PL EN


2010 | 58 | 5 | 675-686
Article title

K Heideggerově koncepci výpovědi a pravdy

Content
Title variants
EN
On Heidegger’s Conception of Statement and Truth
Languages of publication
CS
Abstracts
EN
This paper contributes to the discussion of Heidegger’s conception of statement which rejects the classical understanding of it as being the automatic place of truth and reveals it to be a phenomenon rooted in much deeper hermeneutical and, above all, temporal structures. The article systematises Heidegger’s conception of the three conditions for the untruthfulness of a statement in relation to its primary, that is apophantic, function. The conclusion is a fundamentally ontological conception of the statement which can be applied to the traditional dispute between Russell and Strawson about the statement the current king of France is bald. Fundamental ontology also reveals how the starting point of this dispute is incorrect. If one had to say that one said was right, however, truth would be closer to Russell and not to Strawson, as it is generally thought nowadays.
Keywords
EN
Year
Volume
58
Issue
5
Pages
675-686
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.eeee3954-783d-448d-97c5-08b8ca7b58fe
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