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2020 | 27 | 4 | 494 – 503
Article title

FALSIFICATIONISM AND THE PRAGMATIC PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Authors
Content
Title variants
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EN
Abstracts
EN
I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s proposed solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.
Contributors
  • 13 Sandhurst Road, Yeovil, Somerset, BA20 2LG, United Kingdom
References
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Publication order reference
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-0b7821ab-4b3e-4cdc-9dc8-53492c3900a1
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