Представленный том «Политологических исследований» посвящен политическим процессам, происходящим в государствах Восточной Европы, очевидным проблемам и существующим тенденциям в данной области. В сборнике акцентируется внимание как на правовых рамках государственного устройства стран указанного выше региона, так и на существующей там конституционной практике, включая конституционное правосудие. В данном аспекте в доктрине конституционного права возникают фундаментальные дилеммы, на которые еще до недавнего времени не обращалось особого внимания. В чем же заключается актуальность судебного контроля правовых актов в контексте разделения власти? Как он воздействует на нее? Возможно, практика конституционных судов приобрела характеристики, до этого времени соотносимые с парламентом? Приобрели ли конституционные суды черты верхних парламентских палат в процессе создания законов? В доктрине постсоветских государств, в частности, Российской Федерации четко указывается на нормативный характер решений конституционных судов. Они вызывают последствия, аналогичные нормативным актам. Таким обра- зом, являются существенным фактором, модифицирующим традиционно воспринимаемое разделение власти.
Comparative research of the case-law of constitutional courts concerning the membership of a given state in the EU (referred to in the article as “European” case-law of constitutional courts) requires taking into account various contexts in which this case-law is involved. The aim of this article is to indicate and analyze the most important of them, namely: the systemic context, the temporal context, the political context (including related problem of the politicization of the constitutional court), and the theoretical context. Moreover, the article draws attention to the necessity to contextualize “constitutional borrowings”, which acquires special meaning in connection with the perceived phenomenon of abuse of the “comparative argument”. Sometimes the distinguished contexts overlap, for example in the case of the temporal context and political context, but their separation allows for a better understanding of the complexity of comparative research on the European acquis constitutionnel. The specificity of this subject of legal-comparative research proves the correctness of the thesis that the contemporary constitutional comparative law must face several challenges. The first is the integration of the classical “horizontal” comparative method with the “vertical” dimension related to the influence of international and supranational norms on national constitutional systems. The second challenge is related to supporting an interdisciplinary approach to comparative constitutional law, which will take into account the perspective of social sciences, such as political science, sociology or history. The third challenge, then, is related to establishing the right balance between focusing on specific (not only) legal issues related to the analyzed issue and taking into account a broader vision of the directions of changes in European constitutionalism. The fourth challenge, in turn, concerns the popularization of the results of scientific research related to comparative studies of the “European” acquis constitutionnel. The last (and perhaps the most difficult) challenge facing the comparative research of “European” case law of constitutional courts is an attempt to answer the question to what extent this diverse jurisprudence conglomerate is a manifestation of the stability of constitutional law and the constitution, and to what extent it is a driving force for dynamic changes in contemporary public law.
This article concerns constitutional problems related to the implementation of EU directives seen from both the legal and comparative perspectives. The directives are a source of law which share a number of characteristic features that significantly affect and determine the specificity of Member States’ constitutional review of the directives as well as the legal acts that implement them. The review of the constitutionality of EU directives is carried out in accordance with the provisions of national implementing acts. Member States’ constitutional courts adopt two basic positions in this respect. The first position (adopted by, inter alia, the French Constitutional Council and German Federal Constitutional Court) is based on the assumption of a partial “constitutional immunity” of the act implementing the directive, which results in only a partial control of the constitutionality of the implementing acts, i.e. the acts of national law implementing such directives. The second position, (adopted, explicitly or implicitly by, inter alia, the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court, Czech Constitutional Court, Polish Constitutional Court, Romanian Constitutional Court and Slovak Constitutional Court) concerns the admissibility of a full review of the implementing acts. This leads to the admissibility of an indirect review of the content of the directive if the Court examines the provision as identical in terms of content with an act of EU law. Another issue is related to the application of the EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review. The French Constitutional Council case-law on review of the proper implementation of EU directives represents the canon in this regard. Nonetheless, interesting case studies of further uses of EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review can be found in the case law of other constitutional courts, such as the Belgian Constitutional Court or Spanish Constitutional Court. The research presented in this paper is based on the comparative method. The scope of the analysis covers case law of the constitutional courts of both old and new Member States. It also includes a presentation of recent jurisprudential developments, focusing on the constitutional case-law regarding the Data Retention Directive and the Directive on Combating Terrorism.
