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2013 | 20 | 1 | 50 – 71
Article title

EMPIRICKÁ VÝZVA FILOSOFICKÉMU POJETÍ MYSLI

Authors
Content
Title variants
EN
Empirical challenge to the philosophical conception of mind
Languages of publication
CS
Abstracts
EN
The article reflects on influential views of the mind that come from cognitive science and seem to undermine the traditional philosophical view that the mind is simply unified and transparent to itself. Specifically, the modularity thesis is presented, along with its important modifications and criticisms, suggesting that the apparent unity can be ascribed only to higher cognition, if at all. Various theories of why the mind seems to be unified while being composed of autonomous modules are discussed. The overview results in the conclusion that our linguistic capacity plays a prominent role in the unity of the mind.
Contributors
author
  • Ústav filosofie a religionistiky, Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy, Nám. J. Palacha 2, 116 38 Praha, Czech Republic, martin.vrany@gmail.com
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-86393b32-f2c5-44e5-82a9-e132c17a3d96
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