PL EN


2006 | 53 | 2 | 7-23
Article title

THE DYNAMIC COURNOT DUOPOLY GAME

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
This paper attempts to describe an evolutionary game theoretic model of Cournot competition. Every discrete time period a large population of firms is matched in pairs randomly to play a Cournot duopoly game. The authoress assumes the firms to act according to behavioral rules. A behavioral rule specifies the quantity to be produced in current period as a function of past observation. That behavioral rules are costly to operate. The cost depend on the informational and computational requirements of implementing the rule. Each firm chooses a behavioral rule from a finite set of different rules, which are commonly known. A firm takes into account the past realized profits of the costs associated with the behavioral rules. The model of dynamic Cournot duopoly game is described by non-linear evolutionary dynamical system. The authoress focuses on two specifications of Cournot duopoly game: linear and linear-quadratic and shows that bifurcation routes complicating dynamics occur in a linear-quadratic model due to which fact strange atractors arise.
Year
Volume
53
Issue
2
Pages
7-23
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • E. Drabik, Szkola Glówna Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie, Katedra Ekonometrii i Informatyki, ul. Nowoursynowska 166, 02-787 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
06PLAAAA01573442
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.051b101a-d005-34f9-a490-5223a00383a5
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