The issue of the relations between the European Court of Justice and the constitutional courts of the Member States is a topic of great importance. The latest proof of that is the PSPP judgement of the German Constitutional Court. It has also shown what might happen if judicial dialogue is abandoned. The aim of the paper is to consider the consequences of the PSPP judgement as well as to analyse the conditions for the restoration and development of trust between the courts. The author presents the concept of ultra vires which has been used by the German Constitutional Court. In subsequent parts of the paper, the discussion focuses on the PSPP judgement and the surrounding scholarly debate and points out the consequences for both sides of the dispute. In the author’s opinion, the PSPP saga may, under some conditions, have positive implications for judicial dialogue.
Judicialization of politics has been analyzed in a number of theoretical papers. The book of Stone and Shapiro from 1995, based on empirical descriptions of individual states, had been the first source of inquiry in this respektive field. However academic literature in Europe – and in the Czech Republic – soon started analyzing the excessive influence of the judiciary through descriptions of interpretative methods. This approach gives the impression of judicialization as a fact without being properly verified. Some reasons for judicialization lie in the plurality of legal sources, but it is not clear which other phenomena lead to it.
CS
Judicializace politiky je analyzována v řadě teoretických prací. Prvními zdroji v tomto směru byly práce autorů Stona a Shapira, které vycházely z empirického popisu jednotlivých států. Poté však odborná literatura v Evropě – podobně jako v České republice – rozebírá nadměrné ovlivňování politiky soudy prostřednictvím zdrojů interpretačních metod ústavních soudů. Tento způsob dává vzniknout dojmu o realitě judicializace, aniž by ji verifikoval. Důvody pro judicializaci spočívají v pluralitě právních pramenů, není však vyzkoumáno, jaké další společenské jevy k ní vedou.
The paper deals with the ban on full-face veil known as niqab. The primary focus of this paper is the decision of Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court from the year 1996 which dealt with the ban of niqab in public schools by the minister of education. The Supreme Constitutional Court had to undergo an analysis of alleged violation of Articles 2 and 41 of the Egyptian’s constitution, i. e. article which states that principles of shari’a are the main source of the legislation and an article which guarantees the preservation of personal freedom, by issuing the decisions by minister of education on the matter of school uniforms (not only) for girls in public schools. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the relationship between shari’a and constitutional law on the example of niqab ban and the argumentation of the Supreme Constitutional Court, which came to the decision that banning the full-face veil in schools is in accordance with provisions of the Constitution. The debate on niqab in schools and universities in Egypt is ongoing and the recently lounged campaign calling for a ban on niqab in all state institutions is seen by a part of the Egyptian society as highly controversial.
CS
Příspěvek se zabývá zákazem zahalení tváře známým jako niqáb. Primárně se soustředí na rozhodnutí egyptského Ústavního soudu z roku 1996, které se týkalo zákazu niqábu ve veřejných školách ministrem pro školství. Ústavní soud musel zkoumat domnělé porušení článku 2 a 41 egyptské ústavy, tj. článku, který stanovuje, že principy šarícy jsou hlavním zdrojem zákonodárství, a garantuje ochranu osobní svobody tím, že ministr školství vydal právní předpis upravující otázku školních uniforem (nejen) dívek ve státních školách. Cílem příspěvku je ukázat vztah mezi šarícou a ústavním právem na příkladu zákazu niqábu a argumentace Ústavního soudu, který dospěl k rozhodnutí, že zákaz zahalení tváře ve školách je v souladu s ústavou. Debata o niqábu ve školách a univerzitách v Egyptě stále pokračuje a nedávno byla spuštěna kampaň volající po zákazu niqábu ve státních institucích, což je považováno částí egyptské společnosti za velmi kontroverzní.
Domestic legislation and international instruments designed for the protection of human rights provide for general clauses allowing limitations of rights and freedoms, e.g. public morals. A preliminary analysis of the case-law leads to the observation that both national courts and the European Court of Human Rights, when dealing with cases concerning sensitive moral issues, introduce varied argumentation methods allowing them to avoid making direct moral judgments and relying on the legitimate aim of protecting morality. In the article the Authors analyse selected judicial rulings in which moral issues may have played an important role. The scrutiny is done in order to identify and briefly discuss some examples of ways of argumentation used in the area under discussion by domestic and international courts. The identification of the courts’ methods of reasoning enables us in turn to make a preliminary assessment of the real role that the morality plays in the interpretation of human rights standards. It also constitutes a starting point for further consideration of the impact of ideological and cultural connotations on moral judgments, and on the establishment of a common moral standard to be applied in cases in which restriction on human rights and freedoms are considered.
