PL EN


2011 | 49 | 3 | 43-55
Article title

Czy Uwaga Ekstensywna Jest Świadoma? o Relacjach Uwagi i Świadomości w Kontekście Teorii Stanów Uwagi

Content
Title variants
Is Extensive Attention Conscious? An Essey on Relationships Between Attention and Consciousness in the Context of Attention States Theory
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
PL
Relacja uwagi i świadomości jest jednym z najczęściej dyskutowanych problemów teoretycznych poruszanych w literaturze dotyczącej poznawczych podstaw świadomości. W dotychczasowych badaniach najczęściej przyjmowano założenie, zgodnie z którym uwaga jest niezbędnym warunkiem uświadomienia. Takie ujęcie może być jednak problematyczne, jeżeli przyjmiemy, że dostęp do świadomości ma charakter stopniowalny. Jeżeli bowiem możemy być w różnym stopniu świadomi, to nie jest pewne z jakim stopniem świadomości miałaby być związana uwaga. Obszar analiz jeszcze bardziej komplikuje przyjęcie założeń teorii stanów uwagi Kolańczyk. W proponowanym artykule omówimy konsekwencje przyjęcia założeń tej teorii dla opisu relacji pomiędzy uwagą i świadomością. Interesować nas będą przede wszystkim stany osłabionego dostępu do świadomości i uwagi nie skoncentrowanej (ekstensywnej). Analizie poddane zostaną wyniki badań neurobiologicznych, w których opisuje się stany uwagi podobne do stanu uwagi ekstensywnej, a także związek tych stanów ze świadomością. Omówimy również teoretyczne konsekwencje proponowanego ujęcia teoretycznego dla rozważań dotyczących funkcji uwagi i świadomości.
Year
Volume
49
Issue
3
Pages
43-55
Physical description
Dates
published
2011-01-01
online
2012-05-17
Contributors
  • Instytut Psychologii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński
  • Instytut Psychologii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.doi-10_2478_v10167-010-0026-8
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