These days, the Federal Republic of Germany is a continental power with ambitions to conduct foreign, security and defence policy in a global dimension. In the future, these policies will evolve towards a more open and dynamic demonstration of the country’s own national interests. Yet, it must gain support for its European partners from broad segments of German society, not only among the political and financial classes. Europe and the world will have to come to terms with a situation in which Germany will conduct more “German-oriented” policy, augmenting efforts to widen its influence in the regional and global dimensions.
Whereas much has been said about the reasons behind Poland’s path to the euro, it has been less common to consider the potential interest in eurozone enlargement among its current members, such as Germany. This article offers an overview of possible, mainly economic, rationales that might explain the engagement of incumbents in expanding the common currency area. Abandoning traditional cost-benefit analyses and adopting other frameworks, such as improved competitiveness, cooperation processes or group interactions (games) might be alternative methods to analyse such interests.
Since the beginning of David Cameron’s rule in the United Kingdom (2010) Eurosceptic sentiments have intensified, leading to a split in society, a referendum and, finally, Brexit. Germany was for the UK remaining in the EU, but after the referendum Germany announced the EU would negotiate hard to have its conditions met. Germany decided that Brexit provided favorable prospects for enhancing cooperation among the remaining 27 states. The most difficult negotiating items concern financial settlements between London and Brussels (ca. EUR 60 billion), the status of EU citizens employed and residing in the territory of the UK, and the North Ireland-Irish Republic border. The negotiations of a new trade agreement between the EU and the UK are also difficult.
30. rocznica zjednoczenia Niemiec pozwala z dystansu ocenić skutki polityczne, społeczne i międzynarodowe procesów, które zachodziły w tym czasie w RFN.
Germany is currently a very interesting example of co-existence of different cultures and nations. Among 82 millions of the country's inhabitants 8,5% does not admit to be of German nationality. Whatis interesting is that Germany regards only Frisians, Danes and Serbs as minorities. All other ethnic groups living in FGR do not have the status of national minority. Despite not having such status, there are many more or less official organizations gathering the representatives of each nationality. Some of them are of cultural, other of religious character, some of them are classified as groups and extremist organizations. Among the extremist organizations there are distinguished three groups: Islamic, left-hand extremist and nationalistic. It is characteristic, that mostly are those organizations branches of groups from other countries.
The AfD’s performance in the European Parliament reflects its status as an absolute beginner. Not only is the party a newcomer on the European stage but it also has only been in existence for two years. The party has managed formal integration as a political group of its choosing, but it is not enough to become a fully-fledged member of the ECR. Internal quarrels concerning AfD’s ideological positions will foster its image as a controversial party. Such confrontations are nothing unique at the early stage of a new party, but if the competition between the wings escalates it will shatter the party’s federal reach, or even sink it completely.
Is the German public eventually to wake up to “debating Europe”? What impact will the European campaign have on the new coalition government? How can the Social Democrats match their ambition of changing the majorities in the EU with their performance as part of a coalition at home? And how do the other German parties place themselves in the run for the 96 German seats in the European Parliament? This paper will show that, actual turnout and results of the European elections aside, the drive of the Lisbon Treaty has started to Europeanise political parties in the German national context.
In recent years, Germany’s role within the European Union, especially the eurozone, has been depicted as dominant and even hegemonic. Its doses of austerity have been largely criticized. The article scrutinizes the European policy of the new grand coalition. While Germany plans to holds to its stances on reform and budgetary discipline in order to stabilize the euro, it has announced that it will play an enhanced role on the international and European stages. The first signs of increased engagement can indeed be observed in Germany’s contributions to resolve the ongoing Ukraine crisis. The EU, however, is facing additional challenges that call for a strong, pro-integrationist German role.
Several months ago the European Union and the United States started negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The agreement would lead to an integrated economic area between the parties. The talks, however, have been more difficult than anticipated. Germany is increasingly critical of TTIP, even though theoretically it would be among the partnership’s biggest beneficiaries. The article attempts to explain the scepticism of Germany, focusing on economic arguments and in particular its specific approach to economic growth and competition mechanism.
Remaining outside the euro area while the European Union undergoes deep changes is not optimal. Poland aspires to the elite club, but it is far from clear when this might happen. At the same time, there is a perceived risk of Poland’s marginalisation as the integration of the eurozone progresses. Poland sees Germany as a key factor in its efforts to secure inclusiveness and cohesion in the European project. In these circumstances, it is worthwhile to reflect on the German perspective on Poland’s adoption of the euro and its impact on bilateral relations.
In the past the basic issue at the core of the German question was that Germany had not been able to come to terms with its status quo. It wanted either a better place in the sun, more living space (Lebensraum, as it was called during the Nazi era), or merely national unity, justice, and freedom—in a peaceful way. For Germany to achieve any of those goals, Europe’s political framework would have had to be changed completely. But today, the opposite is true. Since the end of the last century, Germany has settled in so well into the status quo that its role in European and foreign politics has evolved. However, the euro crisis and the Russian crisis have undermined the foundations of this status quo and as a result have raised a new German question. The country that has shaped the status quo and has adjusted to it as no other has now faces the challenge of overcoming the status quo.