The article’s research aims to answer whether constitutional identity (as well as numerous doctrinal studies concerning constitutional identity) may substantially help solve problems regarding the relationship between European law and national law. The article discusses the hypothesis that the identity and the studies multiply doubts and uncertainty rather than answer the pragmatic questions in constitutional law. The author deals with identity as a social construct and convention created by academics and constitutional courts. Identity belongs primarily to the dictionary of academic language. It is rarely used in normative acts, in particular in constitutional provisions. The constitutional identity seems to be also vague and controversial for the author. Nevertheless, studies on identity may – as the article suggests – realise at least one (constitutionally important) aim. It is a better self-consciousness of constitutional law scholars, which may help them – at the end of the day – to discuss the relationship between European law and national law in more and more precise terms.
Preliminary reference to the CJEU is one of the most important achievements of the EU law. In the multicentric legal system it becomes a kind of guarantee to ensure a uniform interpretation of the EU law by courts of the Member States. However, not only is preliminary ruling an aid for judges, who adjudicate cases connected with EU law, but also it might create a possibility for individuals to have their EU rights protected. Unfortunately, EU law does not predict any effective measure, which would protect individual, when a court of the Member State unlawfully refuses to make a preliminary reference. An interesting phenomenon is an attempt to fill this gap by the European Court of Human Rights and constitutional courts of the Member States (especially the German Federal Constitutional Court) in recent years. In their case law, refusing to make a preliminary reference by courts, which are obligated to do that, was qualified as a violation of the right to a fair trial (ECHR) or the right to a lawful judge (constitutional courts). The aim of this article is to consider hitherto situation and to discuss it from the perspective of Polish law.
Preliminary reference to the CJEU is one of the most important achievements of the EU law. In the multicentric legal system it becomes a kind of guarantee to ensure a uniform interpretation of the EU law by courts of the Member States. However, not only is preliminary ruling an aid for judges, who adjudicate cases connected with EU law, but also it might create a possibility for individuals to have their EU rights protected. Unfortunately, EU law does not predict any effective measure, which would protect individual, when a court of the Member State unlawfully refuses to make a preliminary reference. An interesting phenomenon is an attempt to fill this gap by the European Court of Human Rights and constitutional courts of the Member States (especially the German Federal Constitutional Court) in recent years. In their case law, refusing to make a preliminary reference by courts, which are obligated to do that, was qualified as a violation of the right to a fair trial (ECHR) or the right to a lawful judge (constitutional courts). The aim of this article is to consider hitherto situation and to discuss it from the perspective of Polish law.
The current constitutional dispute on the selection of judges of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic stimulates questions on the strengths and weaknesses of various selection models as well as the criteria, with the help of which they can be identified. This paper analyzes the case of judicial selection for the Slovak Constitutional Court from the perspective of the existing selection models. It considers the sources of legitimacy that these models provide to the successful judges as the condition of functioning of individual models. These sources are conceptualized through the degree of involvement of all political actors in the selection process and the ability to generate qualified candidates with a chance to succeed in the selection regardless of the changing political context. The analysis of models is based on the classification criteria of (1) the number of actors involved and (2) the degree of accountability and independence, that they provide to the candidates and which are understood as necessary conditions for generating qualified candidates. The findings are supported with data from the constitutional systems that apply the particular models. Criticizing the absolutization of any model without paying attention to the political context, the study argues that the consensual parliamentary model and the split model have greater potential to increase the legitimacy of constitutional judges than the parliamentary majoritarian model and the collaborative model. With respect to the Slovak Republic, the research shows that its current selection model entails a legitimacy deficit that could be partially overcome by the adoption of the split model or the consensual parliamentary model.
SK
Prebiehajúci ústavnoprávny spor o vymenovanie sudcov Ústavného súdu Slovenskej republiky natíska otázky silných a slabých stránok, ktoré jednotlivé modely výberu sudcov skrývajú, ako aj kritérií, na základe ktorých ich možno identifikovať. Štúdia analyzuje prípad výberu sudcov Ústavného súdu Slovenskej republiky v perspektíve existujúcich modelov výberu.Za určujúce kritérium funkčnosti jednotlivých modelov považuje zdroje legitimity, ktoré sú jednotlivé modely schopné zabezpečiť úspešným sudcom. Tieto zdroje konceptualizuje prostredníctvom miery zastúpenia hlavných politických aktérov v menovacom procese a schopnosti vygenerovať kvalifikovaných kandidátov so šancou uspieť vo výbere bez ohľadu na variabilný politický kontext. Analýza modelov na základe klasifikačných kritérií 1) počtu zapojených aktérov a 2) miery zúčtovateľnosti a nezávislosti, ktorú poskytujú kandidátom a ktoré sú chápané ako nevyhnutné podmienky pre generovanie kvalifikovaných kandidátov, prináša nové zistenia potvrdené dátami z ústavných systémov, ktoré tieto modely využívajú.Odmietajúc absolutizáciu výhod akéhokoľvek modelu nezohľadňujúcu politický kontext, štúdia argumentuje, že parlamentný model s paritným zastúpením aktérov a rozdelený model majú väčší potenciál navýšiť legitimitu ústavných sudcov než parlamentný model s väčšinovým zastúpením a kolaboratívny model.Vo vzťahu k Slovenskej republike ukazuje, že súčasný model obsahuje legitimačný deficit, ktorý by čiastočne prekonalo zavedenie rozdeleného modelu alebo paritného parlamentného modelu.
