEINOVA TRAKTÁTU (1): PŘEDMLUVA A MOTTO

100%
Glombíček P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2014
|
vol. 21
|
issue 3
363 – 380
EN
The article presents a first part of an interpretation of the intention of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. The intention itself used to be considered a rather marginal topic until so called new-Wittgensteinian interpretations. The present article considers main sources to show what kind of content we can ascribe to the book. Its aim is to prove that Tractatus is not purely practical exercise, however without stripping the book of its therapeutic side. The first part considers the preface and the motto of the book.
2

Wittgenstein on Negation

80%
Soin M.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2005
|
vol. 14
|
issue 2(54)
175-186
EN
In a book written recently by Wladyslaw Strózewski Wittgenstein is presented as one of the main advocates of a theory that assigns an autonomous role to negation. A closer look at his writings shows, however, that the problem is not so simple, even if we bear in mind that in the 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' Wittgenstein says unambiguously that existence and non-existence constitute reality on equal terms, and the non-existence of a state of affair is called a negative fact. This initial statement is further qualified in the 'Tractatus ...' when Wittgenstein says that a negative sentence is constructed indirectly, by transforming a positive one . A further complication arises when we turn to later Wittgenstein and to his turnabout connected with the discovery of the autonomy of grammar. This last position indicates forcefully that Wittgenstein saw negation as a particularity connected with autonomous rules of language rather than a separate problem concerning an alleged essence of negation.
3

'...DIE ZEIT IST NOCH NICHT'. (PERICHRÓNIA, TZV. NESKORÝ HEIDEGGER A OTÁZKY TERMINOLÓGIE)

80%
Piaček J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2006
|
vol. 61
|
issue 1
4 - 15
EN
The still growing distance from the classics of the 20th century philosophy (Wittgenstein, Heidegger) enables us to approach their universe of meanings with humbleness, and be still more aware of the problematic and risky character of our speaking of their legacy. This is, however, not a ground not so speak about them at all; on the contrary, it is a challenge to work systematically on the development of Slovak philosophical terminology. Concerning Wittgenstein and Heidegger, there are two main streams of developing a Non-German, national philosophical terminology (the following considerations relate to Heidegger alone): the stream based on translation, and that of developing our own national philosophy, systematically as well as historically. An example of the application of the latter is the author's articulation of the basis of reflecting ontologically the world and the place of humans in it. He calls this kind of reflecting 'perichronosophy', its subject being 'perichrony' (timelessness, atemporality) and its particular forms 'perichronemas'.
4

On Witkiewicz Critique of Wittgenstein

80%
Soin M.
Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mysli Spolecznej (Archives of the History of Philosophy and of Social Thought)
|
2006
|
vol. 50-51
265-275
EN
The article is concerned with the most important threads of criticism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus as it was presented in 'Zagadnienie psychofizyczne' by Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz. The main objection refers to the formal character of Wittgenstein's ontology, which - says Witkiewicz - ignores the basic distinction between the aspects of the dualistic structure of being. The objection is closely connected with the problem of relation between logic and philosophy. At this point Witkiewicz criticized not only Wittgenstein, but also the Lvov-Warsaw school, highly influential in Polish philosophy.
5

Ludwig Wittgenstein o wewnętrznym stosunku odwzorowania między językiem a światem

80%
Dehnel P.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2012
|
vol. 40
|
issue 4
25 - 48
EN
The paper is devoted to the interpretation of proposition 4.014 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which tackles „the…internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world”. Three different approaches to interpreting Wittgenstein’s early work are distinguished. First, there is a metaphysical approach in which the “internal relation” is to be understood as a substantial relation of isomorphism between language and the world. Secondly, there is an anti-metaphysical approach which denies that Wittgenstein intended to offer any explanation of how language connects with the world. In this account the “internal relation” does not have anything genuinely relational. It is only by using a sign with sense that both the logical form of a symbol and the logical form of what it signifies are simultaneously constituted. Thirdly, there is a so-called therapeutic interpretation in which observations on an internal relation, as well as the whole discourse referring to correspondence, are no more than a reflection of how we actually employ expressions and have nothing to do with the metaphysical problem of the relation between language and the world. The paper endorses the anti-metaphysical approach and elaborates its argument by resorting to the notion of “logical space” and including an interpretation of 1.13 (“The facts in logical space are the world”). It is argued that the concept of “the world” and, likewise, those of “fact” and “language”, are formal concepts which, as such, constitute conditions of all representation.
6

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AND THERAPY. POLEMIC WITH THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN

