WILLIAMA ROWE'S BAYESIAN ARGUMENT FROM EVIL AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSEMENT (Williama Rowe'a bayesianski argument ze zla przeciwko istnieniu Boga)
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The aim of this article is to present the Bayesian formulation of the argument from evil for atheism in the context of the contemporary debate on Rowe's initial inductive formulation of the argument. At first the author presents the key premises and the basic elements of the Bayesian formulation (esp. Bayes' theorem, the notion of epistemic probability, etc.). Then he discusses the most important challenges to Rowe's claims, both weak and strong. The main problem with the Bayesian formulation of the argument is that it does not accomplish what it was intended for: it fails to avoid the confrontation with skeptical theism. The latter has to be refuted in order to save Rowe's argument (no matter which formulation we take into account, the inductive or the Bayesian). It seems that the debate about Rowe's evidential argument from evil has reached a deadlock - more and more analytic philosophers of religion claim we should return to the logical formulation of the problem of evil.
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