After the accession of several Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union in 2004, new challenges arose for their highest judicial institutions to define and shape the relationship between the national and European legal order. This paper assesses the first decade of the effort of the Slovak Constitutional Court (SCC) in interpreting the relationship between domestic and EU law via applying the concept of constitutional pluralism which presumes a specific relationship between the legal orders characterized by their heterarchical structure, mutual interaction and cooperation rather than of a hierarchical, monistic structure, governed by clash over dominance. Answering the research question how the SCC has positioned itself vis-à-vis the constitutional monism v. pluralism dilemma can offer an insight on the general relationship between domestic and EU law in Slovakia. By analysing statutory law, selected judgments and reviewing secondary literature, the paper argues that the SCC seems to have chosen the monistic, hierarchical approach to the relationship, having rejected constitutional pluralism. At the same time, this position is not articulated clearly enough due to the veil of secrecy that to some extent still prevails over the SCC’s doctrinal attitudes to EU law. The findings of the paper, which combines conceptual analysis of constitutional pluralism with review of relevant legal provisions and case law, demonstrate the need for a more active and straightforward approach of the SCC when dealing with the challenges of EU law.
The dynamic development of judicial review of the constitutionality of laws in the second half of the twentieth century is reflected in contemporary theories of judicial review. They go beyond the original axis of the dispute over the legitimacy of judicial review, which was shaped by the counter-majoritarian dilemma, and often become more nuanced. In addition to arguments related to the conceptions of institutional cooperation and accountability function of judicial review, rights-based theories of judicial review take on more and more importance. The aim of this article is to outline a wide range of issues related to the protection of fundamental rights, which protection is considered as an argument in the dispute over the legitimacy of constitutional courts. The study presents selected issues that influence the current discourse on judicial review, which include: types of such judicial review; types of arguments used in the analysed discourse; the link between fundamental rights and various concepts of democracy; and judicial review of legislative decisions concerning positive rights guarantees.
PL
amiczny rozwój sądowej kontroli konstytucyjności prawa w drugiej połowie XX wieku, znajduje swoje odbicie we współczesnych teoriach legitymizacji judicial review. Wychodzą one poza pierwotną oś sporu, którą kształtował tzw. dylemat kontrwiększościowy i stają się często bardziej zniuansowane. Poza argumentami związanymi z koncepcjami współpracy międzyinstytucjonalnej oraz rozliczalności władzy coraz większego znaczenia nabierają również argumenty związane z ochroną praw podstawowych i oparte na ich tzw. rights-based theories of judicial review. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie zarysu bogatej problematyki związanej z ochroną praw podstawowych rozpatrywaną jako argument w sporze o legitymizację sądowej kontroli konstytucyjności prawa. W opracowaniu zostały przedstawione wybrane zagadnienia, które wpływają na obecny stan dyskursu dotyczącego legitymizacji sądów konstytucyjnych. Są to kwestie: pojęcia i form sądowej kontroli konstytucyjności; typów argumentów stosowanych w analizowanym sporze; powiązania zagadnienia ochrony praw podstawowych z określoną koncepcją demokracji oraz kontroli konstytucyjności decyzji ustawodawczych dotyczących gwarancji tzw. praw pozytywnych.
Constitutional courts, in order to perform their function of the constitutional review, should be independent of the creator of that law. Independence can be operationalized as a mechanism for filling and changing the composition of courts as defined in the legislation, and also as a difficulty in changing these rules. In this perspective one can describe the extent of independence of the Polish constitutional court against the background of courts in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It can be said that there is a field to increase the independence of the Polish court, eg by increasing the diversity of entities entitled to fill the court or by introducing regular rotation in the positions of the judges at specific dates (instead of individual mandates). But the greatest degree of court independence threatens, compliant with constitution or unconstitutional interference in the composition and constitutional court system, done in the interest of the ruling majority that makes this interference.
