The article interprets the not of "common sense" as presented in the works of Thomas Reid. The focus is not primarily on Reid's epistomology or metaphysics or even on the history of the notion or its influence. Rather, the article is strictly concerned with Reid's use of the term. The notion is considered vague by some interpreters and it is confused with the "principles of common sense". The "principles of common sense" play the role of axioms in the model of the human mind that Reid is aiming at, and thanks to that they play the role of criteria since they are the rules of our thinking. We must only distinguish them from widely-shared prejudices. The "principles of common sense" are propositions believed by every healthy adult who understands the propositions in question, considering them without any prejudice. They are integrated into the structures of different languages, they hold up against explicit criticism, and the acceptance of these propositions does not have any absurd consequences. By the term "common sense", on the other hand, Reid understands the faculty of judgment in the area of sensory experience.
The author offers a critical commentary on the point 2b of the Constitutional Tribunal judgment of 7 October 2021, K 3/21. The Tribunal claims that issuing court verdicts on the basis of the provisions which are not binding, having been revoked by the Sejm and/or ruled by the Constitutional Tribunal, is inconsistent with Art. 2, 7, 8(1), 90(1), and 178(1) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court reconstructs the mentioned above jurisdiction of the courts based on the Art. 19(1), second subparagraph, of the Treaty on European Union. The author doesn’t agree with this statement and argues that the Tribunal incorrectly and unlawfully interprets the provisions of the Treaty. Furthermore, the verdict is in contrary to Art. 2 and 42 of the Polish Constitution and the principle of non retroactivity of law. Moreover, the Tribunal’s decision violates the concept of the Constitutional Tribunal judicature with the deferred clause. The author claims that the Tribunal’s decision does not cause any legal effects and the courts in Poland will not apply it during resolving cases.
In all kinds of ways the idea of judgement has fallen under suspicion in recent times, and opportunities to exercise it have become fewer. It has suffered from being confused with judgmentalism, and from the assumption that it amounts to little more than subjective whim or preference. In the public services of the UK, and especially in education, it has been steadily eliminated by micromanagement and the insistence on tightly specified criteria, for example for assessment, and centrally detailed curricular schemes of work. The growth of neoliberalism, in which judgement becomes replaced by choice, has contributed to these developments. I argue that while the use of judgement does not constitute judgmentalism it cannot be practised in a moral vacuum, and that the exercise of moral judgement is more ubiquitous in our daily lives than is generally acknowledged. Finally I argue that opportunities for judgement and interpretation work to give our lives meaning, and that understandings of the nature of education that are implied by prevalent models of educational research, especially Randomised Controlled Trials and the insistence that educational research should be focused on discovering ‘what works’, further marginalise judgement and the making and discovery of meaning.
This article is devoted to linguistic ways of conceptualizing fragments of reality, which are subject to description in the texts of jurisdictional documents. The author answers the question whether the verbal form of expression corresponds to the convention of the official document. Based on the results of the research, the author identifies the causes, objectives and effects of using selected categories of speech.The research method used was a pragmatic analysis. The textual samples were analyzed using the functional concept. The result of the research is the thesis that the language of court judgments is a combination of the three: legal language, jurisprudence language and doctrinal language. It was also a source of a communicational poly- morphism. The analysis showed that the style of speech in this case was determined on the one hand by the legislative acts, on the other – by the general and individual pragmatics of the court process.
In the author’s view, the judgment of the FCC concerning activities of the European Central Bank regarding the primacy of EU law over national law is of significance, due into the authority of the German constitutional court. However, it does not translate directly to foreign conditions. The view expressed in the judgment is that the ultra vires doctrine forms limits to the principle of primacy of European Union law over member state law. As a result, the principle of primacy may only be binding within the scope of the European Union law. Moreover, criteria of assessment of EU’s legislative activity and ECJ’s jurisprudence are drafted from the perspective of the ultra vires doctrine.
According to the author, the FCC judgment should not have direct financial and economic effects either in the euro area or for Poland. The execution of the FCC judgment is conditional and will depend on institutional arrangements. However, even if the Bundesbank complies with the judgment, the effects will probably be significantly limited or even eliminated as part of the Eurosystem’s activities.
Germany is a democratic state of law that respects human rights. As a member of the Council of Europe, in 1952 it implemented into its domestic law the European Convention on Human Rights - an international document on universal protection of human rights adopted by the Council of Europe. The aim of the article is to analyze whether and to what extent German citizens filed individual complaints to the European Court of Human Rights over the past nine years (2006-2014). The article seeks to answer the question if the German system of human rights protection is effective. One of the indicators of effectiveness is the number of complaints brought from Germany to the ECtHR in relation to the number of inhabitants and also compared to the total number of complaints from the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. The analysis will cover statistics on the number of judgments in German cases before the Court in Strasbourg issued between 2006 and 2014. This will be helpful in determining the degree and the type of violations by the German state of the human rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights.