80%
Stelmach M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 4
281 – 292
EN
The paper argues against the interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy by Conant, Diamond, and Crary presented in The New Wittgenstein. Such interpretations are based on the concept of mere (or plain) nonsense and try out a strategy of translating Wittgenstein’s work into the idiom of therapeutic philosophy. In my argumentation, I show that it is impossible to effectively interpret Tractatus in the way proposed by Conant, Diamond and Crary. This fact has consequences for the concept of mere nonsense. If Tractatus is mere nonsense and means nothing, it is impossible to use the Tractatus method to identify logical object like problem or philosophical problem and finally identify mere nonsense. If philosophy as a therapy is to cure philosophical problems, then we must have a criterion that allows us to identify such problems as philosophical problems and, consequently, the entire therapy as a philosophical therapy. The concept of mere nonsense does not provide such a criterion. Without such a criterion, the therapy proposed by mentioned authors is a therapy with the use of any tool directed against anything. If we reduce understanding of the author’s understanding only and not of his work, there is no reason why this activity should be described as philosophical. My argumentation shows that the consequences of the methodology derived from The New Wittgenstein’s basic postulates, will be always confusing and will usually lead to contradictions, arbitrariness, or lack of connection with interpreted text.
7

WITTGENSTEIN: OD TRAKTÁTU K NESKOREJ FILOZOFII

80%
Ježík P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2006
|
vol. 61
|
issue 9
743-751
EN
The paper is an attempt to shed a light upon the Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical development from its early to its late periods. In the author's view the Wittgenstein's philosophy can relatively sharply be divided into two periods with 1930 as a boundary line. He picks out some main events occurring around this line, which can be seen as the milestones on Wittgensteins' road from 'Tractatus' to his new philosophy. This philosophy stands in many points in the opposition to his Tractarian philosophical opinions and principles. Nevertheless, there are many points concerning his view of the role of the philosophy, which these two periods have in common. This enables us to understand Wittgenstein's philosophical conversion much better - the change is more visible against an unchanging background.
8

Some Remarks on Wittgenstein's Conception of 'Language Game'

80%
Brykczynski P.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2005
|
vol. 14
|
issue 3
189-201
EN
The paper deals with the role of the term 'language game' (Germ. das Sprachspiel) as part of the terminological equipment of the present-day philosophy of language (in what follows only the English term 'language game' will be used for the sake of simplicity).. Various factors will be taken into consideration. The current uses of the term 'game' in and outside philosophy of language (as well as the differences between the English term 'game' and the German term 'das Spiel') will not be neglected. The author's examination of the various Wittgenstein's uses of the term 'language game' covers both the descriptive content of the term, and the underlying intentions of its introduction into philosophical vocabulary - the intentions to accentuate certain features of language and the intentions to accentuate certain of methodological issues. The author says that Wittgenstein uses the term 'language game' in a way that makes it unsuitable for any substantial role in distinguishing philosophical problems and directions of research. Moreover, all talk about language games results not only in accentuating certain important features of language, but also in blurring some others, equally important. However, the first of these two effects is now less significant than it was in the historical context of Wittgenstein's late philosophy (due to changes that took place not without Wittgenstein's influence).
9

PRAGMATIZATION OF NARRATIVE IN WITTGENSTEIN’S LATER PHILOSOPHY: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE

80%
Synytsia A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2022
|
vol. 29
|
issue 3
327 – 347
EN
The main views on the nature of narrative in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy are analysed. It is shown how, realizing the research narrative, he paid attention to the linguistic means of expression of our thoughts, reference to the actual reality, the logical component of argumentation. It is shown that in order to place worldview accents more clearly and strengthen the expressive effect of thought, Wittgenstein pragmatised the narrative, in particular, used metaphors, images of learning, took into account the historic-cultural context. It is important for him to show that the form of the narrative influences what meanings the interlocutor will comprehend. Through a system of micro- and macro-narratives, Wittgenstein intended to express his opinion as clearly as possible, although he made the reader an active participant in the narrative. The thinker did not deviate from the analytic-scientific standards of philosophizing, although he showed that the relevant analysis of the narrative is significantly complicated by the ambiguities of its interpretation, the uniqueness of human experience and the identity of each narrator’s value system. It is argued that a pragmatic approach to narrative analysis significantly expands the research methodology of the analytic thinker and, accordingly, makes it possible to deepen our understanding of reality and human existence, as well as more clearly define the specifics of their knowledge.
10

