PL EN


2020 | 23 | 7-34
Article title

Hurdles and obstacles in moneta- ry policy communication. A model for the communication between the central bank and market

Content
Title variants
PL
Utrudnienia i bariery w komunikacji w polityce pieniężnej. Model komunikacji między bankiem centralnym a rynkami
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Central bank communication has become an essential part of monetary policy in recent years. Against the background of the zero interest rate policy, conventional monetary policy instruments have lost their effectiveness, and the management of market participants’ expectations by means of appropriate communication has become an essential part of monetary policy. In this paper a new model of the communication process between the central bank and financial market players is elaborated, in particular exploring the obstacles and hurdles in the transmission of information from sender to recipient, empirical data are also reported for several stages of the new model. For efficient expectation management, both the selection of information by the central bank as well as the transmission path of this information is important as indirect communication can lead to information distortions. Last but not least, the recipients of the information, as people with a limited capacity and variable readiness to absorb it, play a central role in determining what information actually reaches them. Appropriate communication that takes these obstacles and the recipients’ psychology into account can thus significantly increase the efficiency of monetary policy.
PL
Komunikacja banku centralnego stała się w ostatnich latach istotną częścią polityki pieniężnej. Wobec polityki zerowych stóp procentowych konwencjonalne instrumenty polityki monetarnej straciły na efektywności, a zarządzanie oczekiwaniami uczestników rynku za pomocą odpowiedniej komunikacji stało się istotną częścią polityki pieniężnej. W artykule opracowano nowy model procesu komunikacji między bankiem centralnym a uczestnikami rynku finansowego, w szczególności badając utrudnienia i bariery w przekazywaniu informacji od nadawcy do odbiorcy. Przedstawiono również dane empiryczne z kilku etapów nowego modelu. Dla efektywnego zarządzania oczekiwaniami ważny jest zarówno wybór informacji przez bank centralny, jak i ścieżka ich transmisji, ponieważ komunikacja pośrednia może prowadzić do zniekształceń informacji. I wreszcie, odbiorcy informacji, jako osoby o ograniczonych zdolnościach i zmiennej gotowości do ich przyswajania, odgrywają centralną rolę w określaniu, jakie informacje faktycznie do nich docierają. Odpowiednia komunikacja, uwzględniająca te przeszkody i psychologię odbiorców, może zatem znacznie zwiększyć efektywność polityki pieniężnej.
Year
Issue
23
Pages
7-34
Physical description
Contributors
  • FOM University of Applied Sciences, Germany
  • FOM University of Applied Sciences, Germany
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-06228051-4f07-47ce-9ab7-3135ffa2f276
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