The publication deals with Art. 145a § 1 of the Law on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts, introduced with the amendment of 9 April 2015. Article 145a § 1 of the Law on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts gives the administrative courts a power to impose on public administration bodies an obligation to issue a decision or a resolution of a specific content in a set time. Hence, a judgment of an administrative court based on the new regulation has an indirect character of a decision on merits. Although the judgment does not substitute an administrative act, it offers binding requirements for the contents of the administrative act and a set date for its issuance. The aim of this publication is to analyse the prerequisites of applying the new regulation and the manner in which the new regulation has been applied by the administrative courts up to date. The analysis then turns to de lege lata conclusions. The considerations also touch upon the problem of compliance of the new regulation with Polish Constitution. In spite of some critical voices, the new regulation should be positively assessed in terms of its realisation of the rule of procedural economy and for safeguarding the individuals’ legitimate interests through speeding up the possibility of obtaining a substantive administrative decision. There is, however, a need for a more frequent application of the new regulation by administrative courts.
The article deals with criminal law characteristics and imposition of punishment for offenses in the field of implementation and maintenance of ordinary activity of bodies of inquiry, pre-trial investigation, prosecutor’s office, and court. The research analyzes the fundamentals of establishing criminal liability for particular socially-dangerous acts. The tasks of the present publication encompass methodologically correct preparation of a judgment in cases of offenses against justice which would contain a response to asserted claims, satisfy parties to the case, and be skillfully drafted meeting relevant requirements.
The paper addresses the issues of the model of proceeding for granting a consent to voluntary submission to liability. An attempt was made to show the features of the consensual model of proceedings and an analysis was made of the basic condition of “payment of a public-law receivable” starting the negotiation procedure on other conditions specified in Article 146(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The last part of the article contains some remarks relating to the judicial proceedings with emphasis on the “benefit” for the accused in the form of a judgment in which the court allows for voluntary submission to liability – it is not entered in the National Criminal Register and it does not constitute a condition for fiscal recidivism.
Author considers if Article 4241 § 1 of Civil Proceedings Law is contrary to Basic Law, when it reduces possibility of placing plaint for identifying inconsistency with law of valid court decision in case when ,by its rendering, only one litigant suffered a damage. Law mentioned previously indicates that demanding of identifying inconsistency with law of valid court decision of second instance ending proceedings in process, is possible if by its rendering, litigant suffered a damage and a change or repeal of the judgement by tenable legal means wasn’t and is still not possible. Author shows that mentioned law doesn’t warrant placing a plaint to identify inconsistency with law of valid court decision, in case when by its rendering damage wasn’t done to litigant, but to assigned proxy representing litigant.
The burden of proof is a major part of the way in which the litigant in Polish civil procedure goes to favorable judgment for him or her. It may be difficult in certain situations therefore, the lawgiver introduced the presumptions. On the other hand, civil procedure has also evidence obstructions, particularly applied to the evidences named by the Code of Civil Procedure. This article shortly introduces the issue associated with it.
Symbolika światłości i ciemności, dobrze znana autorom Starego Testamentu, występuje szczególnie często w Ewangelii Janowej. Podczas gdy łatwo jest odgadnąć, że dla Jana symbol światła odnosi się do działania Chrystusa w świecie, trudniej jest dokładnie sprecyzować symbolikę – zdecydowanie negatywną – ciemności; opinie komentatorów są bardzo podzielone. Biblijny obraz światła łączy w sobie nierozdzielnie wymiar poznawczy i moralny, światło pozwala poznać Boga, wskazuje drogę do Niego, a zarazem odsłania prawdę o ludzkich czynach, dlatego sprawcy zła unikają światła, ukrywając w mroku swoje czyny. W teologii Janowej męka Jezusa jest ukazana jako czas działania ciemności, jednak jej zwycięstwo jest tylko pozorne i bardzo krótkie: po nocy męki nadchodzi świt zmartwychwstania.
EN
The symbolism of light and darkness, well known to the authors of the Old Testament, appears particularly often in the Gospel according to St. John. While it is relatively easy to guess that for the writer the symbol of light represents the active presence of Christ in the world, it is much harder to identify precisely the symbolism – undoubtedly negative – of the darkness. On this point commentators have differed very much in their opinions. The biblical image of light joins inseparably a cognitive dimension and a moral one: the light allows us to get to know God, marking the way to Him, and at the same time reveals the truth of human deeds. That is why evildoers avoid the light, hiding their deeds in darkness. In the theology of St. John, the Passion of Christ is presented as a time when darkness prevails, yet its victory is only a brief illusion. Following the night of Passion, the dawn of the Resurrection approaches.
