PL EN


2006 | 15 | 4(60) | 193-205
Article title

Emotions as a moral Sanction in Mill's and Hume's Philosophy

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The utilitarianism of J.S. Mill is similar in some respects to the moral philosophy of David Hume. In both theories the idea of emotional sources of moral experience is derived from empirical epistemology; in both theories emotions operate as sanctions of moral choices and moral acts. However as Mill's normative preferences are quite clear, Hume's position is a descriptive one: he only analyses human nature and psychological aspects of moral choice without adopting any axiological standpoint. It seems also interesting to compare the idea of justice, as a so-called social virtue, in Hume's theory with the same idea in Mill. The two philosophers recognize its deep psychological roots and its important role in everyday moral life.
Contributors
author
  • J. Gornicka, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
07PLAAAA02425039
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.9b58e9ee-7ec0-38f2-aea7-161b69b3eb21
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.