PL EN


2007 | 14 | 1 | 49-52
Article title

EXPRESSIBILITY AND TRUTHMAKER MAXIMALISM: A PROBLEM

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Advocates of 'truthmaker' theory (like David Armstrong) regularly postulate both maximalism (that every truth has a 'truthmaker') and expressibility (that any truth can be expressed in a proposition). The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that these two theses are inconsistent, and hence that we must abandon one of them if we are to preserve 'truthmaker' theory.
Contributors
  • J. Jeremy Wisnewski, Department of Philosophy, Hartwick College, Oneonta, NY 13820, USA
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
07SKAAAA02244703
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.9687f6b5-8b4b-30f4-8248-452c848ec56d
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