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This article provides an overview of the Obama administration’s policies in the Middle East. At the outset, its priorities were to reduce the American role in the region and promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The Arab Spring introduced a number of new and novel issues that the administration had to confront. For the most part, Obama failed to reach his goals, so the final section seeks to contextualize and explain those failures.
PL
W artykule dokonano analizy polityk administracji prezydenta B. Obamy wobec Bliskiego Wschodu. Od samego początku ich priorytetem była redukcja roli USA w regionie oraz promowanie pokoju między Izraelczykami a Palestyńczykami. Arabska Wiosna przyczyniła się do powstania wielu nowych, wcześniej nie występujących wyzwań, z którymi musiała się zmierzyć administracja. Prezydent Obama nie osiągnął większości swoich celów, a wyjaśnienie kontekstu i przyczyn tych niepowodzeń zawarto w podsumowaniu artykułu.
EN
This study identifies and describes a general policy pattern common to French and American interveners in Vietnam as well as Soviet and American interveners in Afghanistan. Each employed political tactics at first and, after their failure, military tactics that also failed. Each intervener then sought a diplomatic solution to its dilemma, a goal that it achieved, but the diplomatic outcome masked the larger failure of each of the interventions.
EN
This study identifies the attitudes and initial policies common to the British, French, American, and Soviet interveners in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan and links those attitudes and polices to the ultimate defeat of each of these interveners.
PL
Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim
EN
This article reviews American policy toward Syria since the onset of its civil war there. It concentrates on debates and decisions about the use of American military power to influence events there. Before 2014, President Barack Obama consistently refused to use military power and, while he did initiate military action against the Islamic State in the summer of 2014, many in and out of the administration thought he should do more. This article identifies reasons for Obama’s hesitance and argues that some of his pre-2014 fears about using military power have been realized in later years.
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This study argues that the United States should not support the creation of safe havens/no fly zones in Syria. It does not have fundamental national interests in the Syrian civil war, the use of American military power to protect civilians has many risks, and any effort to create no-fly zones diverts American attention and resources from the battle against the Islamic State. There is also no guarantee that safe havens actually provide safety to those inside them.
PL
W niniejszym artykule stwierdzono, że Stany Zjednoczone nie powinny wspierać tworzenia bezpiecznych przystani / nie ma stref w Syrii. Nie ma fundamentalnych interesów narodowych w wojnie domowej w Syrii, używanie amerykańskiej siły militarnej w celu ochrony cywilów ma wiele zagrożeń, a wszelkie wysiłki na rzecz utworzenia stref lotnych odbijają amerykańską uwagę i zasoby z walki z islamskim państwem. Nie ma też gwarancji, że bezpieczne schronienie rzeczywiście zapewnia bezpieczeństwo tym, którzy są w środku.
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