The text interprets the particular concepts in Aristotle’s work which present themselves as candidates for being the counterpart to the modern concept of common sense, and it introduces them in their mutual relatedness. Aristotle works with the term endoxos, particularly in his logical and rhetorical texts, which he uses for statements and persons which are recognised in a given community. In epistemology he works with the term koiné aisthésis in connection with perception as such. The author points to a third concept, which Aristotle, thanks to his work in physiology, has a general ability to perceive, and which belongs to ethics: this is fronésis In an interpretation of fronésis there is also a place for the last directly relevant concept – orthos logos. Aristotle’s conception of conduct, which he sometimes interprets with the help of a so-called practical syllogism, displays the role of recognised statements as the typical general premisses in these syllogisms, and the role of persons recognised for their fronésis as the measure of the determining criteria for what is good conduct.
CS
Text vykládá jednotlivé pojmy, které v Aristotelově díle představují kandidáty na protějšek moderního pojmu zdravého rozumu, a uvádí je do vzájemné souvislosti. Především v logických a rétorických textech Aristotelés pracuje s termínem endoxos, který používá pro výroky a osoby, které jsou v daném společenství uznávány. V epistemologii pracuje s termínem koiné aisthésis v souvislosti s vnímáním jako takovým. Autor poukazuje na vazbu, kterou u Aristotela díky jeho práci ve fyziologii má obecná schopnost vnímat třetí klíčový pojem, který patří do etiky, totiž na fronésis. V rámci výkladu fronésis má místo také poslední bezprostředně relevantní pojem – orthos logos. Aristotelova koncepce jednání, jež Aristotelés vykládá někdy pomocí tzv. praktického sylogismu, pak ukazuje na roli uznávaných výroků jako typických obecných premis v těchto sylogismech a roli osob uznávaných pro svou fronésis jako měřítek určujících kritéria pro to, co je dobré jednání.
As several studies, along with a book and movie depicting the true story of a former clinic director, have recently brought to the public’s attention, fetal ultrasound images dramatically impact some viewers’ normative judgments: a small but non-negligible proportion of viewers attribute increased moral status to fetal humans and even form the belief that abortion is impermissible. I consider three types of psychological explanation for a viewer’s shift in beliefs: (1) increased bonding or empathy, (2) various forms of cognitive bias, and (3) type of cognitive processing involved. I consider the normative implications of each explanation, arguing that in each case the viewer’s judgment is presumptively rational.
Originative apprehension often has been examined in recent decades in light of Aquinas’ reflections. Yet there has not always been agreement in regard to what constitutes such, often due to different emphases given by interpreters to aspects of St. Thomas’ analyses articulated in different contexts. Arguably, it is possible to reconcile certain seemingly divergent important interpretations by reflecting on an important, yet somewhat recessive, theme that Thomas adverted to sparingly throughout his career in utilizing analyses of predecessors to forge his own synthesis to explain cognition in terms of being that is centered on the reciprocal priorities of judging and concomitant incomplex abstracting.
The concepts of value, valuing, and judging are often found to be problematic. Heidegger believes that assigning value reifies and subjectivizes that which exists. But perhaps we should differentiate between the concepts of valuing, i.e., assigning value, and judging. To note and acknowledge a value, e.g., an aesthetic value in which the artwork participates and which is given in the experience of the work of art, is not the same as to impose that value in advance, or take a relativizing or reductive approach. The article is supplemented by tables of values taken from Roman Ingarden’s aesthetics and art theory, as well as from the experience of artists – painters and architects.
The statement ‘the way up is the way down’ may imply that the spiritual way to perfection lies through humility. It may however also apply to the physical world that is the source of such spiritual metaphors, and within which the actions play out of fictional characters who themselves serve as metaphors for real ones. I will argue that both meanings apply to both of these films, with a comparison between the two films enabling one to employ Malaparte’s explicit prohibition of a Christ-like position to make apparent a similar prohibition that is only implicit in Kieślowski’s film. Such physical movements provide an appropriate topography for the concern with judgment, knowledge, revenge, isolation and humiliation embodied in the male protagonists of the two films. In each case, the protagonists’ eventual divestment from programmes of judgment and revenge may be related to the prohibition Malaparte formulates explicitly: that upon human re-enactment of the Christ-like position that is the one of judgment. Here a destructive and self-destructive movement downwards, in the sense of dehumanization and extreme isolation, is countered eventually by a downward one that, in fact, leads upwards through an embrace of the humiliation of inaction. The paper examines various ways in which the object of both texts is to rediscover a ‘we’ that is rather one of solidarity than complicity.
The paper intends to initiate a discussion on the politico-liberal concept of judgment. It is argued that whilst political liberalism (PL) – presented as an account of political objectivity – already appeals to judgment, this conception is an unsatisfactory one. This critical assessment is supported by the juxtaposition of PL with an Arendtian understanding of political objectivity which offers a more robust account of judgment. In the conclusion, the possibility of applying the Arendtian solution to PL is outlined.
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