PL
Sądy konstytucyjne, by wykonywać swą funkcję kontroli konstytucyjności prawa powinny być niezależne od podmiotów stanowiących to prawo. Niezależność można zoperacjonalizować jako mechanizm obsadzania i zmiany składu sądów określony w przepisach, a także jako stopień trudności zmiany tych przepisów. W tej perspektywie można opisać zakres niezależności polskiego sądu konstytucyjnego na tle sądów w innych państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Można stwierdzić, że jest pole do zwiększenia niezależności polskiego sądu, np. poprzez zwiększenie różnorodności podmiotów uprawnionych do obsadzania składu sądu czy wprowadzenie regularnej rotacji na stanowiskach sędziów w określonych terminach (w miejsce kadencji indywidualnych), jednak w największym stopniu niezależności sądu zagraża zgodna lub niezgodna z konstytucją ingerencja w skład i ustrój sądu konstytucyjnego, dokonywana w interesie większości rządzącej, która dokonuje tej ingerencji.
The aim of the article is to present the comparative view of the political position of the constitutional courts in three states of the Eastern Europe: Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The author discussed the circumstances of creating the model of the constitutional judiciary within the period of Soviet Union and then the characteristics of modern constitutional courts in the said countries was presented. The following aspects were compared: constitutional basis of constitutional judiciary functioning, the legal definitions of the constitutional courts, the entitled bodies to appear in court, the presence of the constitutional complaint institution, the scope of courts competence, criteria and the mode of selecting the judges. The major differences as to functioning of these bodies were indicated, including its limited role in the political system in Belarus and its increasing role in Ukraine which ought to be related to ongoing democratic reforms.
PL
Celem artykułu jest zaprezentowanie w ujęciu porównawczym pozycji ustrojowej sądów konstytucyjnych w trzech państwach Europy Wschodniej: Białorusi, Ukrainie i Mołdawii. Autor omawia okoliczności kształtowania się modelu sądownictwa konstytucyjnego w okresie Związku Radzieckiego, następnie zaś cechy współczesnych sądów konstytucyjnych w wymienionych państwach. Porównano następujące kwestie: konstytucyjne podstawy funkcjonowania sądownictwa konstytucyjnego, definicje legalne sądów konstytucyjnych, podmioty uprawnione do występowania przed sądem, obecność instytucji skargi konstytucyjnej, zakres kompetencji sądów, kryteria i tryb wyboru sędziów. Wskazano na istotne różnice w funkcjonowaniu tych organów, w tym jego ograniczoną rolę w systemie ustrojowym Białorusi oraz rosnącą rolę na Ukrainie, co należy wiązać z toczącymi się demokratycznymi reformami.
The paper deals with real functioning of the judicial power and the limits of its independence facing authoritarian state. The author offers a skeptical analysis of the past and especially of the future of the judiciary (not only) in Central Europe. After a brief historical excursion before the late 1940s (i. e. before the rise of the communist rule) the attention is shifted on the development of the judiciary within the three decades after the fall of the communist rule. In this context the paper deals with different models of the administration of the judiciary and shows how they function under normal democracy and under the conditions of emerging authoritarianism. It shows different perspectives of the judiciary in common law and civil law and different potentials of resisting the authoritarians. Finally it shows future possibilities and demarcates typology of judiciary in authoritarian and totalitarian states.
CS
Článek se zabývá reálným fungováním soudní moci a limity její nezávislosti v podmínkách autoritativního státu. Autor nabízí skeptické zamyšlení se nad minulostí, a především budoucností soudnictví nejen ve střední Evropě. Po stručném historickém exkurzu před rok 1948 se pozornost přenáší na vývoj justice během prvních tří dekád po pádu komunistického režimu. V tomto kontextu rozebírá rozdílné modely správy soudnictví a ukazuje, jak se tyto modely mohou projevit v normálních demokratických podmínkách a jak v podmínkách vznikajícího autoritativního státu. Ukazuje též rozdílné perspektivy angloamerického a kontinentálního soudnictví a rozdílnou schopnost soudců v různých právních kulturách čelit hrozbě autoritářského režimu. Konečně pak nastiňuje vyhlídky do budoucnosti a pokouší se vymezit typologii modelů fungování justice v autoritativních a totalitárních režimech.