Niewypowiadalność etyki w Traktacie logiczno-filozoficznym Ludwiga Wittgensteina

80%
Szczęch S.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2014
|
vol. 42
|
issue 4
103-118
EN
Ethics is not among the principal or most widely discussed issues in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. It was often disregarded as a manifestation of Wittgenstein’s “mysticism” and was treated as an expression of author’s war experiences, external to logic, the alleged main topic of the book. Those approaches ignored the fact that ethics and logic are connected in the Tractatus by the Wittgenstein’s opinion that they both are equally inexpressible. I argue for a rehabilitation of this interpretation and examine, why ethics „cannot be put into words” and what this means. I achieve this in two steps. First, on the basis of the Tractatus I reconstruct three types of argumentation which are supposed to justify the inexpressibility of categories other than ethics. Next, I analyze how these arguments can be applied to ethics. Finally, I complete these reflections with a reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s original argument, which makes it possible to show that the thesis of the inexpressibility of ethics in the Tractatus is justified.
11

PŘÍKLADY A PRAVIDLA PŘI OSVOJOVÁNÍ DOVEDNOSTI

80%
Beran O.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
|
vol. 22
|
issue 1
90 - 108
EN
Wittgenstein describes the process of mastering a rule (adopting a skill) as implanting mechanically a number of specific examples (steps) after which one “know how to go on”. Such a two-step concept of learning (e.g. in Cavell) can be understood as the sequence of i) propedeutics limited in time and ii) the subsequent skill to extrapolate the rule in unlimited number of cases (Chomsky’s account of rule). The relationship between the “propedeutics of examples” and the mastered skill is, however, more complex. The author will refer here to the Wittgensteinian ethics (e.g., Winch) emphasizing the individual’s repeated work (reflection) on specific examples which never ends. He will also point to the empirical evidence (Ingold, in particular) that in the processes of learning an essential role is played by memorizing and copying of given (specific) models, where attention and observation is necessary. A competence is then a physical implantation and individual mastering of such a limited technique, rather than an ability to extrapolate and innovate foremost.
12

WITTGENSTEIN AND KIERKEGAARD IN AND ON PARADOX

80%
Ule A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 5
451 – 457
EN
The article provides an analysis of the confrontation with the limits of reason in Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. For both thinkers such a confrontation denotes some sort of “running up against the paradox” that helps human beings to constitute themselves as ethical and/or religious subjects. In contrast with the so-called “austere” interpretation of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard (Conant and others), the seemingly futile running up against the absurdity is presented as a necessary ingredient of a certain view of language and life, i.e. a view that conceives life and language merely as a succession of events and a description of facts. However, the meaning of a certain subset of events and propositions shows itself only if these events are valued in terms of the totality of individual life or state of affairs and if these propositions are accompanied by a wholesome way of living and a wholesome attitude towards the world. For both authors the confrontation with the absurdity is also closely related to the confrontation with madness as a far limit of reasoning.
13

HEIDEGGER AS THE KEY TO COGNITION OF WITTGENSTEIN

80%
Gurczynska K.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
|
2006
|
issue 42
155-166
EN
The aim of this essay is tho show the source of the knowledge of 'myself'. How do we know ourselves? The negative answer sounds: we do not know that on the basis of private experience. The way to know our 'own' psychological content runs round about: it goes through the other people. To know that I think, feel pain, or hope we have to know that other people think, feel pain, or hope. The place we find ourselves is the place of finding others. The source of understanding what is thinking, feeling - is primitive reactions, which include the other people as well.
14

FREGEHO DER GEDANKE AKO KONKURENČNÝ PROJECT K WITTGENSTEINOVMU TRAKTÁTU

80%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2025
|
vol. 80
|
issue 3
285 – 299
EN
Based on the contents of the correspondence and an analysis of Der Gedanke and the Tractatus, and a comparison of the two, particularly in terms of the question What is fact and What is the world, we have attempted to provide a justification for the hypothesis that Frege’s essay Der Gedanke was conceived as a rival project to Wittgenstein’s nascent Tractatus. Our hypothesis explains Wittgenstein’s long-lasting animosity towards the contents of this particular treatise even decades after Frege’s death. We consider the key difference between the two projects to be the question of the explication of the concepts of fact and world. For Frege, the external world of sense-perceptible things (the World 1) is only the ground for objective facts, which are true thoughts that are composed exclusively of abstract entities. On the other hand Wittgenstein says that the world itself is the totality of facts which are special complexes.
15

JE ETIKA NÁSLEDKOM LOGICKEJ CHYBY?