During the Eurocrisis, Germany has provided and sustained policy leadership sequentially: first nationally, then together with France and finally in conjunction with the European Central Bank. While attempting to establish legitimate and effective crisis management institutions based on the principle of conditioned support, the Merkel government’s crisis response was driven by cross-cutting role expectations from domestic actors, i.e. the Federal Constitutional Court and the exposed German banks, as well as external role demands by Eurozone members, the ECB and international financial market actors.
In the paper the author analyses the main issues related to the leadership of Germany in the EU in the 2010s. Among them are the financial crisis in the euro zone, the weakening of the Franco-German engine of European integration, the crisis in Ukraine and the prospects for Grexit and Brexit. He indicates that the Germans, although quite reluctantly, are taking advan- tage of an economic situation which is favourable for them and have taken the position of un- questionable leader in the European Union.
Industry 4.0 is associated with the Internet of Things, Internet of Services, and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). This revolution is profoundly transforming the current business models. There is a growing interest in this phenomenon among scholars, policy makers and representatives of business and industry as it poses several challenges to the national legal systems, labour markets and technical capacities. Yet little is known about the international context of the fourth industrial revolution. This paper aims at bridging the gap in this respect. Drawing on the Polish-German case it identifies the research areas worth considering and advances a hypothesis on economic ties in the context of Industry 4.0. The author outlines the premises of the fourth-generation industry, diagnoses and discusses the main risks and benefits associated with it. The paper might be regarded as a starting point for further, more detailed studies on this topic.
Tomasz Morozowski, Współkształtowanie globalizacji. Polityka Republiki Federalnej Niemiec wobec mocarstw wschodzących po 2004 roku, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań 2022, 462 pages (book review)
The author of this paper analyzes the policy of strategic partnership between Germany and Russia, especially in the field of the economy, which originated after the reunification of Germany in 1990. He stresses that it was the government of Angela Merkel after 2005 that began to emphasize the authoritarian rule of President Vladimir Putin and human rights breaches in Russia. Nevertheless, economic cooperation continued under the pressure from business circles. The author’s main hypothesis is that it was only Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine that undermined German-Russian collaboration, which is no longer given priority. Germany is the foremost advocate of the EU’s maintaining its sanctions against Russia. Angela Merkel’s third and fourth governments have tried to ‘Europeanize’ Germany’s policy towards the Russian Federation to a greater extent. Both Germany and the EU need Russia as a strategic partner to resolve problems in the Middle East and combat international terrorism. Russia is also a significant supplier of strategic resources to Germany and the EU. This paper employs the descriptive research method, the method of source analysis and decision-making analysis.
The article discusses the priorities and strategies implemented by the Sorbian minority after the reunification of Germany to safeguard its national interests. The political changes‑unification of both German states accelerated and forced conversion of the structure and organization within the minority. Sorbian minority gained the ability to build pluralistic organizational structures based on democratic legal solutions. In the public debate, set objectives and targets to achieve. Postulated among others: ensuring national rights, the protection of the territory of Lausitz, the creation of a new federal state “Lausitz”, an objective assessment of national policy pursued by the SED to the Sorbs. Domowina – the main organization of the Sorbs, held responsible for the processes of assimilation made has been restructured. Currently, it performs the role of a representative of the interests of national minorities, but does not participate in political participation and has no effect on the allocation of financial grant by the provinces on business organizations and institutions of minorities. Not all identified as strategic priorities in 1990 so far implemented‑the process is still open.
The paper takes stock of the economic policy balance sheet of the era Angela Merkel. It analyzes to what extent the positive economic indicators of her chancellorship is related to principles of economic policy Ludwig Erhard stood for and explains Merkel’s economic policy choices from a public choice perspective. The study shows that economic policy under Angela Merkel has drifted increasingly away from the legacy of Ludwig Erhard’s free market policy towards socially and ecologically motivated interventionism. It is contended that Germany’s current positive economic development is, therefore, actually the result of the labour market reforms of the previous chancellor Gerhard Schröder and the undervalued euro. The paper argues that Angela Merkel’s policy choices have been favoured by the incentives structure of the political system and the prevalence of the widespread belief of the population in the need and good of market regulations and redistribution. Yet, because of their stifling effects on economic dynamism these policies make Germany increasingly ill-equipped to tackle urgent economic challenges.
The author analyzes the results of the election for the Bundestag with special emphasis on the ongoing changes in the German party system. The elections of September 24, 2017 brought about significant changes on the German political scene: a strong representation of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) made its debut in the Bundestag, six factions have formed in the parliament, the position of the great Volksparteien (CDU/CSU and SPD) has weakened, while the middle-sized parties (AfD, FDP, Die Linke and The Greens) have gained in strength. This is an effect of the growing fragmentation and polarization of the German party system. Such an election outcome caused problems with forming a stable federal government. In the author’s opinion, the results of the last election for the Bundestag were heavily influenced by the migration crisis, which deepened and accelerated the processes underway in the German party system and contributed to a good result of the anti-immigrant AfD.
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