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2019 | 26 | 2 |
Article title

What’s the Point of Silent Blame?

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EN
Abstracts
EN
In this article I thoroughly examine Miranda Fricker’s account of blame based on Communicative Blame as a paradigm explanation of the practice by focusing my attention on a non-central case: silent blame. I argue that this kind of instance has not been successfully connected with her selected paradigm case so I propose a different “focal meaning” or rationale to better accommodate it as part of the entire range of cases of the practice of blaming. I begin my argument drawing upon Herbert L.A. Hart’s methodology on central and borderline cases as a more accurate way to address the complex structure of the concept of blame, since this approach is sensitive to borderline cases as well. I also argue that, although marginal, silent blame fulfils a purpose which must too be vindicated. Thus, following Hart’s suggestion on the value of studying borderline cases, I propose a more accurate reframing of the general point of the practice of blame as a mechanism to secure respect for ourselves.
Year
Volume
26
Issue
2
Physical description
Dates
published
2019
online
2019-12-28
Contributors
author
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_17951_k_2019_26_2_7-23
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