70%
Mandzela M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2008
|
vol. 63
|
issue 8
704-714
EN
The article deals with the question, if, taking the validity of Hume's thesis for granted, it is legitimate to deny the cognitive claim of ethics. The author draws on Wittgenstein's differentiating between using the ethical terms in their absolute and relative senses. Using these terms in a relative sense is applied to their ethical using. The author intention is to show, that using ethical terms in this way is not contradictory to Hume's thesis. If ethics avoided using its terms in their absolute senses, the validity of Hume's thesis would not imply the rejection of its cognitive claim.
16

THE ROLE OF THE “PRIVATE” IN INTER-GENDER MISUNDERSTANDING

70%
Beran O.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2017
|
vol. 24
|
issue 2
142 – 165
EN
In this paper, the author uses Wittgenstein’s private language argument for reflecting on some folk-linguistic misconceptions. In Section 1, he shows that elements of the private language semantics inform common ways of looking at some situations referred to as “misunderstandings”. He suggests that it would be appropriate to conceive of the alleged misunderstandings as practical attitudes of mistreatment. This suggestion is explored in Section 2, which is devoted to a commonly assumed prominent example of the problem: the so-called inter-gender misunderstanding. It is believed that men and women use language in systematically different ways, as a result of which they do not understand each other properly, because they miss what their interlocutors “mean”. The conceptual apparatus of mentalist semantics presumed here is abused in order to advocate morally reprehensible actions against women. In Section 3, the author suggests that the Wittgensteinian accounts of language and mind offer arguments for denying private conceptions of understanding on the grounds of both philosophy of language and ethics.
17

POTREBUJEME PRI VYMEDZOVANÍ SOCIÁLNYCH FENOMÉNOV NEVYHNUTNE POJEM PRAVIDLA?

70%
Sedová T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2012
|
vol. 67
|
issue 7
582 – 591
EN
The paper discusses the concept of rule and its role in understanding and defining social facts. On the background of the main objections against Winch’s conception of rule as the necessary and sufficient means for identifying a social phenomenon (M. Hollis, J. Bohmann, M. Gilbert) it questions the analogy between the linguistic activity, the Wittgensteinian conception of meaning and conceiving of agency as a meaningful social activity.
18

ZÁMĚR WITTGENSTEINOVA TRAKTÁTU (2): KORESPODENCE

70%
Glombíček P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2014
|
vol. 21
|
issue 4
516 – 530
EN
The article presents a second part of an interpretation of the intention of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. The intention itself used to be considered a rather marginal topic until so called new-Wittgenteinian interpretations. The present article considers main sources to show what kind of content we can ascribe to the book. Its aim is to prove that Tractatus is not purely practical exercise, however, without stripping the book of its therapeutic side. This second part continues with interpretation of Wittgenstein’s correspondence with Russell, Frege, Ficker and comes to the conclusion for both parts considering mutual relation of all the sources.
19

Říká logicismus něco, co se říkat nemá?

70%
Kolman V.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
|
2010
|
vol. 32
|
issue 1
37-57
EN
The objective of this paper is to analyze the broader significance of Frege's logicist project against the background of Wittgenstein's philosophy from both Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. The article draws on two basic observations, namely (1) that Frege's project aims at saying something that was only implicit in everyday arithmetical practice, as the so-called recursion theorem demonstrates, and (2) that the explicitness involved in logicism does not concern the arithmetical operations themselves, but rather the way they are defined. It thus represents the attempt to make explicit not the (arithmetical) rules alone, but rather the rules governing their following, i.e. rules of second-order type. I elaborate on these remarks with short references to Brandom's refinement of Frege's expressivist and Wittgenstein's pragmatist project.
20

“CO JE DOSAŽITELNÉ ZE ŽEBŘÍKU, MĚ NEZAJÍMÁ”. ANALÝZA A KRITIKA RESOLUTNÍ INTERPRETACE LOGICKO-FILOSOFICKÉHO TRAKTÁTU

70%
Došek T.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 2
222 - 250
EN
This paper surveys a new approach to interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – the resolute reading. The proponents of the resolute interpretation (especially Cora Diamond and James F. Conant) have argued that the central point of Tractatus is § 6.54. The reading of the section should be resolute, which means that the sentences in Tractatus are simply nonsense. Thus the Tractatus’ aim is not a theory or doctrine of aspects of reality, language or their relation. On the other hand, the main point of the text should be elucidation of the reader’s points. The paper analyses two assumptions in the resolute reading and submits criticism of them. The basis of the criticism is to verify the validity of resolute reading’s assumptions by reference to Notebooks, Prototractatus, correspondence and some manuscripts and typescripts from the Tractatus period in Wittgenstein’s thinking.
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