The principle of the primacy of European Union law is one of the most important and, at the same time, the most controversial principles of this law. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice pointing to the absolute primacy of EU law, even over national norms of constitutional character, is not unconditionally accepted by the Member States. They are challenged in particular by constitutional courts, which want to retain the status of a last word court, reserving the right to assess the constitutionality of EU law at least in terms of fundamental rights, acting within the limits of competences conferred in the Treaties and the protection of fundamental constitutional identity. Recently, there are more and more judgments of constitutional courts that refuse to apply EU law, and the allegations against the priority principle are often financial or political. Denying the principle of priority, which is an exception, as in the case of the Czech, German or Danish, in some cases, especially Poland, becomes a rule that allows, under the misuse of constitutional identity, to lower the standard of legal protection resulting from EU regulations.
PL
Zasada pierwszeństwa prawa Unii Europejskiej jest jedną z najważniejszych, a jednocześnie najbardziej spornych zasad tego prawa. Orzecznictwo Trybunału Sprawiedliwości wskazujące na bezwzględny prymat prawa unijnego, nawet przed normami krajowymi rangi konstytucyjnej, nie znajduje bezwzględnej akceptacji wśród państw członkowskich. Kwestionują je zwłaszcza sądy konstytucyjne, które chcą zachować status sądu ostatniego słowa, zastrzegając sobie prawo do oceny zgodności prawa unijnego z konstytucją co najmniej pod kątem praw podstawowych, działania w granicach kompetencji powierzonych i ochrony nienaruszalnej tożsamości konstytucyjnej. Ostatnio coraz częściej pojawiają się wyroki sądów konstytucyjnych, które odmawiają stosowania prawa unijnego, przy czym zarzuty wobec zasady pierwszeństwa mają nierzadko podłoże finansowe lub polityczne. Odejście od zasady pierwszeństwa, mające charakter wyjątku, jak w przypadku czeskim, niemieckim czy duńskim, w niektórych przypadkach, zwłaszcza Polski, staje się regułą, pozwalającą pod przykrywką zachowania tożsamości konstytucyjnej na obniżenie standardu ochrony prawnej wynikającej z przepisów unijnych.
Obecnie często wzywa się sądy administracyjne oraz trybunały konstytucyjne do stosowania prawa międzynarodowego. Wykonując to zdanie, balansują one na cienkiej granicy, szukając równowagi pomiędzy prawem i politykami krajowymi a prawem międzynarodowym, którego źródłem bywają orzeczenia trybunałów międzynarodowych takich jak Międzynarodowy Trybunał Sprawiedliwości. Taka sytuacja często pojawia się w przypadku sądów państw członkowskich UE, do czego dochodzi jeszcze „zeuropeizowane” prawo międzynarodowe tworzone przez Trybunał Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej oraz Europejski Trybunału Praw Człowieka. W artykule przeanalizowano wyzwania stające przed trybunałami konstytucyjnymi i sądami administracyjnymi w państwach członkowskich UE, które muszą stosować publiczne prawo międzynarodowe, międzynarodowe prawo praw człowieka oraz międzynarodowe prawo prywatne. Omawiając każdy z tych obszarów, autor przywołuje rzeczywiste i hipotetyczne przykłady jak też studia przypadków, podkreślając potencjalne obszary sporne oraz miejsca konwergencji w orzecznictwie. Wykorzystując swoje ustalenia, kreśli „mapę drogową” dla sędziów w państwach członkowskich UE, która ma im pomóc w manewrowaniu na międzynarodowych wodach prawnych i w wysiłkach zmierzających do zapewnienia jak najwłaściwszej równowagi pomiędzy prawem krajowym, przepisami unijnymi oraz decyzjami odpowiednich trybunałów regionalnych i międzynarodowych.
EN
In present times, administrative and constitutional courts are called upon to apply international law. Approaching this task, they must perform a delicate balancing act between national law and domestic policies and international law, the latter sometimes originating from rulings of international tribunals such as the International Court of Justice. This is even more the case for courts in EU Member States, adding to the equation “Europeanised” international law as laid down by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights. The article analyses these challenges faced by constitutional and administrative courts in EU Member States when they need to apply public international law, international human rights law and private international law. Discussing each field, the author refers to real and hypothetical examples and case studies, highlighting potential points of conflict and convergence between the relevant case law. Utilising the findings of the analysis, the paper offers a road map for judges in EU Member States to navigate the international legal waters as they seek to achieve the most appropriate balance between domestic law, EU law and decisions of relevant regional and international tribunals.
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